Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

At age 43 Townsend robbed a bank, pretending to have a gun; 36 days later he robbed a payday lender while carrying a gun. He pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) and was sentenced to 41 months’ imprisonment, the low end of the Sentencing Guidelines range. Townsend sought a downward departure under U.S.S.G.5K2.20, for behavior that was aberrant. Townsend had lived a law-abiding life until he got into financial distress. The judge said that he understood why Townsend had committed the crimes but that it is essential to enforce the law to deter people from dealing with economic hardship by turning to bank robbery. Townsend robbed two financial institutions, more than a month apart, and was outside the escape hatch created by 5K2.20. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, declining to read “single criminal transaction” as equivalent to “multiple crimes with a single motivation.” The court noted the trial judge’s reasoned consideration of Townsend’s personal circumstances. View "United States v. Townsend" on Justia Law

After working at the company for four months, Benes charged his employer with sex discrimination. The EEOC arranged for mediation in which, after an initial joint session, the parties separated and a go-between relayed offers. Upon receiving a settlement proposal that he thought too low, Benes stormed into the room used by his employer’s representatives and said loudly: “You can take your proposal and shove it up your ass and fire me and I’ll see you in court.” The firm fired him. He filed suit under the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–3(a), abandoning his claim of sex discrimination. A magistrate judge granted the employer summary judgment, finding that Benes had been fired for misconduct during the mediation, not for making or supporting a charge of discrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that section 2000e–3(a) does not establish a privilege to misbehave in mediation, but only bans retaliation “because [a person] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” View "Benes v. A.B. Data, Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, insured under employer health plans, filed a proposed class action alleging that health-insurance companies violated Wisconsin law by requiring copayments for chiropractic care. The insurance code prohibits insurers from excluding coverage for chiropractic services if their policies cover the diagnosis and treatment of the same condition by a physician or osteopath. The policies at issue provide chiropractic coverage, although, like other services, it is subject to copayment requirements. The complaint cited provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act for recovery of benefits due, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B) & 502(a)(3), and for breach of fiduciary duty, sections 1132(a)(3), 1104. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Nothing in ERISA categorically precludes a benefits claim against an insurance company. The complaint alleges that the insurers decide all claims questions and owe the benefits; on these allegations the insurers are proper defendants on the 1132(a)(1)(B) claim. The complaint nonetheless fails to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty; setting policy terms, including copayments, determines the content of the policy, and decisions about the content of a plan are not themselves fiduciary acts. View "Larson v. United Healthcare Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Blake was indicted for conspiracy to distribute and possess cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846 and retained attorney Fabbri, not knowing that Fabbri was under investigation. Trial was set for January 9, 2007, within the 70 days required by the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161. Killian, prosecutor in the Blake case, had little knowledge of the Fabbri investigation, because he and others in his district had been “screened off” to avoid conflicts of interest. At a final pretrial conference, Blake objected to, and Fabbri withdrew, a motion for continuance. Killian then learned that an indictment of Fabbri was imminent and withdrew from Blake’s prosecution. Fabbri successfully moved to withdraw. Following a bond hearing, several discovery motions by the defense, notice of intent to seek a sentencing enhancement, a conflict of interest hearing, a superseding indictment adding two narcotics-related offenses (two days before trial), and other motions, Blake withdrew consent to a previously-requested continuance and waived the 30-day allotment of time to prepare for trial on the new charges. Trial commenced on March 27; Blake was convicted on all counts. Following unsuccessful appeal, Blake timely filed a habeas petition. The district court denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of ineffective assistance View "Blake v. United States" on Justia Law

Mary, who has both U.S. and Irish citizenship, attended college in Ireland.She and Derek lived together in Ireland for 11 years, but never married. Their son was born in Illinois. The three returned to Ireland 11 days later. A few months later Mary and the baby moved to Illinois against Derek’s wishes. As an unmarried father, Derek had no standing under Irish law to resort to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, which requires return of children to their country of habitual residence if they are “wrongfully removed to or retained in” another country in breach of the custody rights of the left-behind parent. After 3-1/2 years, an Irish court granted Derek guardianship and joint custody. Mary was in Ireland with the baby for the final hearing. The court allowed her to temporarily return to Illinois. Eight months later Derek filed a Hague Convention petition in Illinois. The district court ordered the child returned to Ireland. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court incorrectly treated the parents’ last shared intent as a test for determining habitual residence. Under the Hague Convention, that determination is a practical, flexible, factual inquiry. When Mary moved with the baby to Illinois she was his sole legal custodian and removal was not wrongful under the Convention. By the time of the alleged wrongful “retention,” his life was too firmly rooted in Illinois to consider Ireland his home. View "Redmond v. Redmond" on Justia Law

