Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Child Status Protection Act, 8 U.S.C. 1153(h), allows adult children of lawful permanent residents to maintain child status if their parent filed a visa petition on their behalf while they were under 21 and prevents such children from aging out of visa priority while their petition is under review. But an immigrant may take advantage of this provision only if he “sought to acquire the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence within one year” of a visa number becoming available. Velásquez is the adult child of a lawful permanent resident. In 2005, when Velásquez was 17, his father filed a visa petition on his behalf. Velásquez’s visa number became available in March 2011. Velásquez took steps to acquire permanent-resident status within one year, but did not file a formal application for permanent status until 14 months after his visa number became available. Later, the Board of Immigration Appeals adopted a new rule that required an immigrant to file or attempt to file a substantially complete application for permanent status within one year to satisfy the “sought to acquire” prerequisite. Because Velásquez had not done so, the Board ordered him removed. The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding the new interpretation of the Act’s ambiguous language to be reasonable, but holding that retroactive application works a manifest injustice in Velásquez’s case, View "Velasquez-Garcia v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2006, Matthews, an African-American woman, applied for two open positions in Waukesha County: Economic Support Specialist and Economic Support Supervisor. She was not hired, and filed suit, alleging that she was discriminated against on the basis of race, in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and 42 U.S.C. 1983.Matthews dismissed her claim related to the Supervisor position. With respect to the Specialist position, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the county articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for its hiring decision. View "Matthews v. Waukesha Cnty." on Justia Law

Murphy had a stroke in April 2007. Before leaving the hospital, Murphy was examined by Dr. Mayer, who noted a past history of headaches and diminished fluency in speech. Murphy started seeing a physical therapist but did not complete the program. A year later, Dr. Mayer noted that Murphy still had difficulty speaking and “some significant loss of sensation.” In September 2008, Murphy applied for social security disability benefits. Her application was denied. At a hearing, a vocational expert testified that there were no sedentary jobs in the regional economy for a person who could neither work with the general public nor use her hands more than occasionally for fine manipulation, but that there were a significant number of jobs for a person who had the capacity to do light, unskilled work, but who could only occasionally perform fine hand manipulation. The ALJ ruled that Murphy was not disabled. The Appeals Council adopted that decision. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that the ALJ erroneously excluded information about Murphy’s potential inability to perform light work and by not questioning Murphy further about her failure to comply with her home exercise program and the activities she participated in while on vacation. View "Murphy v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Bormes, an attorney, tendered the filing fee for a lawsuit via pay.gov, which the federal courts use to facilitate electronic payments. The web site sent him an email receipt that included the last four digits of his credit card’s number, plus the card’s expiration date. Bormes, claiming that the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681c(g)(1) allows a receipt to contain one or the other, but not both, filed suit against the United States seeking damages. In an earlier appeal the Supreme Court held that the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2), does not waive sovereign immunity on a suit seeking to collect damages for an asserted violation of FCRA and remanded for determination of “whether FCRA itself waives the Federal Government’s immunity to damages under 1681n.” The Seventh Circuit held that although the United States has waived immunity against damages actions of this kind, it did not violate the statute on the merits. The statute as written applies to receipts “printed … at the point of the sale or transaction.” The email receipt that Bormes received met neither requirement. View "Bormes v. United States" on Justia Law

A patrolman pulled over Mohamed for running a red light. Upon searching Mohamed’s van, he found 1,170 packs of Newport-brand cigarettes not bearing Indiana tax stamps. He was charged under the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act, which makes it unlawful for “any person knowingly to ship, transport, receive, possess, sell, distribute, or purchase contraband cigarettes,” 18 U.S.C. 2342(a). During deliberations, the jury submitted three questions to the district court: whether “more than 10,000 cigarettes being transported into Indiana from another state without paying [Indiana’s cigarette] tax [is] enough to be called contraband?” “Is the question at hand just that [Mohamed] had 10,000+ [cigarettes] and crossed state lines, or do we need to consider intent of what he planned to do with them once he crossed the state line? Sell, distribute, etc.?” “In the definition of ‘handled,’ is ‘buying’ applicable even if [the cigarettes] are bought in Kentucky? Can we see the entire copy of [the statute]” The district judge responded that she could not provide the information they had requested. The jury found Mohamed guilty. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Mohamed intended to sell the cigarettes in Indiana. View "United States v. Mohamed" on Justia Law

