Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gomberg briefly represented Goyal in 2004 settlement negotiations with a former employer over his claims of retaliation for whistle-blowing and gave Goyal’s employer notice of an attorney lien on any settlement or judgment. The negotiations did not produce an agreement; Goyal later retained new counsel to pursue litigation. In 2009, without the aid of any counsel, Goyal settled with his former employer. After Goyal settled, Gomberg reappeared and demanded a share. The employer paid a portion of the settlement to Gomberg. The district court granted Goyal’s motion to quash the lien, effectively ordering Gomberg to pay Goyal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Gomberg is not entitled to any part of the settlement funds Goyal secured and that “Gomberg’s professional conduct is questionable.” His position that he “secured” funds for Goyal when the opposing party made an unacceptable and unaccepted settlement offer is unreasonable to the point of being frivolous and possibly warranting sanctions. Gomberg’s assertion of a lien for $70,000 was far greater than 10 percent of even the employer’s unaccepted (and not yet made) offer of $375,000 and was without basis. View "Goyal v. Gas Tech. Inst." on Justia Law

The petitioner, a Chinese citizen, entered the U.S. in 2001, at the age of 18, and applied for asylum on the ground that if returned to China she would be punished for having refused to marry a Communist Party official. Her application for asylum was denied and in 2004 she was ordered removed. She stayed and applied to reopen her removal proceeding in order to apply for asylum and withholding of removal on the ground of changed conditions in China. In 2011 she had converted to Christianity, and she argued that if removed to China her religious beliefs would compel her to join a Christian church not recognized as legitimate by the Chinese government and to proselytize, which the government forbids, and as a result she would face persecution. The BIA rejected her argument, reasoning that her personal circumstances changed, as opposed to country conditions. The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting evidence of religious persecution in China. View "Shu Liu v. Holder" on Justia Law

Weaver sold methamphetamine on credit to two buyers, who paid off their debts by selling the drugs to their own customers. Weaver pleaded guilty to conspiring with those buyers to possess and distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846, and the district court sentenced him to 235 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of the guidelines range, assessing a 3-level upward adjustment for his perceived leadership role as a manager or supervisor of the conspiracy, U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(b). The Seventh Circuit vacated, stating that there was no evidence that Weaver managed or supervised his buyers or any other participant. Although he determined how much and how often they got drugs, Weaver did not control to whom or at what price the others sold the drugs Weaver fronted. View "United States v. Weaver" on Justia Law

Since entering the U.S. from Mexico in 1993, Garcia-Segura has had arrests. He was first removed in 2003 after serving two years in jail for possessing cocaine. Less than two months later, he was arrested in the U.S. for delivering cocaine to an undercover officer. After serving part of his nine-year prison sentence, he was removed a second time in 2007 but returned within three days. In 2009, he encountered immigration officials while incarcerated on charges of possession of cocaine and possession of a firearm by a felon. He was charged with unauthorized presence in the U.S. after removal, 18 U.S.C. 1326(a). He pleaded guilty and sought a 19-month reduction to account for time he served in county jail after immigration officials learned of his illegal presence but before he was charged. He argued that, had the government charged him when immigration officials first discovered him, he would have received concurrent sentences. The government responded that concurrent sentences would have been inappropriate because the state crimes were unrelated to the illegal-reentry and that his recidivism merited a more severe sentence. The district court imposed a sentence of 90 months’ imprisonment, within the guideline range of 77 to 96 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Segura" on Justia Law

SAMS contracted with Environs to provide architectural services for construction of a Homewood Suites hotel in Fort Wayne. Environs was to be paid a flat fee of $70,000. The contract stated: The Owner [SAMS] agrees that to the fullest extent permitted by law, Environs Architects/Planners, Inc. total liability to the Owner shall not exceed the amount of the total lump sum fee due to negligence, errors, omissions, strict liability, breach of contract or breach of warranty. The hotel was nearly complete when serious structural defects were discovered. The building department condemned the structure. Attempts to remedy failed; the hotel was demolished without opening. SAMS estimated its loss at more than $4.2 million. While SAMS’s suit against Environs was pending, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the “economic loss rule” applies to construction contracts under Indiana law: a party to a contract cannot be liable under a tort theory for any purely economic loss caused by negligent performance of the contract, absent any personal injury or damage to other property. The district court applied the rule to grant summary judgment rejecting SAMS’s negligence claim and held that SAMS’s recovery on its breach of contract claim would be limited to $70,000. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Sams Hotel Grp., LLC v. Environs, Inc." on Justia Law

