Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Officer Kermon charged Gutierrez with public intoxication and resisting arrest. According to Gutierrez, he was walking home from work, minding his own business, when Kermon, who never identified himself as a police officer, stopped him at gunpoint, pepper sprayed him, placed him in handcuffs, delivered gratuitous kicks to his torso, and uttered a racially derogatory slur. Officer Kermon says that Gutierrez was a belligerent drunkard, unsteady on his feet, who yelled at Kermon, and assumed an aggressive fighting stance. Gutierrez sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Kermon violated his fourth amendment. The district court concluded that Kermon had reasonable suspicion to make an investigative detention but that a finding of qualified immunity was precluded genuine issues of material fact on the issue of probable cause. Because Kermon’s argument depends on a disputed fact, the Seventh Circuit dismissed an interlocutory appeal for want of jurisdiction..Tinde View "Gutierrez v. Kermon" on Justia Law

The Palomars filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7. The trustee reported that the estate contained nothing that could be sold to obtain money for unsecured creditors. A discharge of dischargeable debts was entered and the bankruptcy case was closed. The day before the trustee issued his report, the Palomars had filed an adversary action against the bank that held a second mortgage on their home. The balance on their first mortgage, but the house was valued at $165,000. The Palomars argued that the second mortgage should be dissolved under 11 U.S.C. 506(a). Deciding that the adversary action was meritless, the judge refused to reopen the bankruptcy proceeding. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the only debts normally extinguished are those for which a claim was rejected. The bank made no claim; this was a no-asset bankruptcy. Failing to extinguish the lien only deprives the debtors of the chance to make money should the value of their home ever exceed the balance on the first mortgage. View "Palomar v. First Am. Bank" on Justia Law

On May 10, 2011, Harmon was indicted Harmon for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, attempting to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, and using a telephone to facilitate a drug-trafficking crime. Harmon was detained pending trial. The court set trial for July 18, 2011. On June 30, the government filed its only motion for a continuance. Following a hearing, the court reset the trial to August 22. Defense counsel had indicated that he had scheduled a vacation in early August. The court explained that the prosecution needed a reasonable opportunity to investigate evidence about Harmon’s alleged consciousness of guilt, which could not have been obtained before his arrest, by reviewing 200 to 250 telephone calls Harmon had made while detained Convicted, Harmon was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning a speedy trial violation; that disclosure of his prior drug conviction deprived him of a fair trial; and that the district court erred in its fact finding at sentencing. View "United States v. Harmon" on Justia Law

In 1998, Zheng, under the legal age for marriage in China, became pregnant by her boyfriend, who also was under age. The government family planning officials took Zheng to a hospital, where she underwent an abortion. Zheng left China shortly thereafter, entered the U.S. illegally in 1999, married, and had two children. Zheng sought asylum in 2006, claiming she had undergone a forced abortion and feared that, if returned to China, she would be sterilized for having had two children. In 2008 an immigration judge denied Zheng’s application for asylum and withholding of removal, finding that she had missed the one-year deadline for filing an asylum application, 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(2)(B), and did not qualify for any exception, and, in the alternative that even if the birth of Zheng’s second child was a circumstance that allowed for an exception to the deadline, asylum would have been denied because the birth of two children in the U.S. does not give rise to a well-founded fear of future persecution. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed her appeal and ordered her removed. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. View "Zheng v. Holder" on Justia Law

Pulungan tried to acquire 100 Leupold Mark 4 CQ/T riflescopes, for export to Saudi Arabia and transship to Indonesia. He did not secure an export license, but later claimed that he was buying small lots, not to avoid the license requirement, but to be to be unnoticed in an effort to avoid an embargo (which had been lifted two years earlier). Pulungan spent 23 months in prison for attempting to export defense materials without a license, 22 U.S.C. 2778, before the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the evidence did not show beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew that a license was required. Pulungan requested a certificate of innocence, 28 U.S.C. 2513, can be used to seek compensation, 28 U.S.C. 1495. The judge agreed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for determination of Pulungan’s actual intent. A conclusion that the prosecution did not prove a charge beyond a reasonable doubt is not a conclusion that the defendant is innocent in fact View "United States v. Pulungan" on Justia Law

