Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Four upper-level managers at Tradesmen, a construction staffing company, formed a competing company in 2009. Tradesmen filed suit alleging breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential information, breach of duty of loyalty, tortious interference with contractual relations, tortious interference with business expectancy, conversion, and civil conspiracy, and seeking a declaratory judgment with respect to covenants not to compete and injunctive relief. Proceedings against one defendant were stayed, due to bankruptcy. The district court granted summary judgment to the remaining defendants, except with respect to the declaratory judgment count, but found that the covenants had already expired. The district court denied attorney’s fees. The Seventh Circuit held that because of the stay, the summary judgment ruling was not a final decision, so that it lacked jurisdiction on appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1291, except with respect to the request for injunctive relief (28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1)). The court affirmed on that issue, reasoning that Tradesmen failed to show that it suffered any harm, let alone irreparable harm, from the remaining defendants’ actions. View "Tradesmen Int'l, Inc. v. Black" on Justia Law

Yasinskyy, a Ukrainian citizen came to the U.S. in 2007 with an H-2B nonimmigrant visa, sponsored by a New York company for work as a temporary employee at a grocery store, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(H); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h). After working for six weeks, he traveled to Oregon for better-paying employment and began the process for obtaining a commercial driver’s license. At his last exam, he was detained for being unlawfully present in the U.S. In removal proceedings, Yasnskyy applied for asylum claiming past persecution based on political opinion. He claimed to have been hospitalized, twice, with a concussion and bruised kidney after political demonstrations, to have been terminated from his job, and to have been repeatedly threatened. There was no prosecution, due to lack of evidence. An immigration judge denied his claims, stating that Yasinskyy did not show that the Ukrainian government was unwilling or unable to protect him from harm,. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding the decision supported by substantial evidence. View "Yasinskky v. Holder" on Justia Law

Reynolds acquired Pactiv in 2010 under an agreement that calls for severance pay to any non‐union employee terminated without cause, within a year, as a result of the acquisition. Pactiv established a severance‐pay plan with implementing terms, including a requirement that the departing worker execute a separation agreement in a form acceptable to the company, releasing all other claims against Pactiv. Within a year, Pactiv directed Rupert to relocate. He declined. Pactiv acknowledged entitlement to severance pay and sent him an agreement, which required that Rupert promise, for the next year, not to work for competitors in research and development, solicit sales of competing goods and services, or try to hire Pactiv employees. He had not previously been subject to a restrictive covenant and declined to sign. Pactiv withheld severance benefits. The district court held that Rupert was entitled to benefits because the formal plan, governed by ERISA, lacks any language conditioning benefits on signing a restrictive covenant; material terms must be in writing, 29 U.S.C.1102(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that Rupert did not ask for benefits under Pactiv’s plan, but asked for benefits under the acquisition agreement, repeatedly asserting that the plan is irrelevant to his claim. The court remanded for consideration under that agreement. View "Pactiv Corp. v. Rupert" on Justia Law

Stokes was a public school teacher for more than 10 years. In 2000, he pleaded no contest to a charge of misdemeanor battery for indecently touching two boys who were his students. Stokes was sentenced to probation, with a prohibition on unsupervised contact with minors. Less than a month after sentencing, Stokes obtained permission to complete his probation in Thailand. Within weeks of his arrival in Thailand, he began seeking boys for sex. This continued for several years until someone tipped off the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Service, which, with the Royal Thai Police, searched Stokes’s home and recovered a camera, a computer, and compact discs containing thousands of images of Stokes’s sexual activity with Thai boys. Stokes was extradited and convicted of traveling in foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in a sex act with a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2423(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims related to a procedural mistake in the extradition process and to the legality of the search. The Thai foreign ministry waived the “Rule of Specialty,” allowing the government to proceed on a substitute charge. The Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and the Warrant Clause have no extraterritorial application, but Stokes was protected by the Amendment’s touchstone requirement of reasonableness. The search was reasonable. View "United States v. Stokes" on Justia Law

abiu worked as a bank teller, 2003-2007. He searched account records for account holders with balances exceeding $100,000, then stole their information and, along with codefendants, compromised that information to divert money into fraudulently opened bank accounts. Postal inspectors lawfully searched his home and seized notes containing names, Social Security numbers, and account information of 86 customers, and an unspecified number of fake driver’s licenses and Social Security cards bearing the names of some of those customers, but only 17 customers suffered a loss. The losses were reimbursed by the banks. Rabiu pleaded guilty to bank fraud and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1344, 1029(a)(2), 1028A(a)(1), admitting participation in the scheme, but insisting that some of the names and identifying information on the phony driver’s licenses and Social Security cards were fictitious and not from customers. The government successfully sought a four-level upward sentencing adjustment under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) based on 50 or more victims. The government cited a definition of “victim,” which, for offenses involving identity theft, was broadened in 2009, after Rabiu’s arrest, to include “any individual whose means of identification was used unlawfully or without authority.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the court overstated the number of victims, it was clear that the judge would have imposed the same sentence even had he accepted Rabiu’s calculation; the error was harmless. View "United States v. Rabiu" on Justia Law

