Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Between 2002 and 2005, May, a Chrysler pipefitter, was the target of graffiti in and around the plant’s paint department. Messages stated: “Otto Cuban Jew fag die,” “Otto Cuban good Jew is a dead Jew,” “death to the Cuban Jew,” “fuck Otto Cuban Jew fag,” “get the Cuban Jew,” and “fuck Otto Cuban Jew nigger lover.” May found death-threat notes in his toolbox, had his tires punctured, had sugar poured in the gas tanks of his cars, and found a dead bird wrapped in toilet paper to look like a Ku Klux Klansman in his work station. May contacted the police, the FBI, the Anti-Defamation League, and complained to Chrysler. Chrysler responded: The head of human resources informed employees that harassment was unacceptable, a procedure was implemented to document harassment, efforts were made to discover who was present when the incidents occurred, and a handwriting analyst was retained. The offenders were never caught. May sued Chrysler, alleging violations under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. His hostile work environment claim survived summary judgment. A jury awarded $709,000 in compensatory damages and $3.5 million in punitive damages. May accepted remittitur to $300,000; the court vacated the award of punitive damages. On rehearing, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "May v. Chrysler Group LLC" on Justia Law

In 1996, Brown was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and possession of a firearm by a felon. The district court classified Brown as a “career offender” under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. Brown filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion arguing that “counsel was ineffective for failure to object to his sentencing as a career offender which resulted in his sentence being a minimum of 360 months instead of between 262 and 327 months.” The district court rejected this argument. The Third Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. Now incarcerated in Indiana, Brown filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241, contending that under the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision, Begay v. U.S., his Delaware conviction for Arson in the Third Degree did not qualify as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. The district court dismissed, reasoning that the savings clause in 2255(e) requires a claim of actual innocence directed to the conviction, not merely the sentence. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that challenges to a sentence are not categorically barred under 28 U.S.C. 2241. Under Begay, Brown’s prior conviction does not qualify as “generic” arson under the Guidelines’ enumerated crimes clause, nor is it covered by the residual clause. View "Brown v. Lockett" on Justia Law

In 2002, Roux moved in with Roberta and her daughters, seven to 14 years old. In 2003, CC, reported that Roux was sexually molesting her. Although the Illinois DCFS determined the charge to be unfounded, CC was removed from the household. Roux began molesting nine-year-old EV. . Roux acknowledged the abuse to Roberta in 2008 and Roberta evicted him. Roux returned and again began abusing EV. EV told school officials and the police that Roux had taken sexually explicit photographs. Investigators seized a computer and digital cameras and recovered deleted images, including sexually explicit photographs of EV and photographs of a man’s penis. No male face was visible. Roux was convicted of knowingly employing, using, persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing visual depictions of such conduct, using interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). Roux was sentenced to 360 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the admission of testimony about sexual abuse of EV’s sisters and of mug shots reflecting that Roux was heavier when arrested than at trial and based on the prosecutor’s reference to “jail phone calls” and, while cross-examining Roux, asking about records and witnesses that might corroborate his testimony but which had not been produced. View "United States v. Roux" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a Chinese citizen from Fujian Province, entered the U.S. in 1997 and is the mother of two boys born in the U.S. She sought asylum on the ground that she is likely to be forcibly sterilized if returned to China. The immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals denied her application on the ground that she has no well-founded fear of sterilization. The immigration judge also found that she could relocate to a part of China in which the one-child policy is not enforced as enthusiastically as in Fujian. The Seventh Circuit vacated, first noting that the 2007 petition was timely because the birth of a second child resulted in changed circumstances, 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(D). The petitioner claims that after the birth of that child, Chinese authorities, who may have learned of the birth from her parents’ customary party to celebrate it, ordered her (via a letter to her father) to report for sterilization and subsequently revoked her village registration. The court noted that forced sterilization and forced abortion in Fujian have been documented and stated that the Board has not attempted “to construct an empirical basis … for its skeptical attitude toward these applicants.” View "Chen v. Holder" on Justia Law

