Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Avila applied for adjustment of status based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen in 1999. The couple has two daughters. He has been employed laying countertops since approximately 1997. DHS concluded that Avila was ineligible for adjustment of status based on its determination that he attempted to enter in 1997, by representing himself as a U.S. citizen, and that he actually entered at a later date without presenting himself for inspection. DHS charged that Avila was removable as an alien present without inspection or admission, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(I); and (2) as an alien who falsely represented himself to be a U.S. citizen for an immigration benefit, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii). Avila denied making a false claim of citizenship, but conceded removability as an alien present without being admitted or paroled, and sought relief under 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(4)(A). An Immigration Judge found him removable on both grounds and denied adjustment of status and voluntary departure. The Board of Immigration Appeal (BIA) affirmed. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that even assuming that Avila presented a baptismal certificate, there was no evidence indicating that he made any oral statements or even used the name of the person on the baptismal certificate. View "Avila v. Holder" on Justia Law

Dr. Dookeran was hired by Stroger Hospital of Cook County in 2000 subject to biennial reappointment. His 2004 application for reappointment disclosed for the first time that his previous employer had reprimanded him for creating a hostile work environment. This disclosure triggered an investigation and peer review. An administrative committee revoked Dookeran’s staff privileges, and the Cook County Board denied reappointment. The Illinois Appellate Court upheld the denial of reappointment and the Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. In the meantime, Dookeran filed charges of employment discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging that the denial was denied based on race and national origin and retaliation for an earlier EEOC charge. After a long delay, Dookeran received an EEOC right-to-sue letter and sued in federal court under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court rejected a jurisdictional argument but dismissed the claims as barred by res judicata. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to preclude subject-matter jurisdiction. Dookeran had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his federal claims in the state-court proceedings. View "Dookeran v. Cook County" on Justia Law

The CEO and sole shareholder of Zee decided to expand his chemical sales business into the water treatment industry and hired employees who were currently working or had previously worked in the industry. Four employees came from GE and were bound by non-compete agreements. GE sued Zee and its former employees in North Carolina state court for breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and unfair trade practices. The state court found the agreements enforceable and held Zee and the employees jointly and severally liable for $288,297.00 in compensatory damages as a result of unfair and deceptive trade practices and for $5,769,903.10 in attorney fees, $864,891.00 in punitive damages, and $257,931.44 in costs. GE discovered that Zee had tied up virtually all of its assets in a credit facility agreement with BMO Harris Bank before entry of judgment; registered the judgment in Illinois, Harris’s principal place of business; and served Harris with a citation to discover Zee’s assets. GE objected to removal to federal court, but the district court dismissed GE’s case entirely. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that GE raised a timely and sound objection to removal under the forum-defendant rule, and the district court should have remanded the case. View "GE Betz, Inc. v. Zee Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Smiley was a part-time instructor in the college’s Radio Department from 1994 through January 2009. She is of Palestinian and Lebanese descent. Near the end of the fall 2008 semester, one of the nine students in Smiley’s class met with two faculty members and said he felt Smiley had singled him out in class because he is Jewish. At one of the faculty members’ request, the student outlined his complaint in an email. Faculty members and administrators interviewed the student on several occasions and also interviewed Smiley, who asserted that she was “joking.” The school ultimately informed Smiley that it would not ask her to teach further classes. Smiley claimed that the decision was based on her race or national origin in a suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the college. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Investigations of other instructors to which Smiley referred do not suggest more favorable treatment. The school’s procedures did not require the school to contact other witnesses to alleged discriminatory conduct, and the school’s investigation of the complaint does not indicate that its reason for terminating her position was pretextual. View "Smiley v. Columbia College Chicago" on Justia Law

Tucker was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute more than one kilogram of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841 (a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), the use of which resulted in death, and sentenced to 480 months’ imprisonment. During the trial, the prosecutor made references to the devastating effects of heroin and to possible its impacts on members of the jury, the criminal backgrounds of Tucker’s coconspirators, the plea agreements made by coconspirators “with the judge,” and the consistency of statements by coconspirators outside trial. Tucker’s trial counsel did not object to these statements. The jury also heard from the lead investigator on the case, Officer Baranek, describing how his investigation of Tucker unfolded. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct and a challenge to the use of Officer Baranek as a “dual capacity” witness, without giving the jury any guidance on how to properly evaluate such testimony. A “dual capacity” witness weaves fact and expert opinion testimony together and the prosecutor did lay a foundation for Officer Baranek’s expertise. View "United States v. Tucker" on Justia Law

