Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Ho-Chunk Nation, a federally recognized Indian Tribe, operates casinos in Wisconsin and nets more than $200 million annually from its gambling operations. Cash Systems, one of three businesses involved in this case, engaged in issuing cash to casino customers via automated teller machines and kiosks, check-cashing, and credit- and debit-card advances. Whiteagle, a member of the Nation, held himself out as an insider and offered vendors an entrée into the tribe’s governance and gaming operations. Cash Systems engaged Whiteagle in 2002 as a confidential consultant. Cash Systems served as the Nation’s cash-access services vendor for the next six years, earning more than seven million dollars, while it paid Whiteagle just under two million dollars. Whiteagles’s “in” was his relationship with Pettibone, who had been serving in the Ho-Chunk legislature since 1995. Ultimately, Whiteagle, Pettibone, and another were charged with conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 371) to commit bribery in connection with the contracts with the Ho-Chunk Nation and substantive bribery (18 U.S.C. 666). Whiteagle was also charged with tax evasion and witness tampering. Pettibone pleaded guilty to corruptly accepting a car with the intent to be influenced in connection with a contract. Whiteagle admitted that he had solicited money and other things of value for Pettibone from three companies, but denied actually paying bribes to Pettibone and insisted that he and Pettibone had advocated for Whiteagle’s clients based on what they believed to be the genuine merits of those clients. Convicted on all counts, Whiteagle was sentenced, below-guidelines, to 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence on the bribery charges, the loss calculation, and admission of certain evidence.View "United States v. Whiteagle" on Justia Law

Spitz, a freelance copywriter, developed a plan to market “pet safe plants” to the burgeoning pet supplies market. She pitched the idea to Amerinova, a company that develops and licenses plant varieties. Although Amerinova expressed interest, the project stalled. When Spitz discovered that Proven Winners, a company partially owned by the owners of Amerinova, had described some of its plants as “pet friendly” on its website and plant tags, she sued Proven Winners and its owner, Euro. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Proven Winners and Euro. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Spitz did not identify any legal theory that would make Proven Winners and Euro accountable for a contract allegedly reached with Amerinova.View "Spitz v. Proven Winners N. Am., LLC" on Justia Law

ABA Retirement, a not‐for‐profit corporation created by the American Bar Association to provide its members and their employees with a retirement plan qualified to take advantage of income tax benefits, created master retirement plans for adoption by lawyers and law firms. In 1999 ABA Retirement hired State Street Bank to act as sole Plan trustee. ABA Retirement directors ceased to be trustees. ABA Retirement still maintained the IRS‐approved master tax‐qualified retirement plans and acted as Plan fiduciary, with authority to engage, monitor, and fire its trustee. It was responsible for Plan documents (ensuring that they were tax‐qualified), oversight of vendors, contract negotiations, and approval of State Street’s marketing plan. State Street had authority to engage and fire investment advisors, but was required to consult with ABA Retirement. The Plan paid ABA Retirement a fee for its services in connection with the Program based on a percentage of l invested assets. ABA Retirement received the interest on the funds. In 2000, 2001, and 2002, ABA Retirement reported gross income of $1,601,217 to $1,861,258. Its taxable income for those years was $384,972 to $672,098; it held assets worth $3.5 million. On tax returns ABA Retirement described itself as an employee benefit fund, and its product as retirement plans. In 2004 ABA retirement sought tax‐exempt status. In 2005, the IRS determined that ABA Retirement did not qualify for the exemption. ABA Retirement filed claims for refunds on taxes it paid from 2000-2002; those were denied. ABA Retirement filed suit, arguing that it was a tax‐exempt “business league” under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6), from 2000 to 2002, and entitled to a refund. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "ABA Ret. Funds v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2009, Sheth, a cardiologist, pled guilty to a single count of healthcare fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347. As agreed by Sheth, the district court entered an order of criminal forfeiture for cash and investment accounts then valued at $13 million plus real estate and a vehicle. The government represented that the forfeited assets represented the proceeds of Sheth’s fraud, calculated to be about $13 million. Sheth’s plea agreement specifies that forfeited assets would be credited against the amount of restitution, which the district court had determined to be $12,376,310. In 2012, before the government had liquidated all of the forfeited assets or disbursed any of the proceeds, it sought more of Sheth’s assets to apply to restitution. Sheth objected. Without resolving the factual dispute, the district court ordered turnover of the assets, which were held by third parties. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that the court erred by ordering turnover of the assets without first allowing for discovery and holding an evidentiary hearing. View "United States v. Sheth" on Justia Law

Late on a Sunday night, gunshots were fired in northwest Chicago neighborhood. Numerous 911 callers reported from 5 to 9 shots. A dispatcher told officers to check the intersections at Wabansia and Karlov and at Armitage and Kildare, roughly a half-mile apart. Less than two minutes later, based on additional calls, the dispatcher added that shots were fired from a black car traveling south on Karlov near Wabansia. Officers driving south on Kostner Avenue, parallel to and a few streets west of Karlov, passed a black car headed north, and stopped the car. Burgess was a passenger and the officers found a revolver on his seat, five of its six rounds spent. Just over four minutes had passed from the initial dispatch to the officers’ report that Burgess was in custody. Having a 2001 conviction for second-degree murder, Burgess was indicted under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) for possessing the gun as a convicted felon. He unsuccessfully moved to suppress on the theory that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify stopping the car. The court found that, based on what the officers observed regarding the light traffic at that hour and what they knew from the dispatches, and the seriousness of the reported crime, reasonable suspicion justified the stop. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. All told, the circumstances provided ample justification for stopping Burgess’s car.. Reasonable, articulable, particularized suspicion is not a matter of certainty. View "United States v. Burgess" on Justia Law

