Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant was a member of a six-man gang of thieves that stole trucks and sold the cargoes to fences. The district court ruled that he was a leader or organizer and increased his base offense level by four levels, raising the guidelines range from 41 to 51 months to 63 to 78 months for conspiring to transport, and transporting, stolen motor vehicles and goods in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 371, 312, 2314. The judge imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 58 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that defendant was a “mere manager or supervisor.” The defendant used his information about what the fences would buy to direct the other members. The fences paid him for the cargoes and he split the money, acting as a paymaster and as a recruiter. Without him or someone in his position the gang would have fallen apart. View "United States v. Rosales" on Justia Law

Husband, Sirbu, and wife, Prodan, entered the U.S. as nonimmigrant tourists in 2009 and overstayed their visas. They then filed a timely application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Sirbu’s persecution claim is based on politically motivated mistreatment that occurred in Moldova between 2000 and 2009; he claims to fear prosecution based on his active opposition to the Communist Party. The government responded by charging them as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B). An immigration judge denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit granted their petition for review and remanded, finding that the immigration judge and the Board applied the wrong legal standard in holding that the facts did not “compel” a finding of past persecution. If the Board concludes that Sirbu has demonstrated past persecution, the burden will shift to the government to prove that changed circumstances mean that Sirbu’s fear of persecution in Moldova is no longer well-founded. View "Sirbu v. Holder" on Justia Law

Peoples Bank loaned Debtors $214,044, secured by a mortgage recorded in 2004. In 2008, Debtors obtained a $296,000 construction loan from Banterra, secured with a second mortgage on the same property. Banterra was aware of the first mortgage, but did not know was that in 2007, Debtors obtained a second loan from Peoples, for $400,000, secured by another mortgage on a different piece of property. The 2004 Peoples mortgage contained a cross-collateralization provision, stating that “In addition to the Note, this Mortgage secures all obligations … of Grantor to Lender … now existing or hereafter arising,” and a provision that “At no time shall the principal amount of the Indebtedness secured by the Mortgage … exceed $214,044.26 … “Indebtedness” … includes all amounts that may be indirectly secured by the Cross-Collateralization provision.” In 2010 Debtors filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The balance due on Peoples 2004 loan was then $115,044.26. Debtors received permission and sold the property for $388,500.00. Out of these proceeds, Peoples claimed the balance due on the 2004 loan plus partial payment of the 2007, up to the cap. The Bankruptcy Court found in favor of Peoples. The district court reversed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, upholding the “plain language” of the cross-collateralization agreement. View "Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Banterra Bank" on Justia Law

Following a high-speed chase, an assault on an officer, and a four-hour standoff at a hotel, Brown was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by an armed career criminal, bank robbery, interference with interstate commerce by robbery, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. Brown pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e) without a plea agreement and moved to continue the remaining counts of the indictment until after his sentencing on the firearm possession charge. Prior to sentencing, Brown objected to four factual representations contained in his Presentence Investigation Report and objected to the PSR’s application of a two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight. The district court imposed an above-guidelines sentence of 400 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district judge articulated her view of the disputed facts and explained how they impacted her ultimate sentencing determination. Taken together, the undisputed facts surrounding Brown’s flight demonstrate that Brown “recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person” when he fled from law enforcement on the day of his arrest, U.S.S.G. 3C1.2. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Federal agents and local police executed a search warrant at Williams’ residence and found five kilograms of marijuana, a handgun, and several scales. Williams moved to suppress, arguing that the warrant was invalid because officers presented the warrant judge with an affidavit that contained false statements and misleading omissions made with at least reckless disregard for the truth. The district court held a Franks hearing and found that the officers did not recklessly disregard the truth, and that even if they had, once the errors were removed and the omitted material included, probable cause would have remained for a search warrant to issue. Williams was convicted of being an illegal alien in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(5). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the police were rushing to draft an application and hastily omitted both favorable and unfavorable evidence from the affidavit. The court particularly noted omission of the information from monitored calls involving Williams that was “clearly sufficient to establish probable cause.” That omission provides a reasonable basis to believe that the police did not intend to mislead. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Elkhart police responded to a report of gunfire at an apartment and were greeted at the door by an obviously intoxicated Bloch. The officers told Bloch to step outside while they checked to see if anyone was injured. The apartment belonged to Bloch’s girlfriend, who was also told to wait outside. There were no gunshot victims, but the officers located a loaded Glock handgun and an assault rifle in plain view. As the officers removed the firearms, Bloch protested that the guns were his and demanded their return. Bloch is a felon and also has a conviction for a domestic-violence misdemeanor, making his firearm possession a federal crime, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), (g)(9). While in jail awaiting trial, he told a fellow inmate that the police found his Glock and SKS rifle at his girlfriend’s apartment and that he should have hidden them better. The district court imposed consecutive sentences of 120 months and 18 months. The Seventh Circuit remanded for resentencing. The evidence was sufficient to prove possession, but a single incident of firearm possession can yield only one conviction under section 922(g), no matter how many disqualified classes the defendant belongs to or how many firearms he possessed. View "Unted States v. Bloch" on Justia Law

