Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Sanchez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute more than five grams of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841, 846, and was sentenced to 262 months in prison, based on an enhancement for having “maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance,” U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12). He had used his residence to distribute drugs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting procedural arguments and holding that the enhancement merely changed the penalty for already-illegal conduct and did not implicate the ex post facto clause. View "United States v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff left his senior position in 1996, having participated in the Retirement Income Security Plan for Employees (RISPE), a tax-qualified defined benefits plan that guarantees specified retirement benefits, and in the Excess Benefit Plan, a defined unfunded benefits pension plan under which benefits are paid directly by the employer rather than by a trust funded by the employer. Both plans allowed him to choose between an annuity and an actuarial equivalent lump sum distribution. In 2009 he received his RISPE lump sum, $325,054.28 and his Excess Plan lump sum, $218,726.38. The discount rate used to calculate lump sum RISPE benefits was a “segment rate,” 26 U.S.C. 417(e)(3)(C), of 5.24 percent. The discount rate applied to the Excess Plan lump sum was 7.5 percent. The district court rejected his ERISA claim that the discount rate required by both plans was a rate computed by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation on the basis of annuity premiums charged by insurance companies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. With respect to the RISPE, the accrued benefit, which cannot be reduced retroactively, is the annuity; the lump sum is not the accrued benefit and can be reduced retroactively. The court rejected a conflict-of-interest argument concerning calculation of the Excess Benefit Plan discount rate. View "Dennison v. MONY Life Ret. Income Sec. Plan for Emps." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an active genealogist and animal rights activist, claimed that her name had commercial value and that search engines generated revenue as a result of internet searches of her name. She specifically alleges that various features of Google’s search engine violate her right of publicity by using her name to trigger sponsored links, ads, and related searches to medications, including Levitra, Cialis, and Viagra, all of which are trademarks of nationally advertised oral treatments for male erectile dysfunction. The district court dismissed her suit alleging common law misappropriation and violation of the state right-of-privacy law, Wis. Stat. 995.50(2)(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing the public interest and incidental use exceptions. View "Stayart v. Google Inc." on Justia Law

Rodriquez entered the U.S. illegally in 1988 and came to the attention of the Department of Homeland Security in 2005, following a misdemeanor DUI conviction. He subsequently pleaded guilty to using a fraudulent social security card, 18 U.S.C. 1546(a). He sought cancellation of removal based on hardship to his children, who are U.S. citizens, but failed to timely comply with the IJ’s request for biometrics. The IJ deemed the petition abandoned and ordered removal, after which Rodriguez provided the information. Following a remand, DHS notified the BIA that Rodriguez had been removed. BIA withdrew the remand. The Seventh Circuit remanded. An IJ then held that Rodriguez was ineligible for cancellation of removal, based on his conviction of a crime of moral turpitude (8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C)). The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, holding that fraudulent use of a social security card is a crime involving moral turpitude. View "Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Hudson filed suit in an Illinois district court under the Federal Tort Claims Act, charging that medical personnel at a federal prison in Kansas, where he had been incarcerated, had negligently failed to diagnose a blood clot in his leg and that, as a result, he experienced serious health problems. The government moved to transfer the case to the federal district court in Kansas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1404(a), on the ground that the principal witnesses are in Kansas and that the Kansas court has a lighter caseload. The district court granted the motion. Hudson has petitioned the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the case should remain in Illinois because he lives here, as do his current treating physicians, who will testify about his current health problems and causation. His Illinois relatives will also testify to his continuing health problems. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, noting that about two-thirds of the witnesses are closer to Kansas, that the medical records are in Kansas, and the ease of electronic communications. View "Hudson v. Baker" on Justia Law

Engel was convicted in 1991in Missouri state court for a drug-related kidnapping and was sentenced to 90 years in prison. In 2010 the state’s highest court vacated the conviction, based on the state’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence that a police investigator had paid a key witness to testify. The state declined to retry him and Engel was released after 19 years in prison. He sued the police department, the United States, individual officers, and the FBI agent claimed to have fabricated evidence. The district court denied the FBI agent’s motion to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding a “Bivens” action is available for “Brady” violations and that qualified immunity did not apply because the Brady obligations at issue were well-established at the time of the events at issue. View "Engel v. Buchan" on Justia Law

