Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant pleaded guilty to being in the U.S. illegally after having been removed. The judge sentenced him to 84 months in prison. The statutory maximum prison sentence for illegal reentry is usually 2 years, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), but removal after conviction for an aggravated felony (defendant had two such convictions) increases the maximum to 20 years. § 1326(b)(2). Defendant’s appellate attorney asked to be allowed to withdraw from the case on the ground that there is no colorable basis for appealing, but also stated that the district court imposed conditions beyond its authority. The Seventh Circuit modified the judgment of the district court to eliminate the post-release terms concerning the use of controlled substances, drug tests, and collection of a DNA sample, and otherwise dismissed the appeal, granting the lawyer’s motion to withdraw. View "United States v. Gutierrez-Ceja" on Justia Law

Scott pleaded guilty to distribution of 50 or more grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). His plea agreement, entered under FRCP 11(c)(1)(C), specified a prison term of 192 months; the district court accepted the agreement and that sentence. Later, Scott filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c), seeking a reduction in his sentence based on changes to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The district court denied that motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Scott was not eligible for a reduced sentence. When a plea agreement is governed by Rule 11(c)(1)(C) and accepted by the court, the judge does not play as great a role as usual in selecting the final sentence. Scott chose to accept a binding sentence to induce the government to dismiss a repeat-offender notice that it had filed under 21 U.S.C. 851. Had the government not done so, Scott would have been subject to a 240-month mandatory minimum sentence, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). View "Unted States v. Scott" on Justia Law

An inmate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, complaining that officials denied him an accommodation of his religious observances. He is a member of a religious sect, the African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem, and took the “Nazirite vow,” which committed him not to cut his hair. He wore his hair in dreadlocks, which form naturally in some people who do not cut their hair. His previous suit, based on the prison’s refusal to allow him to have visitors unless he consented to a haircut, settled in 2003; the parties agreed that he could receive visitors, if he allowed prison staff to search his hair before and after any visit for concealed contraband. In 2004, for appearance in court in a case he had filed, the prison gave the inmate a choice: a haircut, or segregation as punishment for eluding his scheduled trip to court. He chose the haircut. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Precedent recognizes the need for and validity of rules regulating the hairstyles of prisoners in the interest of security; the Nazirite vow is an optional rather than mandatory observance for African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem. View "Peter Lewis v. Jerry Sternes, et al" on Justia Law

Peterson pled guilty to one count of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), after robbing a bank to pay off a debt with a drug dealer. During Peterson’s sentencing hearing, the district court read from a portion of the probation officer’s confidential sentencing recommendation, which she had submitted only to the court. The report noted a relatively easy childhood, followed by a history of drug abuse and other offenses. After the hearing, the district court sentenced Peterson to 168 months in prison, within Peterson’s sentencing guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court’s reliance on the probation officer’s confidential sentencing recommendation violated Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because Peterson had no opportunity to respond to the analysis contained therein. Peterson received and had the opportunity to comment on all facts supporting the probation officer’s analysis and his counsel presented a comprehensive sentencing argument on the basis of those facts. View "United States v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Zheng, a native of China, arrived in the U.S. in 1991 and applied for asylum, which was denied. The INS charged him with removability in 1998, but Zheng renewed his request for asylum, asserting that his wife (who arrived from China in 1994) would be forcibly sterilized under China’s one-child policy because they had two children. The immigration judge denied his application, relying on Zheng’s lack of credibility, and the BIA affirmed in 2002. Zheng remained in the U.S. and filed three motions to reopen, which were denied as untimely and successive and because Zheng failed to demonstrate changed country conditions as to forced sterilization, 8 U.S.C. 1229a. In 2011, Zheng filed a fourth motion, arguing that he would be persecuted in China because he converted to Christianity in 2010 while in immigration detention. He submitted evidence to show that China’s treatment of Christians had materially worsened since 1999. The BIA rejected the claim. The Seventh Circuit denied appeal. BIA’s conclusory rejection of Zheng’s argument was error, but was harmless, given the highly generalized nature of Zheng’s evidence, which failed to show with any meaningful level of specificity that the persecution against Zheng’s practice of Christianity had materially worsened since 1999. View "Zheng v. Holder" on Justia Law

