Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wang, a citizen of China was smuggled into the U.S. Virgin Islands in 1999, then age 21. Within two days, authorities discovered him and took him into custody. He was personally served with a notice to appear in the New Orleans immigration court at a “[t]ime and date to be set later.” There is no immigration court in the U.S. Virgin Islands. From a New Orleans detention facility, Wang was released on $15,000 bond, providing a North Carolina address. The immigration court twice attempted to inform Wang of the date of his hearing. Although Wang received the first notice, apparently neither was properly served. Wang did not appear and, in November 1999, the immigration judge closed the case. Wang remained in the U.S., married a Chinese citizen, and had children with her. In 2009 he voluntarily returned to immigration court and moved to recalendar his proceedings. He stated that he was pursuing a U Visa and planned to seek asylum and relief under the Convention Against Torture. A U Visa is available to certain noncitizen crime victims who “have been or are likely to be helpful to authorities in investigating or prosecuting that crime.” Wang believed that he was eligible as a victim of human trafficking. An immigration judge continued the case for 20 months. At the next hearing in 2012, the IJ learned that Wang had not obtained a U Visa and denied cancellation of removal on the ground that Wang lacked the required 10 years of continuous presence; his qualifying time ended when he was served with Notice to Appear two days after his arrival. The BIA and Seventh Circuit dismissed appeals. A notice that does not specify a particular time and date for the initial hearing suffices for purposes of the “stop-time” rule. View "Wang v. Holder" on Justia Law

Mosley was convicted in 2008 of distributing cocaine base (crack), 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Following his release from prison, while on supervised release, he was arrested by local police for dealing cocaine, possessing cocaine and marijuana, and driving with a suspended license. Mosley’s federal probation officer petitioned the district court to find him in violation of his conditions of supervised release. Mosley admitted possession of cocaine, but denied dealing cocaine, a more serious “Grade A” violation. At the revocation hearing, the district court heard hearsay statements in a recorded interview of a woman claiming to have bought cocaine from Mosley and from the testimony of the arresting officer, who had interviewed the woman. Mosley had no opportunity to confront or cross-examine the woman. The district court revoked Mosley’s supervised release, and sentenced him to 21 months’ incarceration. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that it was error for the district court to admit the hearsay statements without finding that there was “good cause,” as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C) and the Due Process Clause, but that the error was harmless because, considering only the non-hearsay evidence, the result would have been the same. View "United States v. Mosley" on Justia Law

Jonassen kidnapped his 21-year-old daughter from her Missouri home and took her to an Indiana motel, where he held her against her will and sexually assaulted her. On the third day, she escaped and ran naked from the motel, rope still tied around her leg, screaming for help. Jonassen chased her through the street, into a liquor store, and after a violent struggle, recaptured her. Police arrested him in the parking lot. Jonassen began efforts to get his daughter to recant. She did not recant, but the intimidation made her unavailable as a witness. Although she had cooperated throughout the pretrial period, when called to testify at trial, she failed to respond to the prosecutor’s questions. The court admitted her statements to police under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), which allows admission of hearsay against a party who wrongfully procures a witness’s unavailability. Jonassen was convicted of kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a), and obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1512(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the court’s refusal to conduct a competency hearing under 18 U.S.C. 4241, despite Jonassen’s “bizarre” assertions of “sovereign citizenship.” The government laid an ample foundation for admission of the hearsay statements; the evidence established that Jonassen used bribery, guilt, and psychological intimidation to procure his daughter’s unavailability. Jonassen did not request Jencks Act material before the close of trial, so his claim for relief under the Act failed. View "United States v. Jonassen" on Justia Law

The linkage of the Mississippi River system to the Great Lakes and the effort to control weeds in southern aquatic farms by importing Asian carp, a voracious non-native fish, have combined to create a situation in which two species of carp have overwhelmed the Mississippi River and its tributaries and threaten to migrate into the Great Lakes. Plaintiffs, five states bordering the Great Lakes and an Indian tribe assert that the Asian carp either will soon invade, or perhaps already have invaded, the Great Lakes and are poised to inflict billions of dollars of damage on the ecosystem. Plaintiffs sued the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, seeking a preliminary injunction that would require aggressive interim measures to maximize the chances of preventing the spread of the carp. The district court denied that motion; the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court then dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the plaintiffs did not allege facts showing that the Corps and the District are operating in a manner that is likely to allow the Asian carp to reach Lake Michigan. View "State of Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

Coyomani, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1997. In 2000, he was convicted in Illinois state court of domestic battery and of resisting a peace officer. DHS placed Coyomani in removal proceedings, charging him as an alien present without being admitted or paroled, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), and as an alien who had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). Coyomani denied that he had committed a CIMT but conceded removability and sought cancellation of removal as a non-lawful permanent resident. The IJ concluded that Coyomani was removable and ineligible for cancellation of removal, because he was present without being admitted or paroled. Although Coyomani was convicted of domestic battery, which qualifies as a CIMT, the IJ found that Coyomani “probably” satisfied the statutory exception due to the brevity of his sentence and that resisting a peace officer did not qualify as a CIMT. The IJ found that Coyomani was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he had been convicted of “an offense under” section 237(a)(2), “an aggravated felony.” The same crime—state domestic battery—had different implications for different sections of the INA. The Board of Immigration Appeals and Seventh Circuit upheld the determination.View "Coyomani-Cielo v. Holder" on Justia Law

