Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bauer served as an officer in investment companies, on the pricing committee, and as chief compliance officer, implementing policies to prohibit employees from trading on nonpublic information regarding the securities held in the companies’ portfolios. Following trades for her personal account, the Securities and Exchange Commission charge Bauer with insider trading in connection with mutual fund redemption. The district court granted the SEC summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the SEC rarely brings insider trading claims in connection with mutual fund redemption and that no federal court has ruled on the issue. The district court must determine whether Bauer’s alleged conduct properly fits under the misappropriation theory of insider trading, under which a corporate outsider misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information. The court noted that Bauer did not argue that mutual fund redemptions cannot entail deception under the classical theory, but conceded that insider trading liability could attach to mutual fund redemptions if it could be shown that she knew the product was priced incorrectly, but that the issue must be resolved at the trial court level. View "Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Bauer" on Justia Law

PFG and Acuvest had an agreement (later terminated) under which guaranteed Acuvest’s customers that Acuvest would conform its conduct to CEA mandates. Acuvest advised Prestwick with respect to an investment on which it suffered a substantial loss. Prestwick sued PFG, Acuvest, and two of Acuvest’s principals, alleging violations of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), 7 U.S.C. 1, a breach of fiduciary duty against the Acuvest defendants, and a guarantor liability claim against PFG. Prestwick argued that termination of PFG’s guarantee of Acuvest’s obligations under the CEA did not terminate protection “for existing accounts opened during the term of the guarantee.” The district court awarded summary judgment to PFG and dismissed the remaining defendants with prejudice so that Prestwick could appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that contracts between the parties were definitive and rejecting Prestwick’s assertion public policy and estoppel to overcome a decision that the guarantee agreement was properly terminated. View "Prestwick Capital Mgmt., Ltd. v. Peregrine Fin. Grp., Inc." on Justia Law

Maxwell was arrested after selling 2.9 grams of crack cocaine, 2.8 grams of powder cocaine, and five ecstasy pills to a confidential informant. The arresting officer searched Maxwell and found two straws and a bag hidden in his underwear. The bag contained an off-white substance, which the officer weighed, “field-tested,” and concluded was crack cocaine. The Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory analyst who originally tested the substance seized from Maxwell retired before trial, so the prosecution offered the testimony of his co-worker, who did not personally analyze the substance, but concluded that it contained crack cocaine after reviewing data generated by the original analyst. Maxwell did not object to this testimony and was convicted of possessing with intent to distribute five or more grams of a mixture or substance containing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit rejected an argument based on the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Maxwell failed to show plain error, given that the testimony was subject to cross-examination at trial. The court issued a limited remand for consideration under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. View "United States v. Maxwell" on Justia Law

Smego agreed to civil commitment under the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. During intake, he was seen by Mitchell, a dentist who found that 12 of his teeth had cavities. Throughout 2006, Smego’s cavities worsened and became painful, but he was not given a follow-up appointment. He made healthcare requests for unrelated medical issues, but not for his teeth. He claims that he believed requests were not necessary for problems already known to medical staff. During a chance encounter in 2007, Smego asked a dental hygienist who worked with Mitchell why he had never been called for the follow-up appointment. Smego, claims that she responded that the suction machine was inoperable and that Mitchell could not work on his teeth without it and warned that being a “pest” would not help him get an appointment. Smego saw Mitchell again 18 months after she told him about his cavities, but Mitchell repeatedly delayed treatment until 30 months after the first appointment. In Smego’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part, stating that Smego offered sufficient evidence for a jury to find that some of the defendants violated his constitutional rights. View "Smego v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

In 1982 Hobbs was working as a photographer on a Russian cruise ship where he had a brief affair with a Russian waitress. Based on the experience, he wrote a song, “Natasha” about an ill-fated romance between a man from the U.K. and a Ukrainian woman. In 1983, he registered his copyright to “Natasha” in the United Kingdom and sent the song to several music publishers, including a company that published songs composed by Elton John and Bernard Taupin. Hobbs’s efforts to find a publisher for “Natasha” were unsuccessful. In 1985, Elton John released his very successful song, “Nikita,” in which a singer from “the west” describes his love for Nikita, whom the singer saw “by the wall” and who is on the other side of a “line” held in by “guns and gates.” Hobbs filed a copyright infringement claim 27 years later. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the songs were not substantially similar. The Copyright Act does not protect general ideas, such as a romance between a western man and a woman from behind the iron curtain, but only the particular expression of an idea. View "Hobbs v. John" on Justia Law