Fellowes filed a breach-of-contract suit against Changzou Fellowes, a business established in China, under the international diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(2). Without discussing subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court entered a preliminary injunction in favor of Fellowes, despite the court’s assumption that Changzhou Fellowes had not been served with process. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that diversity jurisdiction is proper only if Changzhou Fellowes has its own citizenship, independent of its investors or members. Deciding whether a business enterprise based in a foreign nation should be treated as a corporation for the purpose of section 1332 can be difficult. Given the parties’ agreement that Changzhou Fellowes is closer to a limited liability company than to any other business structure in the U.S., it does not have its own citizenship and it does have the Illinois citizenship of its member Hong Kong Fellowes, which prevents litigation under the diversity jurisdiction. View "Fellowes Inc. v. Changzhou Xinrui Fellowes Office Equip. Co." on Justia Law

Idento makes robotic milking machines in the Netherlands. BouMatic, LLC, based in Wisconsin, entered into an agreement for purchasing and reselling those machines in Belgium. BouMatic claims that Idento breached the agreement by selling direct to at least one of BouMatic’s Belgian customers and by failing to provide parts and warranty service. The district court dismissed, ruling that commercial transactions in the European Union do not expose Idento to litigation in Wisconsin even though BouMatic has its headquarters there, the parties exchanged drafts between Wisconsin and the Netherlands, and Idento shipped one machine to Wisconsin. After exploring the nature of the business entities, the Seventh Circuit vacated for consideration of personal jurisdiction in light of the contract language. Litigants cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction by agreement or omission, but personal jurisdiction is a personal right that a litigant may waive or forfeit. View "BouMatic LLC v. Idento Operations BV" on Justia Law

Massuda invested $4,000,000 in Concessions, Inc., which was part owner, with Tony Rezko, of a group of Panda Express restaurants. Rezko, who controlled several companies, hoped to expand the business. Rezko was indicted and convicted on federal fraud and bribery charges, for which he received a lengthy prison sentence in 2011. Rezko’s real estate ventures collapsed. Massuda filed suit against Rezko’s corporations and associated people, raising claims of unjust enrichment, fraud, and aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty. The district court concluded that all of Massuda’s claims, except portions of her fraud claim, were derivative, and on that ground dismissed those counts with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Massuda declined to amend her fraud allegations, which were then dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that if the holder of a majority interest acts in a way that helps him and hurts the minority, there is a direct claim. A direct claim exists when a majority shareholder engages in wrongdoing in such a way as to dilute the voting power of the minority shareholders; a dilution of voting power is a direct harm to the shareholders that is not felt by the company. View "Massuda v. Panda Express Inc." on Justia Law

Bell was employed as a substance abuse counselor at an Indiana maximum security prison. An investigator, looking for security breaches, discovered that night-shift employees were having sex on Bell’s desk and told her that he was not concerned about night-shift staff having sex but suggested she wash her desk every morning. The superintendent said that, as long as inmates were not involved, he was not concerned. Immediately thereafter, the superintendent discovered that Bell was having an affair with the Major in charge of custody (allegedly involving sex on his desk) and both were terminated. The prison settled the Major’s appeal to the State Employees’ Appeals Commission and called him to testify against Bell at her appeal. Major was able to keep his benefits, including his pension, to quickly get unemployment benefits, and to subsequently begin working at the prison as a contractor. Bell was not afforded similar benefits and opportunities and filed suit, alleging Title VII claims of sex discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment to the state, concluding that Bell was not similarly situated to the Major, that she failed to prove retaliation, and that the sexual tenor of the prison’s work environment was not severe or pervasive enough to qualify as hostile. The Seventh Circuit reversed with regard to the discrimination and hostile environment claims, but affirmed with regard to her retaliation claims. View "Orton-Bell v. State of Indiana" on Justia Law

Locke and co‐conspirator engaged in real estate fraud. Locke’s presentence report recommended a 16-point addition to the offense level, calculating a loss of $2,360,914.51 based on all of the properties underlying 15 original counts, although 10 counts had been dismissed. She made a written objection. The probation office argued that relevant conduct could be considered in determining the loss amount, but that even if the loss amount was based solely on Locke’s convicted conduct, the loss amount would exceed $1 million. At sentencing, Locke’s lawyer stated that he was withdrawing the objection to the loss calculation. The district court sentenced Locke to 71 months and ordered her to pay $2,360,916.51 in restitution to 13 entities. The Seventh Circuit remanded, finding that the district court did not make the findings necessary when using relevant conduct to increase the sentence and were insufficient under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A. On remand, Locke successfully moved to bar any evidence regarding relevant conduct not already in the record at the first sentencing. The district court recalculated without the two‐level enhancement for offenses involving 10 or more victims. Locke admitted that she had withdrawn her objections to the amount of loss in the first sentencing, but asserted that her loss amount should not be greater than the restitution amount calculated without regard to relevant conduct. The district court sentenced Locke to 57 months of imprisonment and ordered her to pay $340,789 in restitution, reduced by the amount recovered from sales of the property. The Seventh Circuit discussed the factors that distinguish loss and restitution, but affirmed Locke’s sentence based on waiver.View "United States v. Locke" on Justia Law