Harden pled guilty to possession with the intent to distribute cocaine under a written plea agreement. With Harden’s consent, the court instructed a magistrate judge to conduct a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 plea colloquy under a local rule allowing magistrate judges to accept felony guilty pleas. The magistrate judge accepted Harden’s guilty plea. The district court then conducted a sentencing hearing and imposed sentence. Harden appealed the magistrate judge’s acceptance of his plea, arguing that the magistrate’s acceptance of a felony guilty plea, instead of preparing a report and recommendation to the district court, violated the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. 636; Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and the U.S. Constitution. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the prevalence of guilty pleas does not render them less important, or the protections waived by plea any less fundamental. A felony guilty plea is equal in importance to a felony trial; without explicit authorization from Congress, the district court cannot delegate the task. The Supreme Court has never suggested that magistrate judges, with the parties’ consent, may perform every duty of an Article III judge. View "United States v. Harden" on Justia Law

On February 28, 2007, Barriera barricaded himself in his bedroom. He had been diagnosed with schizophrenia years earlier, but had not been taking his medicine regularly. His mother (Wilson) feared he might harm himself. When the family’s efforts to convince him to leave his room were unsuccessful, Wilson called 911. She explained that Barriera might be suicidal. A firefighter was able to open the bedroom door enough to observe Barriera holding a hunting knife and moving around the room and called for police assistance. Officers arrived and worked for several minutes to persuade Barriera to leave his room. Later, an officer deployed his taser through the partially open door, hitting Barriera, who removed the prongs from his chest. Seconds later, he lunged at the officers with the knife. One officer deployed the taser and another fired his weapon. Barriera was struck by the taser prongs and two bullets.. Barriera later died from his injuries. A jury rejected Wilson’s claims against the officers (under 42 U.S.C. 1983) for excessive force; for wrongful death against the officers under Illinois law; under the Illinois Survival Statute against the officers; and that the city was liable for the torts of the officers under the theory of respondeat superior. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings and to the manner in which the court instructed the jury. View "Wilson v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Indiana Code 31-11-6-1 specifies that a marriage may be solemnized (performed) by certain public officials or religious officials designated by religious groups and criminalizes purported marriage solemnization by others. The law omits equivalent officials of secular groups such as humanist societies. Florida, Maine, and South Carolina authorize humanists to solemnize marriages by becoming notaries public, but notaries cannot perform marriages in Indiana. Alaska, Massachusetts, Vermont, and Virginia allow anyone to solemnize a marriage; Colorado, Kansas, Montana, Pennsylvania, New York, and Wisconsin allow the couple to solemnize their own marriage. Indiana recognizes neither option. The state accommodates some religions, such as the Quakers, that do not have clergy, but does not accommodate others, such as Buddhists. In a challenge under 42 U.S.C.1983, the district court upheld the law, reasoning that a humanist group could call itself a religion, which would be good enough for the state or could conduct a ceremony, followed by a trip to court for a legally effective solemnization. The Seventh Circuit reversed, with instructions to issue an injunction allowing certified secular humanist celebrants to solemnize marriages in Indiana. If Indiana amends its statute to allow notaries to solemnize marriages, the court may modify the injunction to minimize the extent to which a federal decree supersedes the state’s own solution to identified problems. View "Center for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk" on Justia Law

King was in police custody awaiting a probable cause determination in 2007. After being rapidly tapered off his psychotropic medication by jail medical staff, complaining of seizure-like symptoms, and being placed in an isolated cell for seven hours, he was found dead. His estate sued La Crosse County and individual employees. After a remand, six weeks before the trial date, after unsuccessful settlement discussions, King’s counsel asserted in a letter to the defendants that the correct standard for jury instructions in the upcoming trial was one of objective reasonableness, not the deliberate indifference standard that had been used by both parties in the pleadings, the summary judgment briefing, the subsequent appeal, and remand pretrial preparations. The assertion was correct as a matter of law, but shortly after receiving the letter, defendants moved that King be precluded from arguing the applicability of the objective reasonableness standard because of her tardiness in asserting the argument. The district court agreed and ordered that the case be tried as scheduled under the deliberate indifference standard. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, acknowledging that King’s long, unexplained delay in asserting the correct standard was puzzling and problematic, but stating that the district court failed to provide a sufficient explanation of how the defendants would suffer prejudice as a result of the delay. View "King v. Kramer" on Justia Law

Tank, who was born in India, worked for T-Mobile as a vice president. After two investigations relating to his treatment of colleagues, he was fired. Tank filed suit alleging discrimination, retaliation, and disparate pay. The district court entered summary judgment for T-Mobile. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Based on the circumstantial evidence Tank provided, no reasonable jury could conclude that T-Mobile fired Tank because of his national origin or race or that the human resources director harbored discriminatory animus or was deliberately indifferent to Tank’s claim. The employees to whom Tank compared himself were not valid comparators.View "Tank v. T-Mobile USA, Inc." on Justia Law