Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Stitts was convicted of murder in Indiana state court and sentenced to 60 years’ imprisonment. The district court denied his petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. Stitts claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, because, before deciding not to present an alibi defense, he only interviewed one alibi witness, Stitts’s father, unreasonably failing to investigate whether there might be more. The state court found that such a limited investigation was sufficient under Strickland. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded to state court for a factual determination of the amount of investigation actually conducted. Stitts’s alibi was that he was at a nightclub, where there could be any number of potential alibi witnesses, so failure to explore that possibility would be unreasonable. The state court unreasonably applied Strickland when it found no prejudice, because the prosecution’s case rested entirely on the shaky testimony of two witnesses which could have been neutralized by alibi witness testimony. View "Stitts v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Zitt and Wampler were charged in a multi-count, multi-defendant indictment alleging a heroin conspiracy and substantive counts of distribution, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. Zitt was convicted after a jury trial of conspiring to distribute, and distributing, heroin. Wampler pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute heroin. The Seventh Circuit affirmed consolidated appeals. A statement, by a witness, that he and Zitt were in jail together, was not so prejudicial or inflammatory as to deny Zitt a fair trial. The court granted an Anders motion to withdraw by Wampler’s appointed lawyer noting that Wampler waived his right to appeal as a condition of his plea agreement. View "United States v. Zitt" on Justia Law

Cromwell was fired from his position as a Momence police lieutenant, after an incident of alleged misconduct involving alcohol that was followed by lying and insubordination during the investigation. Cromwell sued, arguing that his termination was procedurally inadequate and that that he had a constitutionally protected property interest in his continued public employment derived from the city’s Police Department Rules and Regulations, which provide that probationary employees may be terminated at any time for any reason but omit similar language with regard to nonprobationary employees. The district court rejected this argument and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The regulations on which Cromwell based his claim do not contain the clear language needed to overcome Illinois’s presumption of at-will employment. Something more than inference from silence is required. View "Cromwell v. City of Momence" on Justia Law

Annoreno was an administrator of an internet chat room called “Kiddypics & Kiddyvids,” on which users broadcast live videos of people sexually abusing young children, including infants. The chat room allowed users to interact and trade child pornography through “peer-to-peer” file sharing. Big Daddy, another user, broadcast his molestations of four children live to other users. Big Daddy eventually cooperated with investigators and testified at Annoreno’s sentencing hearing that he watched Annoreno molest a child, then no more than one year old, about five times. Investigators identified Annoreno sufficiently to get a warrant for computers in the home Annoreno shared with his mother and daughter. Investigators found more than 57 computer files containing child pornography. Annoreno confessed and helped identify other users. While in custody, Annoreno offered to pay another inmate to procure child pornography for him. Other inmates attacked Annoreno, leaving him nearly blind. After being found competent to proceed, Annoreno entered into a plea agreement, which noted that the maximum sentence was 50 years; a presentence report concluded that the guidelines recommended a 50-year sentence. U.S.S.G. 5G1.1(a). The Seventh Circuit affirmed a 480-month sentence, rejecting argument that the court improperly considered Annoreno’s mental disabilities and the time needed for rehabilitation. View "Unted States v. Annoreno" on Justia Law

In 1999 Irons was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and 846, and two counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). He sought, for a second time, a reduction in his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), based on a 2010 amendment to the federal Sentencing Guidelines for crack cocaine offenses. The district court denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Irons was unable to show that his applicable sentencing range had been retroactively lowered; at his sentencing hearing, the court determined that Irons was found responsible for 31 kilograms of crack cocaine. That amount greatly exceeds the minimum 8.4 kilograms under the amended guidelines for the highest base offense level, 38, under which Irons was originally sentenced. View "United States v. Irons" on Justia Law