Hale, former head of a racist church, was convicted of putting a contract on the life of a federal judge who ruled against the church in a trademark case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court then rejected Hale’s habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hale defaulted claims relating to the trial judge excluding him from a portion of jury selection that dealt with pretrial publicity concerning Hale’s praise of an individual who shot at least 11 people belonging to minority groups. Hale’s lawyer agreed that inquiries would best be made out of Hale’s presence and Hale did not raise the issue on direct appeal. With respect to a claim of ineffective assistance, the court noted that lawyers are forbidden to use peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors based on race and it that it would not second-guess trial counsel’s choice to defend by claiming entrapment or that Hale’s instructions to kill the judge were a misunderstanding. View "Hale v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2006 a coal-mining company borrowed $7 million from Caterpillar secured by mining equipment. The company was also indebted to Peabody, for an earlier loan, and at Peabody’s request, transferred title to the same equipment, subject to Caterpillar’s security interest, to a Peabody affiliate. In 2008, Peoples Bank lent the mining company $1.8 million secured by the same equipment and filed a financing statement. Wanting priority, the bank negotiated a subordination agreement with Peabody. After the mining company defaulted, the bank obtained possession of the assets and told Caterpillar it would try to sell them for $2.5 million. Caterpillar did not object, but claimed that its security interest was senior. The bank sold the equipment for $2.5 million but retained $1.4 million and sent a check for $1.1 million to Caterpillar. Caterpillar neither cashed nor returned the check. The district court awarded Caterpillar $2.4 million plus prejudgment interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The bank’s claim of priority derives from its dealings with Peabody. The bank did not obtain a copy of a security agreement for Peabody’s loan; a security interest is not enforceable unless the debtor has authenticated a security agreement that provides a description of the collateral. View "Caterpillar Fin. Servs. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

Turner was charged with distributing cocaine base premised on sales of crack cocaine to an undercover police officer, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Hanson, the crime laboratory chemist who analyzed the substances obtained by the officer, was on maternity leave at the time of trial. Over Turner’s objection, the supervisor who reviewed her work, Block, testified as an expert, opining based on Hanson’s data that the substances contained cocaine base, that Hanson had followed standard procedures, and that he reached the same conclusion as to the nature of the substances. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Turner’s conviction, rejecting a Confrontation Clause claim. The Supreme Court vacated. On remand, the Seventh Circuit again affirmed the conviction. To the extent Block testified about anything that Hanson did or concluded, his testimony may have violated the Confrontation Clause, but any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Apart from Block’s testimony, there was other evidence indicating that the substances were crack cocaine, and Turner did not contest the issue. The bulk of Block’s testimony was permissible: the government could establish through Block’s expert testimony what the data produced by Hanson’s testing revealed concerning the substances, without having to introduce Hanson’s documentation of her analysis or Hanson’s testimony. View "United States v. Turner" on Justia Law

Sanchez sued her employer for sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Before trial, Sanchez accepted an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, which permits a defendant to serve on an opposing party “an offer to allow judgment on specified terms, with the costs then accrued.” If the offer is rejected and the “judgment that the offeree finally obtains is not more favorable than the unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the offer was made.” The district court entered judgment in Sanchez’s favor but denied her request for attorney fees and costs in addition to the amount specified in theoffer. The employer’s offer said that it included “all of Plaintiff’s claims for relief” but made no specific mention of costs or attorney fees. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the Rule 68 offer was silent as to costs and fees, so costs and fees were not included. Offers of judgment under Rule 68 are different from contract offers; plaintiffs who receive Rule 68 offers are “at their peril whether they accept or reject a Rule 68 offer.” Therefore, any ambiguities are resolved against defendants. View "Sanchez v. Prudential Pizza, Inc." on Justia Law