Basden was hired as a PTI dispatcher in 2007, subject to an attendance policy that did not differentiate between absences for medical reasons and other absences. Basden had two absentee incidents in 2007. In January 2008, Basden became dizzy and fell in her home. A CT scan suggested that she might have multiple sclerosis. She was considered to have five absence incidents following her fall, prompting a verbal warning. Absences in April were treated as a sixth incident, resulting in a written warning. She began to feel numbness in her hands she asked to be relieved of assignments that required additional typing. The company moved her back to dispatcher, but eventually returned her to the typing duties. At her request, Basden was moved to a part-time position. Basden was absent again in May and was suspended for three days. Her request for leave was denied and she did not return to work. Her employment was terminated. In her suit under the Americans With Disabilities Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act, the district court found that Basden had failed to establish a prima facie right to the protection of either statute and granted PTI summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Basden v. Prof'l Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Goodwin pleaded guilty to knowingly failing to register and update a registration as a sex offender, under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, which makes it a felony for a sex offender knowingly to fail to register following an interstate move, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). He was sentenced to 27 months' imprisonment, to be followed by a life term of supervised release, subject to 10 special conditions. Goodwin claimed that the relevant SORNA provision is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority; that the district court committed plain error by miscalculating his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range for supervised release and then imposing a sentence within that miscalculated range; and challenges four conditions of his supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, but vacated the sentence, noting erroneous calculation of the advisory Guidelines range and the imposition of special conditions without explanation by the district court. View "United State v. Goodwin" on Justia Law

Reynolds and seven others drove to Gary, Indiana, and ambushed Russell, a marijuana dealer, outside his house. Russell turned over $15,000. Reynolds and the others beat and cut Russell, then tied him up, demanding more money or drugs. To create an opportunity for escape, Russell proposed that he take them to a cache of marijuana at a Chicago garage. Before they reached the garage, Russell convinced the men to let him drive so that the garage employees would not become suspicious. While held at gunpoint, Russell opened his door and dove onto the pavement. The assailants fled, but were arrested after Russell reported the crime. Russell and the other defendants identified Reynolds as the group’s leader. Reynolds insisted that he departed before the others and had not known of the plan to take Russell to Chicago. Convicted of kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1), conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and brandishing a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), Reynolds’s guidelines range was life imprisonment plus seven years for the firearm conviction. Reynolds had a four-level increase for his role as leader, U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a), and a six-level increase for a ransom demand. The Seventh Circuit upheld the leadership adjustment, but held that section 2A4.1(b)(1) requires that the ransom demand be “made” to a third party. View "United States v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Loera was a passenger in a car stopped for traffic violations. The driver consented to a search and the police found cocaine. Arrested, Loera was read his Miranda rights and refused to sign a waiver. Loera stated that he knew nothing about the cocaine; he had been asked to deliver the car. He offered to assist in apprehending intended recipients of the drugs. On his attorney’s motion, the judge suppressed statements made after a request for counsel, but did not suppress all post-arrest statements, nor rule that Loera had actually requested a lawyer. The court dismissed without prejudice, for violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3162(a)(2). After reindictment, Loera's attorney moved to suppress all the statements made after his arrest. The court ruled that Loera had never asked for a lawyer. Loera was convicted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Loera then moved to aside his conviction, arguing that his lawyer was ineffective, 28 U.S.C. 2255, for failing to argue that the first ruling on suppression should be binding at trial and for failing to argue that the delay violated both the Speedy Trial Act and the speedy trial clause of the Sixth Amendment, so that dismissal should have been with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Loera v. Unted States" on Justia Law

Jacob was convicted of selling an unregistered security, 15 U.S.C. 77e(a), and was sentenced to 14 months’ imprisonment and $241,630.95 in restitution. He was granted permission to travel to Australia two weeks after sentencing. He had been traveling to Australia for work while on bond before sentencing, had returned to be sentenced, and pledged to earn additional money to pay restitution. Five days after he was to report, the probation office informed the court that Jacob had failed to surrender as ordered, and his attorney suggested that he may have fled the country. The government then moved to dismiss Jacob’s pending appeal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. Jacob failed to respond to his attorney’s motion to withdraw, missed his deadline to file an opening brief, sent the court a rambling email arguing the merits of his appeal, and told his probation officer that he had no intention of returning to the U.S. The Seventh Circuit dismissed his appeal. View "United States v. Jacob" on Justia Law

Phillips was beneficiary of a life insurance policy purchased by her fiancé, Strang, issued by Prudential. When Strang died, Prudential informed Phillips that the default method of payment was the “Alliance Account settlement option,” under which the insurer, instead of paying a lump-sum benefit, creates an interest-bearing account for the beneficiary and sends her checks that can be used to draw the funds, in part or in whole, at any time. The funds are held in Prudential’s general investment account, which allows Prudential to profit from the spread between its investment returns and interest paid to the beneficiary, in Phillips’s case, three percent. In a putative class action, Phillips claimed that establishment of the Alliance Account as the default payment method and her enrollment in it breached the insurance policy and unreasonably delayed payment of benefits in violation of the Illinois Insurance Code and that Prudential breached a fiduciary duty by not disclosing information regarding investments made with her funds and by keeping investment profits. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. “Whether this practice is disreputable is open to debate,” but It did not breach the policy, did not effect an unreasonable delay, and did not breach any fiduciary duty. View "Phillips v. Prudential Ins. Co." on Justia Law