Bitsin, a citizen of Bulgaria, entered the U.S. in 2005. Before his visitor’s visa expired, Bitsin applied for a student visa, assisted by an attorney recommended by the college. Bitsin claimed that he believed that he could “just stay,” but not work, while his application was pending and that he was unable to locate the attorney. In 2007 removal proceedings, Bitsin applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT. Bitsin testified that his father, a retired Bulgarian military officer, owned a private security company that threatened the interests of the Galev Brothers crime syndicate, also in the security services business. Bitsin testified concerning a shooting incident and that his father was taken into protective custody, while other families left the country. The Galev Brothers were acquitted; to Bitsin’s knowledge, his father remains under protection. Another cooperating witness was murdered while in police custody and his father’s neighbors were killed when a bomb exploded in their garage. An IJ held that Bitsin’s application for asylum was time-barred and that Bitsin had not established that he was more likely than not to suffer persecution should he be returned to Bulgaria. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit rejected a petition for review. View "Bitsin v. Holder" on Justia Law

A federal prisoner serving a term for unarmed robbery and confined in a two-person cell in the prison’s segregation unit because of a fight he’d had with another inmate, strangled his cellmate. He was convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to life in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that he killed in “the heat of passion” and should have been convicted only of voluntary manslaughter. The jury had to find malice beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict the defendant of murder, so evidence that he acted in the heat of passion and therefore without malice would, if believed, have required the jury to acquit him of the charge of murder. The heat of passion “defense” just puts the government to its proof. View "United States v. Delaney" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Farmer of armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a),(d), and 2, and use of a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Several days after the trial, an alternate juror contacted Farmer’s counsel and said that other jurors had made statements during the prosecution’s case indicating that they had discussed the evidence and had already decided Farmer was guilty, all before jury deliberations could have properly begun. Farmer moved for a new trial, arguing that this premature deliberation prejudiced her and violated her right to a fair trial. The district court denied the motion and imposed a sentence of 141 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The evidence was sufficient to support a guilty verdict, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a new trial.The information, which did not indicate any external influence, came to the attention of the court only after the verdict was returned, when no corrective action could be taken and any inquiry into the effects of the comments would have run into Rule 606(b)’s bar on such inquiry. View "United States v. Farmer" on Justia Law

While proceeding to the Stateville prison cafeteria, Navejar spoke to other inmates in their cells. Officer Iyiola ordered him to get out of the line because prison rules forbid inmates from stopping to speak to other inmates. Navejar disobeyed, became belligerent, and punched Iyiola. Other guards wrestled Navejar to the ground where he was handcuffed. Navejar claims that guards kicked him in the forehead, stomped his head against the ground, pepper-sprayed him, dragged him along the floor, and left him alone for a half-hour, while he screamed in pain, before he was allowed to wash off the pepper spray. The next morning a guard brought Navejar to Stateville’s health care unit, where nurses examined him. Before a doctor could provide attention, a guard escorted Navejar out, explaining that he was being transferred to Pontiac. At Pontiac, Navejar was examined by a physician, who concluded that he had suffered only bruises and scratches. In Navejar’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied motions to recruit counsel and entered summary judgment for the guards on Eighth Amendment claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the court applied the wrong legal standard to Navejar’s motion and that lack of counsel prejudiced him. View "Navejar v. Iyiola" on Justia Law

Beginning in 2003, Schmitz convinced financial institutions and others to lend him money, ostensibly for real estate development, by stating that he was the beneficiary of a multi-million dollar trust fund whose assets were available as collateral. There was no trust; Schmitz concocted a trail of paper and digital documents, even creating a phony financial services firm (with a website and virtual office space), and filing suit against fictitious employees of the (non-existent) firm claiming mishandling of the trust. Schmitz obtained more than $6 million from seven banks and two additional lenders. He used about half to pay off previous lenders, and the rest for personal expenses. Schmitz pleaded guilty to mail fraud affecting a financial institution, 18 U.S.C. 1341. Because Schmitz began the charged fraud in 2003, while on supervised release in connection with a prior state conviction, the advisory Guidelines range was 87 to 108 months in prison. The court imposed an 87-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that “factor creep” in the Guidelines has inflated beyond reason the sentencing range for white collar frauds, particularly for someone of Schmitz’s age (60) and health and concerning the timespan of the fraud. View "United States v. Schmitz" on Justia Law