In 2006, when the real estate market was strong, Burke, a citizen of Ireland, signed a contract with the developer for the Trump International Hotel & Tower in Chicago, to buy a condominium unit and two parking spaces in the Trump Tower. The total purchase price was $2,282,130, which included $150,000 for the parking spaces. Burke deposited $456,426 in earnest money. Burke later refused to close the purchase and, after the developer declined to refund his earnest money, he sued, claiming that the developer made a material change when it placed parking on the Trump Tower’s sixth floor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, noting that the documents he signed demonstrate that Burke was on notice that the use of the sixth floor for parking was a possibility. The agreement was not void for lack of mutuality with respect to provisions for breach, as the developer had an obligation to act in good faith to convey the condominium. View "Burke v. 401 N. Wabash Venture, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Krieger, age 53, cannot pay her debts. She lives with her mother in a rural community; they have only monthly income from governmental programs. She is too poor to move and her car, more than 10 years old, needs repairs. She lacks Internet access. In her bankruptcy proceeding, Educational Credit moved to exempt her student loans from discharge; 11 U.S.C.523(a)(8) excludes educational loans “unless excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph would impose an undue hardship on the debtor.” The district court reversed the bankruptcy court, noting that Krieger, although unable to pay even $1 per year, had not enrolled in a program that offered a 25-year payment schedule. The Seventh Circuit reversed, in favor of Krieger. “Undue hardship” requires showing that the debtor cannot maintain a minimal standard of living if forced to repay; that additional circumstances exist indicating that this situation is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period; and that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay. The court noted that Krieger incurred the debt to obtain paralegal training at a community college, has made about 200 applications in 10 years, and used a substantial part of her divorce settlement to pay off as much of the educational loan as possible. View "Krieger v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp." on Justia Law

In 1956, Sister Ephrem of the Most Precious Blood, experienced apparitions of the Virgin Mary, during which, Sister Ephrem claimed, she was told: “I am Our Lady of America.” The Archbishop supported a program of devotions to Our Lady of America. In 1965 Pope Paul VI approved creation of a cloister, which lasted until at least 1977, when surviving members left and formed a new congregation, dedicated to devotions to Our Lady of America. Sister Ephrem directed it until her death in 2000. Sister Therese succeeded Sister Ephrem, who willed to Sister Theres all her property, mostly purchased with donated money. Sister Therese worked with McCarthy, a lawyer, and Langsenkamp until 2007, when Langsenkamp and McCarthy established the Langsenkamp Family Apostolate in the chapel in which the Virgin Mary allegedly appeared to Sister Ephrem. They sued Sister Therese, claiming theft of physical and intellectual property, fraud, and defamation. She counterclaimed, alleging theft of a statue and of the website and defamation by calling her a “fake nun.” The district court denied McCarthy’s motion that the court take notice of the Holy See’s rulings on Sister Therese’s status in the Church. The Seventh Circuit reversed, with “a reminder” that courts may not decide (or to allow juries to decide) religious questions. Determination of the ownership of the property is likely possible without resolving religious questions. View "McCarthy v. Fuller" on Justia Law

Berg ran a cross-border smuggling scheme that traded American arms for Canadian cannabis. He supplied several bags of cocaine to a dealer who unwittingly resold them to a government agent. Berg confessed to both sets of crimes, hoping that his cooperation would win him leniency. Instead, the government took Berg to trial, and a jury convicted him. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that his two sets of crimes were improperly tried in one case and that he was denied an opportunity to call an exculpatory witness. His attorney made a strategic choice not to call the witness. The evidence against Berg was overwhelming; he was not prejudiced by his attorney’s decisions at trial. He could not show that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move for severance. View "United States v. Berg" on Justia Law

Convicted of possessing child pornography, defendant was sentenced to 108 months in prison. The judge increased his base offense level by 15 levels, including a two-level enhancement for actually distributing the pornography, although the separate offense of distributing child pornography was not charged, U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(b)(3)(F). This adjustment raised the sentencing range from 108 to 135 months to 135 to 168 months. The statutory maximum for the offense of possession was 120 months at the time of the offense, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B) (2011), so the judge could not sentence him within the higher range. The sentence of 108 months was the floor of the lower range. The defendant admitted to having downloaded quantities of child pornography, but he denied knowing that the files he downloaded could be viewed by other users of the programs. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence, noting that the defendant was 61 years old and in poor health. The government failed to prove that the defendant knowingly made files of child pornography available to other users of LimeWire or FrostWire. Someone who knew little about computers and had never seen a file-sharing program before might not realize that files are automatically available to others. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law