Johnson, sole administrator of the Shirley T. Sherrod Benefit Pension Plan and Trust, sued the Plan’s custodian, Merrill Lynch, alleging that Merrill Lynch refused to abide by his instructions and has exercised control over Plan assets by refusing to make distribution to Sherrod. The Plan is a single-participant retirement account, exempt from garnishment under the anti-alienation provision of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1056(d). There is a freeze on the account, as a result of a Michigan state court order in a post-judgment collection proceeding. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that any harm is traceable to the state court order, not to Merrill Lynch. View "Johnson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc." on Justia Law

Under Illinois law, a candidate for the state legislature seeking placement on the general election ballot without having participated in a primary (or having replaced a candidate who did) must submit a nominating petition signed by a certain number of eligible voters. In July 2012, the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners determined that five Republican candidates for the state legislature had not collected the requisite numbers of signatures and denied their petitions to be listed on the ballot in the 2012 general election. In September the candidates and supporters sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the statutory scheme violated their constitutional rights to free speech and association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed, holding that the doctrine of laches barred their claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, after holding that laches does not apply because the delay in filing suit did not impact the Board’’ ability to fashion prospective relief in future elections. The requirement that candidates seeking ballot access submit nominating petitions is reasonable and nondiscriminatory, and serves the important regulatory interests of protecting the integrity of elections from frivolous candidates and preventing voter confusion; it does not unconstitutionally burden the candidates’ and voters’ expressive and associational rights. View "Navarro v. Neal" on Justia Law

From 1996 to 2003, Harbaugh worked periodically for Chicago Public Schools as a substitute music teacher. In 2003, she was hired as a “full-time basis substitute,” and tin 2004 she was appointed to a fulltime probationary tenure-track teaching position. In 2008, the principal at Harbaugh’s school recommended against renewing her contract. The Chicago Board of Education accepted that recommendation and terminated her appointment effective at the end of the semester. Harbaugh sued, alleging violation of her due-process rights by terminating her employment without a hearing. The district court entered summary judgment for the Board. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under Illinois law Harbaugh had a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment only if she had tenure; a teacher becomes tenured at the beginning of her fifth year of full-time employment on the tenure track. Her year as a full-time-basis substitute teacher does not count toward the four-year requirement. View "Harbaugh v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

From 2005 to 2008, Collins obtained drugs from the Flores twins in Mexico. They would contact their couriers, who would deliver 20-50 kilograms of cocaine to Collins in the Chicago area, often on “credit.” Collins would sell it to his “crew” at a profit of approximately $1,500 per kilogram. The crew sold the cocaine on the streets. In 2008 the Flores twins agreed to cooperate with the Drug Enforcement Administration. As a result, Collins was indicted for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. At trial, the government was allowed to play Flores’ taped conversations with Collins and to use the testimony of Officer Coleman regarding the “coded drug-dealing language” on the tapes. Collins did not object to the testimony’s admissibility at the time. Convicted, Collins was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, called for a term of 360 months to life, with an enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1 because the judge determined that Collins’ conduct in the conspiracy qualified him as a “manager or supervisor.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law