Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Shaw and two others were charged with aggravated battery after King was beaten to death outside a Fort Wayne motel. Shaw denied participating in the beating, but the other defendants, in exchange for prison sentences of less than three years, agreed to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter and to testify against Shaw. The court allowed the prosecution to elevate the charge against Shaw to murder over Shaw’s objection that an Indiana statute limits the time for amending charging documents. Shaw was convicted and sentenced to 60 years. On direct appeal, Shaw’s new attorney abandoned the argument that the information was amended too late and argued, unsuccessfully, insufficiency of the evidence to support conviction. Appellate counsel dropped the case and did not file with the Supreme Court of Indiana. Shaw unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief in state courts. The federal district court denied a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, which claimed that the lawyer’s decision to forgo challenging the amended information in favor of a frivolous challenge constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, reasoning that the Indiana appellate court’s decision to the contrary was an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington (1984), and the 2000 elaboration in Smith v. Robbins. View "Shaw v. Mize" on Justia Law

In 1999, Quintana and his friends lured a woman into a van. Quintana restrained the woman, while his friend sexually assaulted her. The victim escaped by jumping nude out of the moving van. Quintana was arrested and charged with kidnapping and sexual assault. After a year in prison awaiting trial, the state offered Quintana a plea deal of a four-year sentence on the kidnapping charge and a four-year sentence on the sexual assault charge to run concurrently at 50% good time, so that Quintana could plead guilty and serve one more year in prison. Quintana declined the deal, opting to go to trial and face a minimum of two six-year consecutive sentences. He was convicted and the district court sentenced Quintana to a term of six years and a consecutive term of 21 years. After 13 years, Quintana sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that trial counsel failed to adequately inform him of the consequences of his plea under the Illinois “accountability law,” under which his sentence had to be served at 85%. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the writ, finding that Quintana did not establish deficient performance or prejudice. View "Quintana v. Chandler" on Justia Law

FH-T joined the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front in 1982 at age 15, while Eritrea and Ethiopia were engaged in a 30-year war. The EPLF refused to let him leave. For nine years he worked in communications and as a driver. He did not transport weapons. In 1994, the EPLF dissolved and became Eritrea’s only political party. FH-T was employed at a government-owned company, and, in 2005-2006, repeatedly expressed concerns about abuses of the compulsory National Service program. FH-T was imprisoned in a military prison camp for five months. After release, he remained under surveillance, was regularly interrogated, and received threats on his life. He fled Eritrea and sought asylum in the U.S. His father and sister were arrested when he left. An Immigration Judge denied FH-T’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1158. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed on the basis that he had provided material support to the EPLF, classified as a “Tier III” terrorist organization, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III). The Seventh Circuit denied review, rejecting challenges to the system and an argument that he was eligible for an exemption because he did not know that the EPLF was involved in the unlawful use of force; he did not exhaust this argument before the Board. View "F. H.-T. v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 1998, Hedstrom married Kotter, a real estate agent. The marriage lasted two years, but the two were on good terms when Hedstrom died. There is no evidence that Hedstrom lacked mental capacity. In 2006 Hedstrom purchased two Chicago condominiums. Kotter acted as his real estate agent and Geldes acted as his real estate attorney. Kotter told Geldes that Hedstrom would take title in another name and that Hedstrom could not hear over a phone so she would answer questions for him. Hedstrom died in 2007. Hedstrom’s children from a prior marriage were appointed administrators. Title to one condominium vested fully in Kotter, the other was titled to the Kotter Family Trust. The administrators sued, alleging breach of fiduciary duty by a real estate agent and legal malpractice. Because the administrators failed to timely identify experts, the magistrate barred them from presenting expert testimony encompassing Kotter’s position as a real estate agent and Geldes’ position as an attorney. The district judge affirmed and the administrators did not appeal. The district court granted summary judgment because expert testimony was needed on the standard of care and because undisputed evidence demonstrated the units were titled in accordance with Hedstrom’s intent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Ball v. Kotter" on Justia Law

Walsh and Martin, principals of a futures and foreign currency trading company that acted as a “futures commission merchant” and as a “forex dealer member,” used customer funds for personal expenses, then concealed the company’s insolvency and their criminal conduct by misleading customers about the company’s ability to meet its obligations. Existing customers got account statements that falsely stated their available margin funds, and they solicited new customers by making false statements. They also used a Ponzi-like scheme for redemptions. Shortly before it was shut down, the company had $17,654,486 in unpaid customer liabilities and only $677,932 in assets. Walsh and Martin pleaded guilty to wire fraud, tax evasion, and to making false statements in a report to the Commodities Futures and Trading Commission, a Commodities Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 6d(a)) violation. The district court sentenced them to terms of imprisonment of 150 and 204 months, respectively, and ordered each to pay $16,976,554 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to a finding as to the amount of loss and restitution and to application of a sentencing enhancement based upon a finding that each was an officer or director of a futures commission merchant. View "United States v. Walsh" on Justia Law

