Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The law firm represented a potential buyer in the purchase of a drugstore. Buyer and Seller executed the sales contract separately. The firm misfiled the contract executed by Buyer, however, and Seller subsequently attempted to rescind the contract, which it characterized as an offer, because it had not timely received a copy of the contract executed by Buyer. When Seller’s efforts to avoid the purported contract were successful, Buyer sent a “formal notice of claim” to the firm, which sought coverage from its professional liability insurer. That insurer concluded that the firm was not entitled to coverage because it failed to properly notify the insurer of the mistake that ultimately led to the malpractice claim. The firm sought a declaratory judgment. The district court granted the insurer summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the firm’s knowledge of the email exchange with Seller’s counsel and of an Alabama declaratory-judgment action constituted knowledge of “any circumstance, act or omission that might reasonably be expected to be the basis of” a malpractice claim. View "Koransky, Bouwer & Poracky, P. C. v. Bar Plan Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Following his arrest in 2009, Budd spent 45 days in the Edgar County Jail. In newspaper articles, the sheriff described the jail as not “livable” and violating “acceptable standards.” During his detention, Budd was confined with eight inmates in a space intended for three; he had to sleep on the floor alongside broken windows and cracked toilets. After another arrest, Budd returned to the jail. Vents were blocked, the heating and air conditioning systems did not work, and inmates were denied any recreation. During a third stay at the facility, something scratched or bit Budd’s leg. After infection set in, the jail nurse gave Budd ice. Budd wrote to the sheriff asking to see a doctor. Over the course of several hospital visits, he received tests, medication, and an MRI. He developed a “hole in [his] leg,” which doctors attributed to unsanitary conditions at the jail. He became “hysterical” at the prospect of returning to the jail. A judge ordered that he be taken to another facility. After a video conference to screen Budd’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint, the district court dismissed, but furnished no written statement of reasons and did not prepare a transcript. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. View "Budd v. Motley" on Justia Law

Lomax pleaded guilty in 2008 to one count of distributing crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). By the time he was sentenced in 2011, Congress had enacted the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 124 Stat. 2372, which increased the threshold amounts of crack that will trigger enhanced statutory penalties under section 841(b)(1). The court rejected Lomax’s arguments concerning application of the 2010 Act, but still imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 188 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated, stating that it could not determine that any error was harmless, given the incomplete record. The court noted that the judge must first resolve whether Lomax is subject to the section 851 recidivism enhancement. View "United States v. Lomax" on Justia Law

During her birth in 2004, the 11-pound baby became lodged in the mother’s pelvis, so that nerves in her shoulder were injured (brachial plexus injury), resulting in a limited range of movement in her right arm A few months later her mother consulted a lawyer, who recommended against suing. Fifteen months later the mother consulted another lawyer; he agreed to represent her, but 16 months later, he withdrew. Finally, in 2010, the mother filed a malpractice suit against the Erie Family Health Center and the Center’s nurse-midwives who had provided her prenatal care. Erie is a private enterprise, but it receives grant money from the U.S. Public Health Service, so that its employees are deemed federal employees, 42 U.S.C. 233(g)(1)(A),(g)(4) and tort suits against it or its employees can be maintained only under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 42 U.S.C. 233(a),(g)(1)(A). The district court found the claim time-barred. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the limitations period for a tort suit under Illinois law would be eight years for a minor, 735 ILCS 5/13-212(b), the extension of the statute of limitations for a child victim does not apply to claims governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act. View "Arteaga v. United States" on Justia Law