A tip identified Smith as a possible cocaine dealer. With a search warrant, agents arrived at his apartment to discover 806.5 grams of powder cocaine, 148.6 grams of crack cocaine, 603.4 grams of marijuana, and a loaded handgun. Smith admitted that the drugs were his and that he intended to distribute them. Smith agreed to plead guilty to the cocaine count, to cooperate, and to waive his appellate rights. The government agreed to dismiss two counts, not to pursue enhanced statutory penalties based on Smith’s prior narcotics conviction, to recommend that Smith receive maximum credit for acceptance of responsibility, to consider filing a motion to reduce the Sentencing Guidelines range in recognition of cooperation, and to recommend that the court impose a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range. The court overruled Smith’s objections to the sentencing report, which produced an advisory range of 188 to 235 months, but ultimately imposed a sentence of 168 months. The Seventh Circuit rejected an argument that a competent attorney would have recognized the problem with a reckless homicide conviction as a predicate for career offender status, and that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting. On that basis, he asks us to vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing. The court relied on Smith’s waiver of his appellate and the thorough colloquy before the court accepted the plea. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Jewel Foods employed Reeves as a bagger from 1997 until his dismissal in 2005. Reeves has Down syndrome and received vocational tutoring from Jewel; a social service agency sent a job coach to work with Reeves. Jewel’s Service Manager provided individual training. Jewel instituted supervision policies that applied only to Reeves. Reeves, unlike the other baggers, was exempted from collecting shopping carts from the parking lot after he was found directing customers how to park their cars. Reeves sometimes had trouble complying with workplace rules. He cursed at a manager when the table at which he usually ate lunch was used for a tasting; he once cursed within earshot of a customer about another customer. In 2005, Reeves took an American flag pin from a store shelf without paying for it, apparently not realizing the pins were for sale. Despite its usual policy, Jewel decided not to fire him. Reeves’s parents asked if Jewel could bring back a job coach. Reeves’s supervisor deemed the extra instruction unnecessary. Reeves was later terminated for cursing at another employee within earshot of a customer and other employees. The EEOC concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe both that Jewel discriminated against Reeves because of his disability and that Jewel engaged in a pattern and practice of denying reasonable accommodations to disabled employees. The district court dismissed his Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, failure‐to‐accommodate claim, citing numerous accommodations Jewel had made and the fact that Jewel did not explicitly reject the Reeves’s job coach suggestion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Reeves v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Baptist is a native of Belize who entered the U.S.as a lawful permanent resident in 1988.In 1992, Baptist pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to probation. In 1995, Baptist was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and was again sentenced to probation. In 1996, Baptist was again convicted of possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. At the time, the offense was considered an aggravated felony and he was placed in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Baptist signed a stipulated removal order in 1998. Afterwards, he illegally reentered the U.S. several times; each time he was discovered, he was again removed to Belize. In 2005, Baptist illegally entered once more and avoided detection until he was arrested in 2010. Charged with being illegally present in the U.S. after having been previously removed, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). Baptist moved to dismiss the indictment, collaterally attacking his 1998 removal as violating his due process rights. The district court denied Baptist’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Baptist failed to establish that his removal proceedings were “fundamentally unfair.” View "United States v. Baptist" on Justia Law

Townsend, a prisoner at the Green Bay Correctional Institution (GBCI), sued GBCA officials for civil rights violations. Townsend suffered from significant mental illness and engaged in disruptive behavior, including suicide attempts and fighting. Townsend was repeatedly subjected observation placements and Behavioral Action Plans (BAPs). The district court rejected his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, but otherwise vacated. Townsend has raised genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the imposition of the BAP violated his due process rights by imposing an atypical and significant hardship compared to the ordinary incidents of prison life, without appropriate notice and an opportunity to be heard and whether the BAP imposed conditions of confinement that denied Townsend the minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities. View "Townsend v. Cooper" on Justia Law

In 1952 an Illinois owner granted a pipeline operator an easement for two pipelines across the parcel. The first was built immediately; the second, if built, had to be within 10 feet of the first. The contract says that any pipeline must be “buried to such depth as will not interfere with such cultivation.” In 2012 the operator notified the owner that it planned to build a second pipeline. The owner filed a quiet-title suit, alleging that either the right to build a second line had expired or that another line would violate the farmability condition. The operator replied that 49 U.S.C. 60104(c), preempts enforcement of the farmability condition. The district court dismissed. A second pipeline has been built 50 feet from the first, using eminent domain to obtain the necessary rights, but the owner anticipates construction of a third pipeline. Vacating the judgment, the Seventh Circuit held that no construction is currently planned and the district court acted prematurely. Until details of a third pipeline’ are known, it is not possible to determine what effect it would have on agricultural use. Only if a third pipeline prevents using the land for agriculture would it be necessary (or prudent) to determine whether section 60104(c) establishes a federal right to destroy more of the land’s value than paid for in 1952. The court stated that it had no reason to think that Illinois would call the 1952 contract an option or apply the Rule Against Perpetuities. View "Knight v. Enbridge Pipelines, L.L.C." on Justia Law