Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission served administrative subpoenas on Worth, a precious metal wholesaler, Mintco, a precious metal dealer, and DSD, a depository that stores precious metals, seeking documents relating to purchases and sales of precious metals, in connection with its investigation into whether those companies violated the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. 1. The companies handed over the requested documents, but redacted the names and contact information of the individual customers, retailers, and intermediaries, asserting that they (the companies) were covered by the Right to Financial Privacy Act, which requires that customers of a “financial institution” be given notice and the opportunity to object before any disclosures, 12 U.S.C. 3401, 3402(2), 3405. The district court held that the RFPA does not apply to the companies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the nature of the businesses is readily distinguishable from that of the other entities listed in the RFPA’s definition of “financial institution.” View "Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Worth Bullion Grp. Inc., " on Justia Law

Harris was a registered representative with an affiliated broker of MetLife and sold insurance, annuities, and other financial products. Investigations by the Illinois Securities Division, MetLife, and the IRS revealed that for almost eight years, Harris had been diverting client funds, using deposit and accounting methods that substantially departed from MetLife’s standard practices. She manipulated software to generate account summaries that falsely displayed the investments that her clients intended to purchase. Harris received $10,938,986.58 in client funds from more than 50 but fewer than 250 clients, reinvested $4,055,945.73 on the clients’ behalf, and used the balance for personal purposes. MetLife settled with clients who suffered a loss, paying more than $7 million. Harris pled guilty to mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957. The court’s sentencing calculation included addition of 18 offense levels for a loss in excess of $2.5 million, four levels for the number of victims, two levels for sophisticated means, for a total offense level of 35. The final guideline range was 168 to 210 months; the court sentenced her to 210 months in prison plus $6,812,764.98 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court erred in counting married couples as two separate victims. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

Earl was convicted of intentional homicide, jailed, and placed for five days onto “suicide watch” segregation where he was dressed in a “suicide-proof gown,” kept in continuous light for 24 hours, and constantly monitored. The jail says that suicide watch is required of every inmate convicted of a serious felony until he is examined by a mental-health expert. Earl claims that he was placed on suicide watch as punishment after an officer relayed false information that he had threatened other guards. Earl claimed an allergic reaction to the special gown and received medical attention. After a mental-health worker recommended that Earl be discharged from suicide watch, Earl was placed for 12 days in administrative segregation, apparently as punishment for initially refusing to wear the suicide gown, and afterwards was transferred to a Wisconsin state prison. Two years later Earl returned to the jail for a court appearance and again was housed in segregation. In his suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) the district court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that Earl’s placement in segregation was too short to deprive him of a liberty interest and that conditions were not “unusually harsh.” Earl did not show delay in responding to his claim of allergic reaction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Earl v. Racine Cnty. Jail" on Justia Law

Martin made images and videos depicting child pornography available on a file-sharing network. A search of his home uncovered hundreds more images and several videos of child pornography on computers. Martin pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). The presentence report calculated that sentencing guidelines yielded a range of 121 to 151 months. Given the ten-year statutory maximum sentence, Martin’s effective guidelines range was 120 months, U.S.S.G. 5G1.1(c)(1). The PSR noted that Martin had been diagnosed with major depressive disorder, dysthymia, alcohol and marijuana dependency, and polysubstance abuse, and had received a “possible, but doubtful” diagnosis of bipolar disorder. Martin had engaged in self-mutilation, had been hospitalized for mood disorders, and had attempted suicide, but was not receiving medication or treatment because he could not afford it. Martin did not object to the calculations, but argued that: his personal characteristics indicate a low likelihood of recidivism; the guidelines produce excessive sentences in possession cases: his contribution to the total harm of child pornography was negligible; and a shorter sentence was necessary to avoid disparities. The district court sentenced Martin to 120 months’ imprisonment, explaining that child-pornography offenders “are not rational thinkers in the first place.” The Seventh Circuit remanded for resentencing, because the court failed to address arguments concerning Martin’s personal characteristics and the goals of sentencing. View "United States v. Martin" on Justia Law