McDaniel arrived at the emergency room in May, 2001, with a gunshot wound to the head. She died two days later. Her death was ruled a homicide, and Brady, her boyfriend and the father of her child, became a suspect. After several weeks on the run, Brady was arrested in Los Angeles, extradited to Illinois, and convicted. Brady claims the shooting was an accident and has identified four witnesses to corroborate his story. None of them testified at trial, because Brady’s lawyer did not call them. State courts were not persuaded that the omission was serious enough to undermine his conviction, and the federal district court held that their decision was not so unreasonable that federal relief was possible. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even assuming that the performance of Brady’s lawyer fell below constitutional standards, he cannot show prejudice. The court characterized the proffered testimony as only “marginally exculpatory.” View "Brady v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are correctional officers and were part of a specialized unit, the Special Operations Response Team (SORT) that guarded inmates in the Cook County Jail’s Abnormal Behavioral Observation Unit (ABO). In 2006, six violent felons escaped from the ABO, raising suspicion of inside assistance. A correctional officer, Gater, confessed to allowing the escape and named three others as assisting him or having advance knowledge of the escape. Those officers were investigated and reassigned after disbandment of SORT. They filed suit, claiming psychological and emotional injuries from the investigation and that they were investigated due to their political support for a then-candidate for Sheriff. Following a remand, the district court again denied summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact relating to the political retaliation claims, the veracity of Gater’s confession and the fact that no other officers were investigated for the jailbreak. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Authorities had probable cause to investigate the officers, making other possible motivations for their treatment less relevant. While the defendants may have expressed negative opinions regarding the officers’ support of the candidate, it was objectively reasonable to investigate officers implicated in a multi-felon jailbreak. View "Hernandez v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't" on Justia Law

Burge joined the Chicago Police Department in 1970 and rose to commanding officer of the violent crimes section in the 1980s, but his career was marked by accusations from more than individuals who claimed that he and officers under his command tortured suspects in order to obtain confessions. Burge was fired in 1993 after the Office of Professional Standards investigated the allegations, but he was never criminally charged. When asked about the practices in civil interrogatories served on him years later, Burge lied and denied any knowledge of, or participation in, torture of suspects. A jury heard overwhelming evidence to contradict that assertion and convicted Burge for obstruction of justice and perjury, 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2) and 1621(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the evidence showed that Burge lied when he answered the interrogatories, his false statements impeded an official proceeding, and the statements were material to the outcome of the civil case. Burge received a fair trial and hearsay reference to a victim impact letter was admissible at sentencing.View "United States v. Burge" on Justia Law

Although Hall has been a plumber for the City of Chicago since 1995, she was on disability leave from 1999 to 2003 due to a work-related injury. Hall returned to the City’s employ with the limitation that she could not lift over 25 pounds. Hall and the City agree this restriction precluded her from resuming work as a plumber, so Hall began working in the House Drain Inspectors Division of the Department, which was composed of 13 male house drain inspectors and the supervisor’s female secretary. Hall claims that the supervisor created a hostile work environment by assigning her menial work and prohibiting coworkers from interacting with her. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment in her Title VII suit, finding that the conduct was not hostile in comparison to other employees’ responsibilities and that Hall failed to produce evidence that the supervisor’s conduct was because of her sex. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that a jury could infer that deliberate isolation of Hall was sufficiently pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment and that the supervisor’s comments to Hall could indicate that Hall’s gender played a part in his actions. View "Hall v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 2008, Harris N.A. loaned Acadia money on a revolving basis. Acadia is a limited liability company consisting of members of the Hershey family and three trusts. The loan was personally guaranteed by Loren Hershey, a managing member of Acadia. The amount of the loan was enlarged to $15.5 million, again guaranteed by Hershey. The agreement enlarging the loan amount required Acadia to reduce its principal debt to Harris to less than 35 percent of the value of Acadia’s assets by the end of each quarter and to make a principal payment of $3 million by January 31, 2009. By February 2009, Acadia had not made the $3 million principal payment and was in default. After granting additional time, Harris declared a default and filed suit to collect the debt from Acadia and to enforce Hershey’s guaranty. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Harris as to all issues except the calculation of prejudgment interest. Acadia sought bankruptcy protection and its appeal has been stayed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to Hershey and, finding the appeal frivolous, imposed sanctions under FRAP 8. The court noted that there was no evidence of various promises Hershey claimed were made. View "Harris N.A. v. Acadia Invs. L.C." on Justia Law

In 2003 the Jacksons obtained a $282,500 home mortgage refinancing loan with a 30-year fixed interest rate of 5.875% from AWL. They used a mortgage broker, MFMS, to apply for the loan. The Jacksons allege that other defendants have been “involved with the mortgage process in various capacities.” The Jacksons went into default in March 2010. Although there was no foreclosure action, the Jacksons initiated an action to quiet title on the property in December 2011. They claimed that defendants negligently evaluated the Jacksons’ ability to repay the loan and that the loan contract was substantively and procedurally unconscionable. The district court dismissed all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Jackson v. Bank of Am. Corp." on Justia Law