Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Turley is serving a life sentence in an Illinois state prison. Between January 7, 2008, and October 4, 2010, administration 25 times placed the prison on lockdown, confining prisoners to their cells without yard time; the longest continuous lockdown was 81 days, for a total of 534 lockdown days, more than 50% of the period at issue. Turley brought Eighth Amendment claims and a Due Process claim, claiming that lockdowns were often imposed for non-penological purposes, such as isolated fights, rumors of a potential fight, or no reason at all. Turley claimed that he suffered injuries including irritable bowel syndrome, headaches, tinnitus, sleep deprivation, colon spasms, nosebleeds, weight loss and extreme stress; that there was of a conspiracy among prison officials and union employees to create a staff shortage, negotiate a pay raise, and allow staff to take vacation; and that his $10 monthly idle pay stipend was withheld during lockdowns without due process. Turley’s grievances were denied; he filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, which was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, finding that Turley exhausted administrative remedies with respect to the Eighth Amendment claims, that those claims are not time-barred, and that they sufficiently state a claim. The Due Process claim was properly dismissed. View "Gregory Turley v. Dave Rednour, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to gun and drug offenses and was sentenced to 270 months in prison: 240 months for those offenses, with classification as an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1)), plus 30 months for violation of supervised release imposed for a previous drug offense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence, finding error in making the sentence of 30 months consecutive and a clerical error. The 240-month sentence exceeded the applicable guidelines range of 188 to 235 months, and it was unclear whether the judge knew he was sentencing above the range. On remand, the judge imposed a sentence of 230 months, based solely on the gun and drug offenses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting the defendant’s argument that the remand required that the court “start from scratch.” View "United States v. Simms" on Justia Law

Five died after using heroin distributed by a narcotics trafficking organization; five defendants pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute in excess of one kilogram of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. Because of the deaths, the prosecution requested a mandatory minimum of 20 years’ imprisonment, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). The district court believed that it was required to impose the same penalty on each defendant under a theory of strict liability. The Seventh Circuit affirmed three of the sentences and vacated two. A trial court must make specific factual findings to determine whether the relevant conduct of each defendant encompassed the distribution chain that caused a victim’s death before applying the 20-year penalty. Three defendants were found to be in the distribution chain that led to the deaths; the record supported those findings. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

In the 1980s, the owners bought the Cottonwood seasonal campground in Cedar Grove, Indiana. Each of 50-80 campsites has a water spigot and sewer hookup for recreational vehicles. The property also has two restrooms with working toilets, sinks, and showers. In 1998, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued an Administrative Order under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 300g-3(b), (g), finding that Cottonwood operated as a public water system and was required to sample its water system, and to notify any individuals who use the property of its past failure to monitor the water system. The owners tested the water only sporadically over the following years. They denied that the water system constituted a public water system under SDWA because the water spigots are marked as “Non-Potable,” so users would know that water is not provided for human consumption. The district court entered summary judgment, finding violation of SDWA. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, finding that the owners had not raised any of their appellate arguments in the district court. View "United States v. Ritz" on Justia Law

In 2010, Hill filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241, arguing that the district court had erred in deeming him a career offender when calculating his sentence in 1999. The Seventh Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. 2255(e) forecloses resort to 2241, because Hill could have used section 2255 to present the same argument, if he had acted promptly after the decision in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008). Hill did not seek rehearing or Supreme Court review, but sought relief in the district court under F.R.C.P. 60(b), arguing that the Seventh Circuit overlooked that he had earlier lost a 2255 motion The district court denied the motion, concluding that failure to apprise the court of important facts is not “excusable neglect,” permitting reopening of a judgment. The Seventh Circuit subsequently held that 2241 may apply under specific circumstances when 2255 does not allow successive collateral attack. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of relief, reasoning that legal developments after a final judgment do not qualify as extraordinary circumstances for a litigant who bypassed arguments on appeal. The court noted that Hill did not argue that he is in prison for an act that is not criminal; his sentence is within the range that would have prevailed had the judge not applied a career-offender enhancement. View "Hill v. Rios" on Justia Law