The original named defendants in the case, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act with respect to overtime pay, were JT Packard, the plaintiffs’ employer, and Packard’s parent, Bray. A parent corporation is not liable for FLSA violations by its subsidiary unless it exercises significant authority over the subsidiary’s employment practices. The district judge allowed substitution of Betts, which had purchased Packard’s assets and placed them in a wholly owned subsidiary. After a conditional settlement for $500,000 in damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs, Betts appealed the substitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no good reason to reject successor liability in this case. Packard was a profitable company. It was sold, not because it was insolvent, but because it was the guarantor of its parent’s bank loan and the parent defaulted. View "Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action on behalf of stock purchasers, alleging that Boeing committed securities fraud under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), and SEC Rule 10b-5. The suit related to statements concerning the new 787-8 Dreamliner, which had not yet flown, and did not specify a damages figure. At argument the plaintiffs’ lawyer indicated that the class was seeking hundreds of millions of dollars. The district court dismissed the suit under Rule 12(b)(6) before deciding whether to certify a class. Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal; Boeing cross-appealed denial of sanctions on the plaintiffs’ lawyers for violating Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal with prejudice, but remanded for consideration under 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(c)(1), (2), of Rule 11 sanctions on the plaintiffs’ lawyers. No one who made optimistic public statements about the timing of the first flight knew that their optimism was unfounded; there is no securities fraud by hindsight. Plaintiffs’ lawyers had made confident assurances in their complaints about a confidential source, their only barrier to dismissal of their suit, even though none of them had spoken to the source and their investigator had acknowledged that she could not verify what he had told her. View "City of Livonia Emps' Ret. Sys. v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

Westmoreland was convicted first for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, and in a second trial, for additional counts stemming from the murder of the wife of his partner in drug-dealing: causing the death of a person through the use of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime; using interstate commerce facilities to commit murder for hire; conspiring to commit murder for hire; tampering with a witness by committing murder; and causing the death of a witness through use of a firearm. His convictions were affirmed in 2001 and 2002. In 2002 he moved for a new trial, based on outrageous conduct, including the fact that a state police officer had an affair with his wife and a recantation. The court took no significant action before denying the motion in 2010. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Westmoreland did not present “newly discovered evidence” and was not prejudiced by allegedly ineffective assistance of counsel. View "United States v. Westmoreland" on Justia Law

In 2006 a teenager accused Gakuba of kidnapping and raping him. State charges are pending Gakuba sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that investigating police barged into his Rockford hotel room without a warrant and seized his wallet and other items after obtaining Gakuba’s video rental records from Hollywood Video to corroborate the accuser’s story that he had spent time watching videos in Gakuba’s room. He also sought damages under the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2710. The district court dismissed without prejudice, granting Gakuba leave to amend his complaint if the indictment concluded in his favor. The court advised Gakuba that certain claims would be barred on immunity grounds. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Gakuba’s claims of damages resulting from illegal searches, seizures, and detentions involve constitutional issues that may be litigated during the course of his criminal case. Monetary relief is not available to him in his defense of criminal charges and his claims may become time-barred by the time the state prosecution has concluded, so the district court should have stayed rather than dismissed Gakuba’s civil-rights claims. The court noted that Hollywood Video employees knowingly disclosed his rental information to the police without a warrant. View "Gakuba v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services removed Woods, then seven years old from his parents’ home in 1991 and placed him in a residential treatment facility. There had been many reports of sexual abuse among residents of the facility and Woods, claiming to have been abused by another resident, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the suit as untimely because Woods failed to bring his claim within two years of its accrual, rejecting Woods’s contention that the 20-year limitations period applicable in Illinois to personal injury claims based on childhood sexual abuse applied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The limitations period applicable to all Section 1983 claims brought in Illinois is two years, as provided in 735 ILCS 5/13-202, and this includes claims involving allegations of failure to protect from childhood sexual abuse. View "Woods v. IL Dep't of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law