Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Westerfield was a lawyer working for an Illinois title insurance company when she facilitated fraudulent real estate transfers in a scheme that used stolen identities of homeowners to “sell” houses that were not for sale to fake buyers, and then collect the mortgage proceeds from lenders who were unaware of the fraud. Westerfield facilitated five such transfers and was indicted on four counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. She claimed that she had been unaware of the scheme’s fraudulent nature and argued that she had merely performed the typical work of a title agent. She was convicted on three counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, to admission of a codefendant’s testimony during trial, and to the sentence of 72 months in prison with three years of supervised release, and payment of $916,300 in restitution. View "United States v. Westerfield" on Justia Law

A jury found Terrance Jones guilty of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and of using a telephone to facilitate possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 843(b). Jones moved for a judgment of acquittal under FRCP 29. The district court granted Jones’ motion, concluding that “the inferences the jury had to draw in order to reach a guilty verdict fall into the realm of impermissible speculation.” The government has appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the circumstantial case simply required too much speculation to support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. No witnesses testified that they saw Jones in possession of any cocaine, and the intercepted telephone calls that the government relied upon were not tied directly to actual or constructive possession of any cocaine. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Davis repeatedly gave false addresses when purchasing guns, six of which were later recovered from persons who could not lawfully possess them. Davis claimed that the guns were stolen, but pleaded guilty to two counts of lying to gun dealers, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6), 924(a)(1)(A). Other charges were dismissed. Davis was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment. His offense level, would have been lower had the district judge given him a three-level reduction for accepting responsibility by pleading guilty. It deducted only two levels, because the prosecutor declined to move for the subtraction of a third level under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(b). The prosecutor wanted Davis to waive his right to appeal, and his refusal to do that led the prosecutor to withhold the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a motion from the prosecutor is mandatory whenever the defendant pleads guilty early enough to spare the prosecutor the burden of trial preparation. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Cloe started working for the City of Indianapolis in 2007 as an Unsafe Buildings/Nuisance Abatement Project Manager. In 2008, she was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis, a chronic, incurable neurological disorder that rendered her disabled and significantly impaired her day-to-day life. In 2009, the city terminated her, ostensibly for poor performance. Cloe sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, alleging that the city discriminated against her because of her disability; failed to reasonably accommodate her disability; and retaliated against her for requesting accommodations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to the reasonable accommodation claims, but reversed on the discrimination and retaliation claims, noting “suspicious timing, ambiguous statements oral or written, and other bits and pieces from which an inference of retaliatory intent might be drawn.” View "Cloe v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law

Draiman filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2009, but converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy one day short of two years after his initial filing. That same day Fogel was appointed interim trustee. He became the permanent trustee by default more than two years after the initial filing. The statute of limitations governing avoidance is two years from filing bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. 546(a)(1)(A), but the period is extended to one year from the “appointment or election of the first trustee under section 702…if such appointment or such election occurs before the expiration of the period.” The issue was whether the date of Fogel’s appointment was when he became permanent trustee, more than two years after the initial filing, or =when he became interim trustee. The bankruptcy court held that ambiguity is best resolved by allowing the extension when the trustee is an interim trustee who, because creditors never elected a permanent trustee, became permanent trustee by default. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that creditors could “game” the system in similar conversion cases. They might put off their meeting to elect a permanent trustee until two years were nearly up, to obtain the maximum limitations period, knowing that if they waited too long they could meet without electing a trustee, so that the period would be extended by one year from the date of appointment of the interim trustee. The statute as written discourages creditors from dawdling after conversion. If, without fault, creditors cannot procure appointment of a permanent trustee within the deadline, equitable tolling would permit an extension. View "In re: Draiman" on Justia Law

