Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Almy lives in Indiana. He began working for Kickert School Bus Line in 2000, at a terminal located in Illinois. He picked up children at private schools in Illinois and took them to homes in Indiana, drove charter trips for Illinois schools, and would occasionally pick up children at Illinois schools and drive them to Indiana. Almy believed that Kickert was under-paying him because, under the collective bargaining agreement, he did not receive a higher hourly rate of pay for overtime, even though he worked more than 40 hours per week; he was not paid for the 20 minutes it took him to prepare his bus each morning or for time required for fueling, cleaning, and paperwork; and was not paid during charter trips for time it took to drive the empty bus to the school and then back to the bus terminal. Kickert began providing overtime pay in 2008. Almy sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act for back pay. The district court entered summary judgment for his former employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on an exemption from overtime provisions for interstate drivers whose maximum hours are regulated by the Department of Transportation, 29 U.S.C. 213(b)(1). View "Almy v. Kickert Sch. Bus Line, Inc" on Justia Law

Hobgood was the subject of repeated, intensive investigations that resulted in disciplinary proceedings and termination of his employment with the Illinois Gaming Board, though another state agency ultimately ordered that he be reinstated. Hobgood contends he was targeted because he helped a fellow Board employee with suits against the Gaming Board under Title VII and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations. Hobgood sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), and the First Amendment. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, reasoning that Hobgood was fired, not because he had assisted his friend, but because the “nature” of that assistance involved providing confidential information. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting genuine issues of fact concerning the defendants’ motives for investigating, disciplining, and terminating Hobgood, who presented a “convincing mosaic” to show that his employer acted for unlawful reasons. When the evidence is viewed as a whole, a jury could reasonably infer that the Board investigated and fired him because he assisted in lawsuits against the Board. View "Gnutek v. IL Gaming Bd." on Justia Law

Wright met with an individual who was secretly cooperating with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and the Chicago Police Department as a confidential informant and was wearing a wire. The CI told Wright that he had a customer, looking to buy cocaine. Wright said he was stocked up. The CI did not testify at trial, but the prosecution presented evidence that Wright admitted to stocking up drugs for sale. Wright was convicted of cocaine distribution and sentenced to 150 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Wright’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated when the CI’s statements were admitted without live testimony. The statements, mostly confirmatory inquiries, were used to provide necessary context for Wright’s admissions, which does not violate the Confrontation Clause. The court also rejected an argument that the court should have told the jury that it could draw an adverse inference against the prosecution because it did not call the informant to the stand. The primary purpose of the missing witness instruction is to address situations where a defendant was unfairly deprived of and opportunity to elicit favorable testimony; Wright failed to show that the CI would have given such helpful testimony. View "United States v. Wright" on Justia Law

The Federal Highway Administration and the Indiana Department of Transportation decided to complete an Indiana segment of I-69, which will eventually run from Canada to Mexico. Environmentalists opposed the route and sued under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1344, which authorizes the Army Corps of Engineers to issue permits for discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters of the United States. A permit will be denied if there is “a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge which would have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem,” 40 C.F.R. 230.10(a), or if the discharge “would be contrary to the public interest.” 33 C.F.R. 320.4(a)(1). The permit at issue allows six streams to be filled where the highway crosses them and permits destruction of wetlands. The environmentalists proposed, in the alternative, simply upgrading to federal interstate highway standards, and existing route. In an environmental impact statement, the Corps concluded that no less environmentally damaging alternative was practicable, that the project was not contrary to the public interest, that damage to wetlands would be modest and would be offset by creation of new wetlands. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the environmental analysis. View "Hoosier Envtl. Council, v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