Blackout performs asphalt paving work and other construction services and had contracts with the Chicago Transit Authority that were terminable at will. The CTA informed Blackout that it would not do business with the firm for the next year (debarment) and did not give a reason. Illinois law allows judicial review of debarment by public bodies, but Blackout did not avail itself of that process, nor did it sue for libel, although it insists that public announcement of debarment is defamatory, but filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deprivation of “occupational liberty” without due process. The district court dismissed, noting that that inability to work for a single employer is not deprivation of occupational liberty and that there was no allegation of inability to work for public or private entities other than the CTA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Blackout won a school district contract after the CTA debarment. View "Blackout Sealcoating, Inc. v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Ten years ago Certco had one food-distribution warehouse; it now has four. As the new warehouses grew, jobs at the original Madison site dwindled. Certco staffed the three new locations with non-union labor, paid them more per hour than it paid union members and offered a defined-contribution pension plan that cost less than the expensive defined-benefit plan that the union sponsors. In 2006 the NLRB concluded that work at one of the new facilities did not accrete to the union under 29 U.S.C. 158 (a)(5). The union later asked an arbitrator to order Certco to return bargaining-unit work to union members. The arbitrator concluded that much of the labor at the two newest warehouses is bargaining-unit work under the collective-bargaining agreement, which covers all of Certco’s warehouse labor regardless of work site and forbids the transfer of bargaining-unit work to non-union workers. The district court enforced the award. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the arbitrator did not require Certco to recognize the union as representative of workers at two new facilities, but only ordered that work formerly done at the old warehouse be returned there or be performed by bargaining-unit members. View "Certco, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters" on Justia Law

In 1968 French founded a successful manufacturing firm that he sold, in 1996, for about $200 million. French executed interlocking irrevocable trusts to benefit his four children upon his death. In 2004 he moved the trust accounts to Wachovia Bank. The trusts held two whole life insurance policies. Wachovia replaced the policies with new ones, providing the same benefit for a significantly lower premium, after months of evaluation and consultation with French and his lawyers. Wachovia received a hefty but industry-standard commission for its insurance-brokerage affiliate. French’s adult children sued Wachovia for breach of fiduciary duty by self-dealing. The district court rejected the claim, based on the trust document’s express conflict-of-interest waiver, and held that the transaction was neither imprudent nor undertaken in bad faith. The court ordered the Frenches to pay the bank’s costs and attorney’s fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The trust documents gave Wachovia broad discretion to invest trust property without regard to risk, conflicts of interest, lack of diversification, or unproductivity. The trust instrument overrides the common-law prohibition against self-dealing and displaces the prudent-investor rule. While there is always a duty to administer the trust in good faith, there was no evidence that the bank acted in bad faith. View "French v. Wachovia Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

McDonough is an engineering firm that frequently does design jobs for the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT). The Illinois Procurement Code provides that, absent required signatures, a contract of the type in dispute is not valid and not an enforceable debt, 30 ILCS 500/20-80(d). McDonough claimed that IDOT owed it $2 million for additional work on three projects, none of which had a supplemental agreement that was fully executed. McDonough claimed that it continued working without the agreements because it was IDOT’s normal business practice always to sign an agreement after a prior approval letter was sent. Based on findings that McDonough had made accounting errors that called its business integrity into question, the chief procurement officer suspended McDonough’s status as a “prequalified vendor” automatically eligible to bid on IDOT projects. McDonough claimed that refusal to sign the agreements deprived it of property interests in the debts without due process of law. Faced with threats, of bankruptcy, the district court entered a temporary restraining order, effectively ordering state officials to pay. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the suit is, in substance, an effort to have a federal court order state officials to make payments from the state treasury to remedy alleged breaches of contract and is prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. View "McDonough Assocs., Inc. v. Schneider" on Justia Law

The pro se plaintiff filed a qui tam suit against the university and nine chemistry professors, charging that they defrauded the United States in violation of several federal statutes by obtaining federal grant money on the basis of plagiarized research papers. He does not allege that the fraud harmed him, but apparently sought a “bounty,” 37 U.S.C. 3730(d)(1-2). The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that to maintain a suit on behalf of the government, a qui tam plaintiff has to be either a licensed lawyer or represented by a lawyer. Georgakis is neither and cannot maintain the suit in his individual capacity because he does not claim to have been injured. View "Georgakis v. IL State Univ." on Justia Law