When Meherg was arrested on an outstanding warrant, police discovered that he had been carrying a firearm and ammunition. Meherg pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm after having previously been convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(a) defines an offender who has three earlier convictions for qualifying crimes as a career criminal and prescribes a mandatory minimum 15-year sentence. Qualifying crimes include “serious drug offenses”—manufacturing or delivering a controlled sentence where the maximum punishment is greater than 10 years’ imprisonment—and “crimes of violence”— crimes that either have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force; or present a serious potential risk of physical injury. 18 U.S.C. 922(e)(2)(A), 924(e). The district court found that Meherg was a career criminal because he had two Illinois state convictions for manufacture or delivery of 1-15 grams of cocaine (punishable by up to 15 years’ imprisonment) and a conviction for aggravated stalking, which, the court found, has as an element the use or threatened use of force and in addition presents a serious potential risk of physical injury. The court imposed the mandatory minimum of 180 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Meherg" on Justia Law

Allegedly in retaliation for Modrowski’s unwillingness to skimp on building repairs, defendants fired him, withheld $11,000 in wages, had Modrowski jailed, and locked Modrowski out of his personal Yahoo email account. Modrowski sued, challenging the refusal to relinquish control over his email account. The district court issued a temporary restraining order, but Modrowski discovered that years’ worth of personal correspondence had vanished. Modrowski claimed violation of the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications Act (18 U.S.C. 2701), the Federal Wire Tapping Act (18 U.S.C. 2511), and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. 1030). The district court dismissed the first two claims because Modrowski acknowledged that he voluntarily linked his personal account with the defendants’ business account. The district court dismissed without prejudice the Computer Fraud Act claim for failure to allege an injury of at least $5,000. When Modrowski returned his first amended complaint, defendants moved for summary judgment. The window for fact discovery had closed and neither party had sought an extension. Modrowski responded by attacking perceived deficiencies of the defendants’ motion. Noting Modrowski’s failure to offer “any evidence in response to defendants’ motion, let alone evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact,” it granted defendants’ motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Modrowski v. Pigatto" on Justia Law

Steine was a subcontractor for installation of thermal units at a Wal-Mart store in Gas City, Indiana. Steine rented a boom lift from NES. Steine foreman Crager signed a one-page, two-sided NES “Rental Agreement” with a signature line is at the bottom of its front side. Above the signature line, the Agreement states: “Signer acknowledges that he has read and fully understands this rental agreement including the terms and conditions on the reverse side” and “Please note that there are important terms on the reverse side of this contract, including an indemnification provision.” Menendez, a Steine employee, died from injuries he suffered while operating the 40-foot boom lift. His family filed sued NES and others, alleging negligence. NES sought indemnification from Steine. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Steine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The indemnification clause in the rental agreement does not expressly state, in clear and unequivocal terms as Indiana law requires, that Steine agreed to indemnify NES for NES’s own negligence. View "NES Rentals Holdings, Inc.l v. Steine Cold Storage, Inc." on Justia Law

After years of paying taxes on wages he received for his work as a carpenter, Scheuneman stopped paying federal income tax in 1998. In 1999, in an effort to prevent the IRS from discovering his income, Scheuneman purchased a sham tax avoidance system from an Arizona company, Innovative Financial , and formed a limited liability corporation, Larch, and two illegitimate trusts, Soned and Jokur. Scheuneman retained complete control of all three. Scheuneman was eventually convicted of three counts of tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. 7201 and one count of interference with the Internal Revenue laws, 26 U.S.C. 7212(a). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting arguments that that a clerical error in the indictment’s description of the relevant date rendered two counts legally insufficient and that the government constructively amended the indictment by introducing proof regarding dates other than those described in the indictment. Schueneman also claimed that the district court improperly ordered restitution for losses that are unrelated to his tax evasion offenses. The court rejected the argument; although those losses were not caused by the conduct underlying his tax evasion offenses, they are properly included as restitution because they were attributable to his interference with the Internal Revenue laws. View "United States v. Scheuneman" on Justia Law

Gomez was convicted of four drug-related crimes and sentenced to four concurrent 84-month terms. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his possession of cocaine a few weeks after the charged crimes, and that the district judge did not specify his perjurious statements when increasing his sentencing range for obstruction of justice. Given the context of the statements, the district court made a sufficient record. View "United States v. Gomez" on Justia Law