Amicas agreed to a merger for $5.35 per Amicas share. Shareholders sued in Massachusetts state court, contesting the adequacy of a proxy statement used to seek approval. A preliminary injunction stopped the vote. The suit settled when a third party made a $6.05 per-share tender offer. Amicas shareholders gained $26 million. The lawyers who filed the suit sought attorneys’ fees based on the difference between the bids. Carolina Casualty had issued a policy covering what Amicas and its directors pay their own litigation lawyers and what Amicas must pay adversaries’ lawyers. The state court awarded $3,150,000, using a lodestar of $630,000 (1,400 hours at $450 per hour) times five, to reflect the risk of nonpayment and “an exceptionally favorable result.” Carolina Casualty filed a diversity suit, claiming that coverage was limited to $630,000. The district judge affirmed, but denied damages for bad faith or vexatious failure to pay. The Massachusetts appeal settled with payment of a sum that cannot be affected by the results of federal litigation. The Seventh Circuit held that the case was not moot, but affirmed, rejecting an argument that the award constituted excluded “civil or criminal fines or penalties … punitive or exemplary damages, the multiplied portion of multiplied damages.” View "Carolina Cas. Ins. Co v. Merge Healthcare Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Luevano works as a greeter at Wal-Mart. She complained to her supervisor that a male co-worker was repeatedly harassing her. The supervisor refused to act. The harassment continued. Luevano unsuccessfully complained to the district manager of human resources. Her working hours were cut. She filed a gender discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which issued a right to sue letter. Two days before the 90-day filing deadline expired, Luevano filed a pro se complaint, with requests to proceed in forma pauperis and for recruited counsel. Using the court's four-page form, she checked boxes for sex discrimination, failure to stop harassment, and retaliation based on a protected activity, supplemented by two handwritten pages alleging that her co-worker harassed her because she was a woman; her male supervisor refused to correct her co-worker’s behavior; and her supervisor retaliated by reducing her hours and intimidation. The district court dismissed without prejudice, stating that Luevano had failed to allege properly that the harassment or retaliation had occurred because of her sex. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Luevano’s claims in amended complaints relate back to the initial timely filings and adequately alleged violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. View "Luevano v. Walmart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Police officers stopped a car in which Smith was a passenger. Smith fled on foot. When police captured him, they found him with a plastic bag containing 9.9 grams of crack. Two weeks later, Smith sold $60 worth of crack (0.3 grams) to a confidential police informant in a hand-to-hand transaction. He pleaded guilty to distribution and possession with intent to distribute crack, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Given the amount of crack, Smith’s base offense level would have been 18, and his prior convictions would have placed him in criminal history category III. However two prior convictions for aggravated fleeing from police (a felony) qualified as crimes of violence, U.S.S.G.4B1.2(a), and Smith was sentenced, as a career offender, to 151 months in prison, the bottom of the guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the nature of his offense and his personal characteristics made the sentence substantively unreasonable and that, because the career-offender guideline was not empirically based, but congressionally-mandated, it was not entitled to deference or a presumption of reasonableness. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Heron and his friend, Hamilton, worked as truck drivers. Hamilton invited Heron to accompany him on a trip, involving delivering furniture to San Diego, then picking up marijuana for delivery on their way east. They picked up a legitimate load in Las Vegas and returned to Phoenix, where a crew loaded marijuana. Heron was present, but did not personally load the boxes. The sleeper berth was packed with bags of marijuana and cocaine, so that the two took turns sleeping in the passenger seat in violation of 49 C.F.R. 395.1(g) (2). The DEA tracked the truck; a buyer in East St. Louis was actually a confidential informant. Local police stopped the truck after it made a turn without signaling. Hamilton was driving and consented to a K-9 search of the exterior. The dog alerted, leading to discovery of the drugs. Heron was convicted of possession with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of a substance containing marijuana and a substance containing cocaine 21 U.S.C. 841(a). The court imposed concurrent sentences of 108 months and 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the prosecution used a peremptory strike to remove a juror on the basis of religious commitment in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and that the court abused its discretion in admitting testimony that Hamilton identified Heron as his “co-driver” during the traffic stop. View "United States v. Heron" on Justia Law

Gao, from Fujian in southeastern China, entered the U.S. without inspection in 2005 with the goal of earning money to send home to his family in China. Shortly after he arrived Gao’s wife (in China) gave birth to the couple’s second child, a daughter,and was sterilized. Gao sought asylum on the ground that his wife’s sterilization amounted to persecution of him.An IJ denied his petition and ordered him removed to China. The Board dismissed his appeal, reiterating its rule that spouses of persons subjected to forced sterilization no longer qualify automatically for asylum. One day after the applicable 90-day deadline, Gao moved to amend his asylum application to add a claim that he feared that he would be subjected to religious persecution if he was returned because he had connverted to Christianity. The Board denied this motion, concluding that Gao had not established changed country conditions necessary to excuse untimely filing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. View "Gao v. Holder" on Justia Law

Almutairi served in the Kuwaiti Air Force in1990, when Iraq invaded. Almutairi joined a resistance group. Iraqi soldiers captured him and for nine days he was brutally tortured. Almutairi cracked under the pressure and brought the Iraqi soldiers to a house that he thought would be unoccupied. When the soldiers entered the house, they found and arrested a man. They released Almutairi, Days later the soldiers publicly executed the man from the house, along with three others. Almutairi fled the country, but he and his family returned, after the country’s liberation. Almutairi received threatening phone. Two years after the threats, after spending time in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates, Almutairi came to the U.S. in 1994 on a nonimmigrant student visa. He ended his studies 10 years later. In 2006 he was served with a Notice to Appear for violating his visa. The following year, after his family had received another threatening phone call in Kuwait, he applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The Seventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision that the asylum application was untimely and that substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision to deny withholding of relief. View "Almutairi v. Holder" on Justia Law