Clark, the owner and president of an East St. Louis Illinois company, was charged with making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(3). Clark’s company had entered into a hauling services subcontract with Gateway, general contractor on a federally funded highway project in St. Louis, Missouri. Employers must pay laborers working on certain federally-funded projects the “prevailing wage,” calculated by the Secretary of Labor based on wages earned by corresponding classes of workers employed on projects of similar character in a given area, and maintain payroll records demonstrating prevailing wage compliance, 40 U.S.C. 3142(b) The indictment charged that Clark submitted false payroll records and a false affidavit to Gateway, representing that his employees were paid $35 per hour, when they actually received $13-$14 per hour. The district court dismissed for improper venue, finding that when a false document is filed under a statute that makes the filing a condition precedent to federal jurisdiction, venue is proper only in the district where the document was filed for final agency action. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Although the effects of the alleged wrongdoing may be felt more strongly in Missouri than in Illinois, the Southern District of Illinois is a proper venue. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

Buban participates in union politics as part of the dissident “Teamsters for a Democratic Union,” and served as secretary-treasurer of his local from 2004 to 2006. He lost his bid for reelection in 2006, after an acrimonious campaign against rival “Teamsters 4 Teamsters” candidates. Before leaving office, Buban referred himself for work as a shuttle driver, transporting workers to and from a construction site. The company laid Buban off (along with all other drivers who lacked a certain license) in 2007. During the grievance process, Buban clashed with union leadership, his former political rivals. Despite repeatedly stating that he wished to return to work, he remained unemployed. A political ally of Buban’s informed Buban that officials told her that Buban “hasn’t put his name on the out-of-work list.” Buban was unaware of such a list, but was promptly added after his request. Officials referred other members for positions. Buban fled charges, 29 U.S.C. 158(b), and an ALJ found that the union: violated the NLRA by operating an exclusive hiring-hall without consistently applying objective criteria; by discriminatorily failing and refusing to refer Buban for employment; and by failing and refusing to provide him with pertinent information. The Board and Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Teamsters "Gen." Local Union 200" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin state prison inmate filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that prison officials retaliated against him for speaking up about two guards allegedly assaulting him. He was placed in segregation and forbidden to discuss the alleged assault. The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that he had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, by not filing a grievance that conformed to prison rules. He responded that he interpreted the prohibition against speaking about the alleged assault to extend to filing a grievance and was afraid to file it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. While the duty to exhaust administrative remedies as a precondition to suing under section 1983 is limited to those remedies that are “available,” and a remedy is not available to a prisoner prevented by threats or other intimidation from seeking an administrative remedy, Wisconsin regulations limit the offense of making false statements to prison staff to statements made “outside the complaint review system.” The inmate had no reason to fear filing a grievance about alleged retaliation. View "Schultz v. Pugh" on Justia Law

Gray filed returns for tax years 2001 through 2004 after the IRS notified her in 2006 that it planned to assess her tax liability on its own. The IRS accepted Gray’s calculations, but imposed penalties for late filing and payment, 26 U.S.C. 6651. When Gray did not pay, the IRS filed liens. Gray timely requested a Collections Due Process hearing, 26 U.S.C. 6330, at which she unsuccessfully argued that penalties, liens, and levies should be eliminated. The IRS then mailed Gray “notices of determination” approving liens and levies. Gray sought review in Tax Court, waiting more than 30 days to file. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because Gray’s petitions were untimely. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The statute creates a 30-day time limit for appealing CDP determinations, 26 U.S.C. 6330(d)(1); no longer period applied to Gray’s cases. Gray then claimed that IRS employees engaged in wide-ranging wrongdoing in dealing with her and sought damages for unauthorized tax collection, 26 U.S.C. 7433. More than six months later, after the IRS moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, Gray filed an administrative claim. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the exhaustion requirement is not actually jurisdictional, but is still mandatory. View "Gray v. United States" on Justia Law

Gray filed returns for tax years 2001 through 2004 after the IRS notified her in 2006 that it planned to assess her tax liability on its own. The IRS accepted Gray’s calculations, but imposed statutory penalties for late filing and late payment, 26 U.S.C. 6651. When Gray did not pay the taxes or penalties, the IRS filed liens. Gray timely requested a Collections Due Process hearing, 26 U.S.C. 6330, at which she unsuccessfully argued that her statutory penalties should be eliminated and the liens and levies withdrawn. After the hearing, the IRS mailed Gray “notices of determination” approving liens and levies to collect the delinquent taxes. Gray sought review in Tax Court, but waited more than 30 days to file her petitions. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because Gray’s petitions were untimely. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the statute explicitly creates a 30-day time limit for appealing CDP determinations, 26 U.S.C. 6330(d)(1); no longer time limit applied to Gray’s cases. View "Gray v. Comm'r Internal Revenue" on Justia Law