Sroga filed a 54-page complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against employees of Chicago Public Schools and the Board of Education, alleging that they got him fired from his job as an instructor. The district court dismissed for violation of FRCP 8(a)(2), stating that “the morass of irrelevant and tangential allegations” made it “impossible” to evaluate the complaint, but allowed submission of an amended complaint. Sroga timely filed an amended complaint asserting various constitutional and tort-law claims. After five months with no indication of whether Sroga would be permitted to proceed, the district court dismissed most of the claims, leaving claims for retaliatory discharge against an individual and for indemnification against the Board. The court scheduled a status hearing two months later and warned that if Sroga failed to appear, “the Court may dismiss the case for want of prosecution.” The U.S. Marshal’s Office mailed Sroga a letter requesting information about how to serve summonses. Sroga did not respond, and the summonses were returned unexecuted. When Sroga did not appear for his status hearing, the court dismissed. Sroga unsuccessfully moved to vacate, asserting that he was working out of town and did not receive any notification. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting Sroga’s history of compliance and that one missed date is not generally a basis for dismissal. View "Sroga v. Huberman" on Justia Law

Simpson, convicted of drug offenses, was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment, which the district court found to be the statutory minimum, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Simpson’s collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that his lawyer had furnished ineffective assistance, was rejects. Three years later he filed another collateral attack, which the district court rejected as lacking required appellate authorization. At the time of Simpson’s sentencing, either the jury or the judge could decide whether a defendant’s conduct met requirements for a mandatory minimum sentence. In 2013 the Supreme Court held that a judge cannot make that decision unless the defendant waives entitlement to a jury. Simpson argues that the decision entitles him to a second collateral attack because it establishes a new constitutional rule, 28 U.S.C. 2255(h)(2), and proposes another ineffective assistance attack, which is barred by 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(1) and a claim based on the jury clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, stating that section 2255(h)(2) applies only when the new rule has been “made retroactive to cases on collateral review” by the Supreme Court. View "Simpson v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2011 Wisconsin reduced subsidies for the Wisconsin Care Program, which funds grants for organizations administering programs for disabled persons who live in group homes. The plaintiffs are developmentally disabled and suffered the largest cuts. Persons who had received smaller payments bore smaller cuts. For some (frail elderly) per capita payments increased. Plaintiffs claim that making larger absolute cuts for persons whose care is most expensive violated the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act and that reduction in payments increases the risk that they will be moved from group homes to institutions. The district judge noted that states have waived sovereign immunity with respect to the Rehabilitation Act, as a condition to receiving federal funds. The Supreme Court has held that the portions of the ADA that are not designed to implement disabled persons’ constitutional rights cannot be used to override states’ sovereign immunity. The district court concluded that the relevant provisions of the ADA do not concern the Constitution and that other claims were premature because no plaintiff has been moved to an institution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that without information about care provided to other disabled persons, there is no useful theory of discrimination. View "Amundson v. WI Dep't of Health Servs." on Justia Law

Thompson, convicted of a gun crime based entirely on the testimony of Chicago police officers, claimed that the officers planted a gun in the vicinity of his stop and arrest to fabricate a case. While he was imprisoned, the State’s Attorney uncovered widespread corruption in the department, implicating the officers who testified against Thompson. His conviction was vacated. Thompson sued the arresting officers, alleging due-process violations under Brady v. Maryland and sued the city. During discovery, the defendants and other potential witnesses from the department invoked their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Thompson had to rely on his own testimony and the adverse inference from assertion of the Fifth Amendment. The court excluded much of Thompson’s proferred testimony from other victims of police misconduct and the guilty-plea testimony of officers who were convicted. The jury found one of the officers liable, only on the Brady claim. As damages for more than three years of wrongful imprisonment the jury awarded $15,000. Thompson challenged the evidentiary rulings and certain trial tactics by defense counsel that he claims were improper. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. While none of the errors were prejudicial standing alone, their cumulative effect had a substantial and injurious effect. View "Thompson v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Akram, her mother, and her younger sister were citizens of Pakistan. Akram’s mother married Siddique, a U.S. citizen, in 2005 when Akram was 18 years old. The marriage occurred outside the U.S.; Siddique requested K visas so that the women could wait for permanent visas in the U.S. and filed I-130 petitions to make them eligible for immigrant visas as “immediate relatives” of a citizen. 8 U.S.C. 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). Akram’s mother and sister received K-3 visas and their I-130 Petitions were granted. Akram’s request for a K visa was granted, but her I-130 petition was denied because of inconsistent definitions, such that she was too old to be Siddique’s “child,” even though she was still her mother’s “minor child.” Akram’s mother became a lawful permanent resident and filed her own I-130 alien relative petition on Akram’s behalf in 2008, which is pending. Akram remained in the U.S. after her K-4 visa expired, and removal proceedings began in 2009. An Immigration Judge held that 8 C.F.R. 245.1(i) bars Akram from adjusting status by any means other than through Siddique. The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, referring to the Immigration and Nationality Act as "Byzantine” and concluding that the regulation at issue conflicts with congressional intent. View "Akram v. Holder" on Justia Law