Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2007 Maniscalco hosted a party for a local politician at his Gurnee restaurant. Maniscalco capped the night with celebratory shots of tequila and a trip to McDonald’s, where he encountered Fidel Castro at the drive-through window. Minutes earlier, a police officer had handed Castro a note containing four numbers (2626) and told him to give it to his co-worker Guzman. Castro did so. The numbers partly corresponded to Maniscalco’ license-plate number: C112626. Maniscalco got into an argument with Guzman while paying for his order, grabbing Guzman and, according to Guzman, nearly pulling him through the window. Maniscalco released Guzman and drove to the pick-up window. As Castro was giving him his food, Guzman yelled to stop. Castro stopped; Maniscalco drove off. The manager called 911. A dispatch went out over the police radio. Maniscalco was arrested. A jury found him not guilty of drunk driving and battery. Maniscalco sued the officers and McDonald’s under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming conspiracy to induce him to breach the peace so the officers would have a pretext to arrest him. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Notwithstanding Castro’s deposition testimony about the unexplained note, the evidence supported probable cause to arrest. McDonald’s cannot be liable because there is no vicarious liability under section 1983. View "Maniscalco v. Simon" on Justia Law

From 1997 through 2009 Sachdeva, the vice president for accounting at Koss, instructed Park Bank, where Koss had an account, to prepare more than 570 cashier’s checks, payable to Sachdeva’s creditors and used to satisfy personal debts. She embezzled about $17.4 million, pleaded guilty to federal crimes, and was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment. The SEC sued Sachdeva and an accomplice because their scheme caused Koss to misstate its financial position. Koss and Park Bank are litigating which bears the loss in Wisconsin. In this suit, Park Bank argued that Federal Insurance must defend and indemnify it under a financial-institution bond (fidelity bond) provision that promises indemnity for “Loss of Property resulting directly from . . . false pretenses, or common law or statutory larceny, committed by a natural person while on the premises of” the Bank. Sachdeva did not enter the Bank’s premises. She gave instructions by phone, then sent employees to fetch the checks. The district court entered judgment in the insurer’s favor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed; every court that has considered the subject has held that a fraud orchestrated from outside a financial institution’s premises is not covered under the provision, which is standard in the industry. View "Bankmanagers Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Lisa Williamson and her husband Lance were arrested on a charge that they had stolen someone else’s horse. The facts are disputed, but the horse had apparently been boarded at Lance’s stable, by an agent of its owner, but against the owner’s specific wishes. After being acquitted, Williamson filed suit against two Lake County, Illinois sheriff’s deputies under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they arrested her without probable cause and in violation of her right to equal protection by arresting her based on nothing more (she contends) than her status as Lance’s wife. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. So far as the deputies knew, Lance was in the wrong in maintaining possession of the horse, and the lien filed by Williamson Stables was a ruse to give cover to his conversion of the horse and, quite possibly, to extort money from the horse’s owner; they also had reason to believe, based in large part on Williamson’s own interaction with them, that she shared responsibility along with her husband and Williamson’s Stables for the possession of and refusal to surrender the horse. View "Williamson v. Curran" on Justia Law

In 2008, Pepper, then 54 years old, applied for Supplemental Security Disability Insurance Benefits, alleging that she became unable to work in November 1998 as a result of numerous physical and mental impairments. The alleged onset date was later amended to October 2002, when Pepper last worked. Extensive medical records show that Pepper sought treatment for numerous health concerns over the years. At various times, Pepper has been assessed as having ongoing neck pain and limited range of motion in her neck, degenerative disc disease in her spine, left knee problems, migraine headaches, problems with her vision, diabetes, asthma, mitral valve prolapse, sciatica, dyslipidemia, hyperglycemia, hypertension, allergic rhinitis, obesity, plantar fasciitis in her left heel, caregiver stress, and depression. An ALJ denied the claim and the district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the ALJ erred when addressing Pepper’s residual function capacity and that the ALJ’s credibility determination was inadequately supported and patently wrong. Substantial evidence supported denial of benefits. View "Pepper v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Binns was driving a truck on an interstate highway, transporting parts on behalf of U.S. Xpress. Binns was in the center lane negotiating a curve when he saw, in his mirror, a motorcycle sliding down the right lane. After pulling over, Binns ran back to find Betty Jordan lying on the pavement. She ultimately lost both legs below the knee. According to Binns, Betty repeatedly said, “it’s not his fault. It’s my fault.” Betty has no recollection of these statements or of seeing Binns. Binns relayed Betty’s statements to U.S. Xpress claims manager Bukovitz, State Trooper Litt, and insurance adjuster Niles; each of them testified to that effect at trial. Ted, who had been notified of his wife’s accident, had arrived on the scene and introduced himself to Binns. Binns testified that Ted said that Betty stated it was not Binns’s fault. Litt testified that Ted told him that Betty had said that the accident was her fault. Niles also testified that Ted told him that Betty said the accident was her fault. Ted denied the testimony. A jury returned a defense verdict. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the court erred in admitting certain evidence, the error was harmless in light of expert testimony that Binns could not have caused the accident. View "Jordan v. Binns" on Justia Law