Weddington was convicted in two separate Indiana state trials of four counts of rape, two counts of criminal confinement, one count of criminal deviate conduct, and one count of robbery. He was sentenced to 133 years’ imprisonment. After unsuccessful appeals, Weddington filed a state petition for post-conviction relief in 2007, asserting ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The state court held evidentiary hearings and denied relief. Weddington did not appeal. In 2011, Weddington filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming that the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress evidence from a traffic stop and ineffective assistance of counsel. He maintains that his wife would have testified and given him an alibi, but counsel failed to contact her or any other witness, although aware that she wanted to testify. Weddington asserts that prison administration confiscated his legal work, legal books, pens and pencils, and even legal mail, for more than a year. The Seventh Circuit vacated dismissal and remanded for assignment to another judge. The district judge, in her former capacity as a state judge, presided over Weddington’s conviction for state criminal charges related to charges underlying the federal habeas action. The record presents factual issues regarding equitable tolling and procedural default of certain issues. View "Weddington v. Finnan" on Justia Law

The Lippert tile installation business employs union workers. Some customers require or prefer union workers for tile installation projects, but others prefer nonunion labor. In 2004 the Lipperts created a new tile installation company that employed non-union workers solely to serve those customers. The union filed a successful grievance with the joint arbitration committee (JAC), seeking union benefits for non-union tile installers working for the new company. The Lipperts petitioned to vacate the award, arguing that the new company should not be bound by the award because it was not a party to the collective bargaining agreement. The district court granted the union’s motion to enforce the award, finding that the nominally new company could be treated as the same with the old company for purposes of the agreement under the “single employer” doctrine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. By failing to present it to the JAC, the Lipperts waived an argument that the arbitration award is unenforceable because the National Labor Relations Board has never found that the non-union laborers are in the same bargaining unit as the union laborers. The companies, which are centrally operated by the same entity, are one and the same for purposes of arbitrability under the contract. View "Lippert Tile Co., Inc. v. Int'l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen" on Justia Law

Davis was convicted of three Milwaukee-area bank robberies, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). Four robberies were committed in a similar fashion and surveillance photos also suggested that the robberies had been committed by the same individual; images from the four robberies showed a male robber with similar facial features who sometimes wore the same clothes. He was acquitted of one count of robbery and of witness intimidation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the two witness intimidation counts should have been tried before a separate jury under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 8(a) and 14(a). Although the Seventh Circuit’s pattern jury instructions use the word “should,” in describing the government’s burden, substituting the word “must” in the place of “should” did not alter the jury instruction to Davis’s prejudice, View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Hill, an African American, began working for the General Services Administration in 2008 through the Federal Career Intern Program. Realizing that his Master’s degree entitled him to a higher pay rate, he filed a complaint with the EEOC. The parties settled. Hill maintains that he acted professionally during his one-year probationary period. His coworkers complained to supervisors about Hill’s temper on three occasions. A supervisor told Hill that his “stomping around” and slamming doors could be seen as threatening because he was a “pretty big guy,” which Hill took as a coded racial reference. After his probation, Hill was fired, based on those three incidents. Hill sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-17, for race discrimination, gender discrimination, and retaliation for filing an EEOC complaint. The district court granted summary judgment to GSA, stating that Hill was not meeting legitimate expectations because he had engaged in a pattern of behavior that led three different coworkers to report him to their supervisors, and that a white female intern was not a suitable comparator because only one coworker had ever complained about her behavior, nor had Hill established pretext. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Anthony Hill v. Martha Johnson" on Justia Law

In 2007, Williams was pulled over for allegedly running a stop sign. Because he had no proof of insurance, he and his car were taken to a Chicago police station. The next day, officers approached Williams on the street and claimed that he had wrongfully taken his car from the station the previous night. Williams claimed that one of the officers said he could take the car and gave him the keys. The officers sought to tow his car; Williams resisted. According to Williams, the officers beat him repeatedly; after he was handcuffed and taken to the station, the physical abuse continued. Williams sued the officers for false arrest and excessive force, 42 U.S.C. 1983. . The trial was largely a credibility contest; defendants presented evidence that Williams had committed seven drug or gun felonies in the last 10 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a verdict in favor of defendants, rejecting an argument that the district court erred in allowing in evidence of his prior convictions under Federal Rule 609, because it did not articulate a probative-prejudice balancing analysis. Williams did not ask the court to perform the balancing test. View "Williams v. Dieball" on Justia Law