Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Johnson Controls, a Wisconsin manufacturer of building management systems and HVAC equipment, and Edman Controls entered into an agreement giving Edman exclusive rights to distribute Johnson’s products in Panama. In 2009, Johnson breached the agreement by attempting to sell its products directly to Panamanian developers, circumventing Edman. Edman invoked the agreement’s arbitration clause. The arbitrator concluded that Johnson had breached the agreement and that Edman was entitled to damages. Johnson sought to vacate or modify the arbitral award, challenging the way in which the award took account of injuries to Edman’s subsidiaries and the arbitrator’s alleged refusal to follow Wisconsin law. The district court ruled in Edman’s favor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and upheld the district court’s award of attorney fees. View "Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Edman Controls, Inc." on Justia Law

Bracey, an inmate at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility, was injured in a 2005 altercation with officers after refusing to exit his cell as requested by officers executing a random search. Two days later, Bracey filed a complaint claiming that an officer “viciously attacked” him; by the time he notified the prison that tapes of the incident probably existed, the tapes had been recorded over. Bracey filed suit in 2010 alleging that corrections officers used excessive force and spoliation in failure to download and preserve video from the prison security cameras. Bracey requested court assistance in recruiting counsel, 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(1). The district court concluded Bracey had made adequate efforts to find counsel but found the allegations sufficiently straightforward and Bracey sufficiently competent to handle the case himself. It denied a motion to compel disclosure of information relating to the destruction of the videotapes and denied requests for spoliation sanctions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Bracey did not meet his burden of establishing a duty to preserve the videotape and destruction of that video in bad faith. View "Bracey v. Grondin" on Justia Law

In 2003, Congress created Health Savings Accounts to help people with high-deductible health plans save for health care costs by providing tax-preferred treatment for money saved for future medical expenses, 26 U.S.C. 223. Banas and others started a company that created a suite of software products that allowed savers to manage their Health Savings Accounts online. By 2009, the company had more than 100 employees. Venture capital and private equity firms thought the company was a solid investment and bought stock, but the company had provided counterfeit financial documents and had even “faked” customer calls. The owners started raiding clients’ Health Savings Accounts. By the time Banas and Blackburn were stopped, they had misappropriated more than $18,000,000 in client funds. Banas admitted his guilt, accepted responsibility for his actions, and has worked to secure some degree of restitution. The district judge sentenced Banas to 160 months of imprisonment for wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, well below the Guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, particularly noting the impact of the crime on victims. View "Unted States v. Banas" on Justia Law

Tompkins began working in 1978 and was a participant in the Fund, a multi-employer pension fund established and administered under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001. In 1999, Tompkins was granted a disability pension based on chronic asthmatic bronchitis, which he attributed to working with cement dust for 22 years. Tompkins’s application included agreement to be bound by all the Fund’s rules and regulations, although he did not inquire about those rules or make any effort to find out what they were. Upon receiving his first monthly payment of $2,115.43, he was required to sign a Retirement Declaration that provided notice of disqualifying employment for plan participants receiving retirement pensions but did not include the rules and regulations specific to disability pensioners. In 2007, the Fund suspended his disability pension, claiming that his full-time employment in 2005 and 2006 indicated that he no longer met the definition of “total and permanent disability.” The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Fund. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the Fund acknowledged ambiguity, it based its decision on a reasonable interpretation. View "Tompkins v. Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were riding in the family’s 1978 station wagon in 2007, in heavy rain with limited visibility. Williams, a recently hired substitute letter carrier for the Postal Service, was in a postal truck, parallel parked on the side of the road with the front of the truck sticking out. Williams had visited a friend and, in violation of USPS rules, was away from his designated route. The vehicles collided, damaging the station wagon. Plaintiffs claim that Williams refused to call police and left the scene, afraid of losing his job. Williams first denied involvement, then resigned. After exhausting administrative remedies, plaintiffs sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, seeking $45 million. They did not offer any expert testimony on the cause of the collision. Williams did not appear at trial, but in a deposition stated that his vehicle was stationary at the time of the collision. Asked to reconcile this a with the fact that the back end of the car came into contact with the postal truck, Williams responded that he had no explanation and that it was “mystical.” The district court declined to find that Williams breached his duty of ordinary care. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Furry v. United States" on Justia Law