In 1996, Stalker was fatally bludgeoned and stabbed following a drug sale. Witnesses led Chicago police to Monroe and three fellow members of the Black P-Stone Nation street gang: Thomas, Curry, and Jackson, who had been selling crack cocaine and Stalker, a member of another gang, who had recruited customers. Members of Stalker’s gang drove up to make a purchase but sped off without paying for the cocaine. Stalker was beaten by Monroe and Curry, then stabbed by Thomas. Monroe later acknowledged striking Stalker but denied any foreknowledge that Thomas would stab him. Monroe pleaded not guilty. Jackson, after himself being acquitted on a murder charge, was a key witness. Monroe was convicted of first-degree murder on an accountability theory and sentenced to 40 years. After exhausting state remedies, Monroe unsuccessfully petitioned for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments: that Monroe was arrested without probable cause; that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call his brother and sister-in-law as witnesses at trial and in support of his motion to suppress his post-arrest statements; and that the state presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction on an accountability theory. View "Monroe v. Birkey" on Justia Law

Dill was charged with possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(e)(1). After closing arguments, the district court read jury instructions and had counsel approach the bench, where it asked whether they had any objection to leaving the alternate in the jury room with an instruction that the alternate may not deliberate. The prosecutor stated that he did not think “it’s generally done,” but neither party objected. The district court gave the instruction orally. The jury retired for deliberations and was given a written set of instructions without the instruction covering the alternate juror’s role. The jury did not submit any notes or questions. A little over an hour later, the jury returned its verdict finding Dill guilty. When the jury was polled, all 12 regular jurors confirmed the verdicts read by the foreperson, but the alternate juror was not polled and remained silent. The district court sentenced Dill to 420 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding no evidence that the alternate juror participated in deliberations. View "United States v. Dill" on Justia Law

Defendant, arrested after assaulting a woman and pointing a pistol at her, was convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and sentenced to 188 months in prison. He argued that the pistol was not a firearm, defined as “any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive,” or “the frame or receiver of any such weapon.” Defendant’s pistol is a Hi-Point .380 caliber semi-automatic, designed to be a gun, but inoperable because of “significant damage, missing/broken parts, and extensive corrosion.” To restore the gun to firing condition would require that it be disassembled and cleaned and the corroded and missing parts replaced. All this would take an hour or two for an expert in gun repair. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The gun, although in bad condition, neither was redesigned to be something other than a gun nor is so badly damaged that it could no longer be regarded as a weapon designed to fire bullets. Its outward appearance is normal and it was not so dilapidated as to be beyond repair. View "United States v. Dotson" on Justia Law

Warren shot and killed a man in 2002, during a marijuana sale. Although Warren was originally charged in state court with first-degree intentional homicide, he eventually pled no contest to first-degree reckless homicide, a reduced charge. Soon after entering the plea, Warren began attempting to withdraw it. He unsuccessfully fought his 40-year sentence through the Wisconsin court system and was denied habeas corpus in federal district court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting his argument that the state trial court’s refusal to allow him to withdraw his plea deprived him of due process and that he received unconstitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel throughout his state court proceedings. View "Warren v. Baenen" on Justia Law

For more than two years, members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), an organization that violently opposes the existence of Israel, tried to recruit Jabr to join their group. Jabr resisted because he is a member of Fatah, a political party that, according to Jabr, is open to cooperation with Israel. PIJ members harassed him, beat him, and labeled him a traitor to their cause. After surviving a brutal attack in 2006, Jabr fled to the U.S. Within a year of arriving, Jabr sought asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Jabr claimed that he feared returning to Palestine because the same individuals associated with the PIJ that hurt him before will attack him again. The immigration judge denied his application. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit granted review, finding that the IJ and BIA overlooked material evidence demonstrating that Jabr suffered past persecution on account of his political opinion. View "Jabr v. Holder" on Justia Law