Defendant, a Mexican native, first entered the U.S. illegally before June 1988. He was convicted of receiving stolen property, auto theft, attempting to pass a fraudulent check, selling cocaine, and forgeries, and was deported in 1992. In 1994, he burglarized Nebraska construction companies. He was deported again in 1999. By 2005, defendant had returned and was convicted of burglarizing companies, stealing payroll checks, and fraudulently cashing checks. He was deported for the third time in 2008. In 2010 defendant stole blank checks from Illinois and Iowa businesses. Three banks cashed checks, losing more than $42,000. Defendant was charged with unlawful reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and 1326(b)(2); bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344; conspiracy to utter forged securities, 18 U.S.C. 371; and uttering forged securities, 18 U.S.C. 513(a). Defendant pleaded guilty unlawful reentry and to three bank fraud counts,. The district court sentenced him to a total of 84 months’ imprisonment, followed by 36 months of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence. Neither party objected to the sentencing reports at the time, but both agree that the sentence was based on an improper U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range and that the error affected defendant’s substantial rights. View "United States v. Tovar-Pina" on Justia Law

Kamlager was convicted of first-degree intentional homicide and use of a dangerous weapon in the death of his girlfriend, Wis. Stat. 940.01(1)(a), and was sentenced to life imprisonment with no possibility for extended supervision. He was also convicted of hiding a corpse and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. After exhausting postconviction remedies, Kamlager sought collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied his writ of habeas corpus petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing as “harmless error” the admission of statements Kamlager made to officers after he requested to see counsel. Given the “overwhelming” evidence of guilt, it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have rendered the same verdict even if the tainted evidence had been suppressed. View "Kamlager v. Pollard" on Justia Law

Under the Federal Mine Safety & Health Act of 1977, the Secretary of Labor protects the health and safety of miners, acting through the Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). Regulations under the Act require mine operators to report all mine-related injuries and illnesses suffered by employees. In 2010, MSHA acted on a new and broader interpretation and informed 39 mine operators that they would be required to permit MSHA inspectors to review employee medical and personnel records during inspections. Two operators refused to provide the records. MSHA issued citations and imposed penalties. An ALJ and the Review Commission found that the demands and enforcement were lawful under 30 U.S.C. 813(h) and 30 C.F.R. 50.41. Mine employees intervened to raise personal privacy challenges. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting arguments that MSHA does not have authority for the requirement; that 30 C.F.R. 50.41 is not a reasonable interpretation of the Act and was not properly promulgated; that the requirement infringes operators’ Fourth Amendment right not to be searched without a warrant; that the demands violate the miners’ Fourth Amendment privacy rights in their medical records; and that penalties imposed for noncompliance violate the operators’ Fifth Amendment due process rights. View "Bickett v. Fed. Mine Safety & Review Comm'n" on Justia Law

Ni came to the U.S. in 2001 from Fujian Province, China. An Immigration Judge ordered him removed in 2003, but he has remained in the U.S., and has started a family. In 2011, following the birth of his second child, Ni moved to reopen his removal proceedings, arguing that he will personally face forced sterilization under China’s “one-child policy” if he returns to Fujian Province, a form of persecution based on “political opinion” for which asylum may be granted, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(B). The Board of Immigration Appeals denied Ni’s motion, holding that his evidence was not sufficient to establish a change in circumstances or country conditions, as generally required when an applicant moves to reopen more than 90 days after entry of a final administrative order. The Seventh Circuit granted review, noting that courts of appeals have received scores of similar petitions involving Fujian Province in recent years, and have regularly upheld the BIA’s refusal to grant relief. “Routine can be numbing, however, and it can lead to errors. Here, the BIA failed meaningfully to address documents bolstering Ni’s assertion that family planning officials in and around his hometown recently launched a crackdown on those who flout the “one-child policy.” View "Ni v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2006, W&S hired Martino, a naturalized citizen born in Italy, as a sales representative. He signed an agreement that prohibited him from engaging in any other business or work for remuneration or profit without consent. W&S only approved outside positions requiring five or fewer hours a week on average, not including Sundays, and average weekly pay of $100 or less. Martino also served as a pastor of a small church and he submitted an outside position request, indicating that his pastoral position involved eight to 10 hours per week, not including Sundays, with average weekly pay of $300. After rejecting Martino’s argument that his position was a public service, human resources responded that W&S was not discharging Martino but asking that he resign his pastoral position. Martino subsequently was unable to timely produce I-9 eligibility to work documentation. Within two months of hiring him, W&S terminated Martino. The district court entered summary judgment for W&S in Martino’s suit, alleging termination based on religious beliefs and defamation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Martino’s evidence neither called into doubt W&S’s explanation for his discharge nor established a prima facie case of defamation. View "Martino v. W & S Fin. Grp." on Justia Law