Ramos was arrested in 2007 and charged with residential burglary. After an Illinois state court acquitted him of that charge, he brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Chicago and five police officers violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in conducting a false arrest and malicious prosecution, and also asserting state law claims for malicious prosecution and indemnification. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the section 1983 claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ramos’ state law claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Based on a report of a burglary and a description of the suspect, the officers had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was ongoing, sufficient to justify a “Terry” stop. Ramos’ failure to produce a valid driver’s license provided probable cause for his arrest. View "Ramos v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, defendant was sentenced to 168 months of incarceration, applying a relatively recent sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12) for “maintain[ing] a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Considering the frequency and significance of the illicit activities conducted on the premises, application of the enhancement was clearly warranted; the judge did not improperly consider the defendant’s personal characteristics. View "United States v. Flores-Olague" on Justia Law

Morris died after a 2004 collision in Indiana; he was a passenger in Sampson’s vehicle. Sampson was insured by Mid-Century. The Estate made a claim for $50,000, the highest allowable amount. Nuzzo, a citizen of Ohio, was the assigned claims adjustor. The Estate ultimately filed a wrongful death suit. An Indiana state court awarded $1.2 million. Sampson assigned his rights against Mid-Century for an agreement that the Estate would not pursue collection against Sampson personally. In 2011, the Estate sued Mid-Century in California state court, alleging that its bad faith failure to pay the claim resulted in the excess jury verdict against Sampson. The court dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. The Estate then sued Mid-Century and Nuzzo in Ohio state court, alleging tortious bad faith failure to pay the claim and breach of contract. The case was removed to an Ohio federal district court, then transferred to the district court in Indianapolis, which found that claims against Nuzzo were potentially viable under Ohio law, but that Indiana law governed both claims, so that Nuzzo was fraudulently joined. The court dismissed claims against Nuzzo and denied the Estate’s motion to remand. The Seventh Circuit vacated with instructions to remand, finding that Nuzzo was not fraudulently joined. View "Morris v. Nuzzo" on Justia Law

Hakim was an Accenture employee for nearly 10 years before being let go as part of a workforce reduction. During part of his tenure with the company, he participated in the company’s pension plan. In 1996, Accenture amended the plan to exclude a number of employees in various departments. In 1999, Hakim was promoted to a position in which he was no longer eligible to participate in the plan under the terms of the 1996 amendment. Upon his 2003 termination, at age 39, Hakim signed a release in exchange for separation benefits that waived all claims that arose prior to signing the release. In 2008, while employed elsewhere, Hakim sought additional pension benefits from Accenture, arguing that the notice of the 1996 amendment to the plan (which was emailed to employees) was insufficient and violated ERISA’s notice requirements, 29 U.S.C. 1054(h). His claim was denied by Accenture. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Accenture, holding that Hakim knew or should have known about his claim when he signed the release, and thus waived his claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hakim v. Accenture U.S. Pension Plan" on Justia Law

Parker was employed as a bank teller, assigned to reconcile temporary checks to temporary check issuance forms. Temporary checks were blank checks kept behind the counter for customer use. Investigation of a 2006 robbery at the branch led to the allegation that Parker stole eight temporary checks, drawn on the accounts of four customers, and cashed them for a total of $76,450. Some of the funds were returned, the actual loss to the Bank was approximately $49,890. Parker was represented by four different appointed counsel and eventually proceeded pro se; in 2011, the district court ordered a competency evaluation. Although represented by counsel, Parker filed an unsuccessful pro se motion to dismiss on several grounds, including an alleged speedy trial violation. More than 18 months after her arraignment, Parker’s jury trial commenced. Convicted of three counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344, and of embezzlement by a bank employee, 18 U.S.C. 656, she was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment, including an enhancement for obstruction of justice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, but vacated the sentence. The district court’s comments did not clarify whether it found that Parker’s denial of involvement in the scheme was willful. View "USA v. Ruby Parker" on Justia Law

Davenport showed his gun to his friends at a bar. A bar employee observed him and called the police, and Davenport, a felon on probation, was arrested and charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He pleaded guilty and was sentenced as an armed career criminal to 192 months’ imprisonment. Davenport filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed lawyer filed an Anders motion to withdraw. The Seventh Circuit granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. In challenging the voluntariness of his plea, Davenport could not meet the stringent plain-error standard on the record before us. The district court ensured that he understood the charge against him, Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(1), the penalties he faced (from 15 years to life in prison, a fine of up to $250,000, and up to 5 years of supervised release), id. at (H)-(M), and the various trial and appellate rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. The court’s single omission from the list of waived rights was Davenport’s right to testify if he went to trial, but such an oversight does not constitute plain error unless the error actually renders the defendant’s conviction unjust. View "United States v. Davenport" on Justia Law