Thomas was sentenced to 65 years’ imprisonment for murder. Indiana courts affirmed the conviction and rejected collateral attack. A federal district judge denied Thomas’s petition for habeas corpus, declined to issue a certificate of appealability, and certified that the appeal had been taken in bad faith, 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(3). Thomas sought to proceed in forma pauperis. Under section 1915, appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith. The Seventh Circuit rejected an argument that the prohibition does not apply to collateral attacks. Appellate fees are authorized by 28 U.S.C. 1913, which predated the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA). If Section 1915 were entirely inapplicable to collateral attacks, just because several of its subsections were rewritten by the PLRA, then there would be no basis for excusing prepayment of the fees and prisoners would be worse off. View "Thomas v. Hank" on Justia Law

Kristofek, a part-time police officer in Orland Hills, arrested a driver for traffic violations, but the driver turned out to be the son of a former mayor of a nearby town. Kristofek was ordered to let him go. Kristofek disagreed with what he believed was political corruption and expressed his concerns to fellow officers, supervisors, and eventually the FBI. When Police Chief Scully found out about this conduct, he fired him. Kristofek sued, bringing First Amendment retaliation claims against Scully and the village under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, finding that Kristofek’s speech did not involve a matter of public concern, principally because his sole motive was to protect himself from civil and criminal liability. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The complaint did not allege that Kristofek’s only motive was self-interest, and the mere existence of a self-interest motive does not preclude the plausibility of mixed motives, which is consistent with protected speech. Kristofek plausibly pled, “albeit barely,” that Scully had at least de facto authority to set policy for hiring and firing, sufficient to sustain a “Monell” claim against the village. View "Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills" on Justia Law

Alexander boarded a train in Chicago carrying a large amount of cocaine. When he disembarked in Springfield, police officers were waiting, ordered Alexander to place his hands on a brick wall and proceeded to search him. After initially submitting to a pat-down, Alexander turned and swung a right hook at Officer Steil, striking him on the left side of his head behind the ear. Steil ducked a subsequent punch and wrestled Alexander to the ground. Alexander continued struggling, got back on his feet, and began running. A police dog caught and subdued him. Alexander pled guilty to possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). A probation officer concluded that Alexander’s punches had posed a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to Steil, and recommended in the presentence report a six-level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. 3A1.2(c)(1). Alexander objected. At Alexander’s sentencing hearing Steil testified that he had suffered only minor injuries that did not require medical attention: a sore neck and scraped knees. The district court applied adjustment and imposed a sentence of 108 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Vaughn started working for the U.S. Forest Service in 1974. Vaughn filed internal complaints in 1997, 2004, 2005 and 2006, asserting discrimination based on race and age, and retaliation for exercising his right to bring such complaints. Vaughn filed suit, but in 2007 signed a settlement agreement. Two days later, he received a “letter of direction” describing a change in his work schedule. He would no longer work regular weekday hours. After receiving the letter, Vaughn was passed over for a temporary assignment and was denied overtime. During roughly the same period, Vaughn’s relationship with a co-worker ended, she accused him of harassment, and he was placed on administrative leave. She continued to complain after he returned and filed an EEOC complaint and a state court order of protection. Vaughn sued under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-17, claiming retaliation for engaging in protected activity. The district court granted the employer summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Vaughn failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because he has failed to demonstrate that he was meeting his employer’s legitimate expectations. The employer put forward, and he failed to rebut, a legitimate reason for the action that was taken. View "Vaughn v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Collins, an African-American woman, worked for Red Cross. In 2006, Collins called the Red Cross’s 24-hour confidential hotline to complain that her co-workers put tacks on her chair, damaged her property, demanded private information, stole her files, required her to pay business costs from her own pocket, and otherwise harassed and sabotaged her. She later filed a racial discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which gave her a “right-to-sue” letter. Collins did not sue at that time. A few months later, several of Collins’s co-workers complained that Collins told others that the Red Cross was out to get minorities; said she could not work with homosexuals; instructed an employee to falsify records; coerced a subordinate into teaching a class for free; and gave out blank certifications for Red Cross courses. Red Cross fired her after an investigation concluded that Collins committed multiple acts of employee misconduct. Collins sued under Title VII (42 U.S.C. 2000e), claiming that she was really fired because of illegal retaliation and discrimination. The district court granted Red Cross summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Collins v. Am. Red Cross" on Justia Law