An Illinois judgment creditor may, without court action, require a third party to freeze property of a judgment debtor until a court determines whether the creditor has a valid claim, by serving the third party with a citation to discover assets. If the third party releases the property without court order, the third party may be liable to the creditor for property that was released. Mendez was awarded $387,931 in damages for unlawful abuse suffered at the hands of her employer. She served more than 50 citations to discover assets on the employer and banks where she believed the defendants had deposited assets. She successfully fought the employer’s fraudulent attempt to declare bankruptcy. She has recovered only $99,519.97. Mendez served Republic Bank a citation, requiring the bank to freeze accounts held under the names of 22 entities that Mendez believed contained assets belonging to her former employers. Republic Bank froze all of the listed accounts. Interveners, who owned only a subset of the accounts frozen, obtained a court order that the bank claims unambiguously required it to unfreeze all accounts, except two that were specifically mentioned as remaining frozen. The Seventh Circuit held that Republic Bank is not liable because the most reasonable reading of the order unfroze the accounts in question. View "Mendez v. Republic Bank" on Justia Law

Bathula and her husband, Reddy, citizens of India, separately applied for asylum, claiming that their family had been subjected to persecution at the hands of a local criminal group after Reddy testified against its members on trial for murder. The Department of Homeland Security denied the petitions. In removal proceedings, they together renewed their request for asylum and requested withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge denied relief and ordered removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, then denied a request to reopen on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Seventh Circuit denied petitions for review, finding no evidence that would require a fact-finder to conclude that the petitioners were subjected to past persecution or that any harm was on account of a statutorily protected ground. They showed no prejudice from ineffective assistance. View "Bathula v. Holder" on Justia Law

Mire’s business, the Indianapolis Somali House of Coffee, served as a place where people could get and use khat. Government agents received a tip, after which Mire and Rafle were indicted for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cathinone, 21 U.S.C. 841(a) and 846. Mire was also indicted for knowingly using or maintaining a place for the purpose of distributing and using cathinone, 21 U.S.C. 856(a)(1) and possession with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing cathinone, 21 U.S.C. 841(a). They were found guilty on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting defendants’ arguments that their due process rights were violated because they were not given fair warning that the possession of khat may be illegal and that the district court erred under Daubert in admitting prosecution expert witness testimony regarding khat plants that were seized at the coffee house and tested for cathinone. Mire’s convictions for conspiracy to distribute khat and for maintaining a place for the distribution or use of khat did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause and the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions. View "United States v. Mire" on Justia Law

Lambert, an African-American was hired as a laborer at a Peri distribution yard in 2003. Lambert claims that co-workers and supervisors often made sexually and racially offensive comments. He complained regularly, but supervisors took no action. Nonetheless, Lambert was promoted to a lead position. One day, Lambert’s supervisors observed him behaving in an unusually aggressive manner and ordered him to take a drug and alcohol test. The test revealed that he was intoxicated. He was immediately fired under Peri’s “no tolerance” policy toward consuming alcohol on the job, an important policy for safety in a yard where workers operate heavy machinery and maneuver large concrete objects. Lambert attributed Peri’s decision to terminate his employment to racial discrimination and retaliation for his complaints. The district court rejected his claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit remanded. There was insufficient evidence that Lambert’s race motivated Peri’s decision to test for intoxication or to fire him, but the court acted prematurely in dismissing claims of sexual and racial harassment. A jury could find that he was subjected to a hostile work environment on account of race or sex, and that he took all necessary steps to call his treatment to the company’s attention. View "Lambert v. Peri Formworks Sys. Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, the taxpayers filed petitions for redetermination based on IRS notices of deficiency. The cases were consolidated for trial. With respect to Seven W, a calendar-year taxpayer, the Tax Court rejected a deficiency for calendar year 2000, but affirmed deficiencies for the years 2001 through 2003. With respect to Highland, a fiscal-year taxpayer, the court affirmed deficiencies for the fiscal years ending on April 30, 2003, and April 30, 2004. Although the opinions correctly identified the taxpayer with its respective tax liability, the decisions, entered in 2011, incorrectly stated that Seven W was responsible for deficiencies in fiscal years ending in April 2003, and April 2004, and that Highland was responsible for deficiencies for calendar years 2001 through 2003. The Commissioner discovered the error and sought to vacate the decisions. The Taxpayers did not object to correcting the errors, but did object to vacatur of the original decisions. The Tax Court vacated its decisions and entered new decisions correctly setting forth the respective deficiencies of Seven W and Highland. The Seventh Circuit vacated, with instructions to reinstate and correct the original decisions. Absent fraud that infected the Tax Court’s decision, the Tax Court cannot vacate a decision that has become final. View "Seven W. Enters., Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law