Taylor, convicted of murder in Illinois state court, was sentenced to 35 years in prison. In his habeas corpus petition, Taylor claimed that his counsel operated with a conflict of interest by jointly representing him and his brother, Lowell, in simultaneous murder trials. He claimed that the conflict adversely affected his representation because his lawyer refused to call certain exculpatory witnesses, because they might implicate his brother in the murder. The Illinois Supreme Court denied relief, finding that Taylor’s interests did not conflict with those of his brother and relied upon a purported credibility finding by the trial court that any conflict did not adversely affect the performance of Taylor’s lawyer. In a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, the district court rejected the arguments. The Seventh Circuit remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the conflict of interest between Taylor and Lowell adversely affected Taylor’s representation. The state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in holding that Taylor’s interest in presenting exculpatory witnesses did not conflict with his brother’s interest in preventing admission of inculpatory testimony and unreasonably determined that the trial court’s bare rejection of the claim must have constituted an implicit credibility finding concerning the motivation of the lawyer. View "Taylor v. Ground" on Justia Law

Ferraro suffered serious burns after falling asleep next to the power adapter of her newly purchased laptop computer. She filed a product liability suit, alleging a design defect that allowed the power adapter to overheat, that HP failed to include adequate warnings about the power adapter’s propensity to overheat, and that HP breached an implied warranty of merchantability. The district court granted HP summary judgment, reasoning that Ferraro would be unable to show that the adapter was “unreasonably dangerous,” as required for her design defect claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Illinois law provides two alternative methods of establishing unreasonable danger: the “consumer-expectations test” and the “risk-utility test.” Ferraro appealed with respect to the consumer expectations test, but, under Illinois law, the risk-utility test “trumps” in design defect cases if the two methods of establishing unreasonable dangerousness have conflicting results. The district court’s finding that Ferraro could not succeed under the risk-utility test furnished an independent, unchallenged ground for its decision. View "Ferraro v. Best Buy Stores, L.P." on Justia Law

Vaughn was the leader of a heroin distribution conspiracy in Beloit, Wisconsin. Tips from heroin users led police to one of Vaughn’s distributors, who was arrested with 70 bags of heroin on his person. The distributor signed a plea agreement and agreed to testify against Vaughn and Vaughn’s other distributor, Lockhart. They were charged with conspiring to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a) and 846. A jury convicted them on largely-circumstantial evidence. Vaughn was sentenced to 240 months and Lockhart to 72 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentence. The district court properly concluded that a 350-page production detailing witness statements and surveillance activities was adequate to satisfy the need for a bill of particulars without being so voluminous that it placed an unreasonable burden on the defendants. View "United States v. Vaughn" on Justia Law

Vitrano pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possessing a firearm while under a domestic abuse injunction, 922(g)(8)(B). The prosecution argued that, under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), he should have faced a minimum of 180 months’ imprisonment based on three prior “violent felony” convictions for escape and recklessly endangering safety. On remand, the district court imposed an above-guidelines sentence of 360 months; the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Vitrano moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing Fifth Amendment violations, ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the court erred in sentencing him under ACCA. Vitrano claimed that he had located a discharge certificate restoring civil rights he lost due to his 1977 conviction for endangering safety. The prosecution determined that the certificate was forged. Vitrano was indicted for perjury and corrupt influence, 18 U.S.C. 1623(a); 1512(b)(1) & (c)(2). Instead of filing a reply, Vitrano sought leave to amend his 2255 motion, claiming that the earlier convictions were not violent felonies for ACCA purposes. The government argued that, not filing a reply to his initial 2255 filing, Vitrano had abandoned his claims. The district court denied Vitrano’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Vitrano v. United States" on Justia Law

The 1987 Public Utilities Act, 220 ILCS 5/8-403.1, was intended to encourage development of power plants that convert solid waste to electricity. Local electric utilities were required to enter into 10-year agreements to purchase power from such plants designated as “qualified” by the Illinois Commerce Commission, at a rate exceeding that established by federal law. The state compensated electric utilities with a tax credit. A qualified facility was obliged to reimburse the state for tax credits its customers had claimed after it had repaid all of its capital costs for development and implementation. Many qualified facilities failed before they repaid their capital costs, so that Illinois never got its tax credit money back. The Act was amended in 2006, to establish a moratorium on new Qualified Facilities, provide additional grounds for disqualifying facilities from the subsidy, and expand the conditions that trigger a facility’s liability to repay electric utilities’ tax credits. The district court held that the amendment cannot be applied retroactively. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The amendment does not clearly indicate that the new repayment conditions apply to monies received prior to the amendment and must be construed prospectively. View "Illinois v. Chiplease, Inc." on Justia Law