Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Carter, an Illinois prison inmate, sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. His petition was transferred to Illinois in June, 2010. On December 5, having heard nothing about the status of his case, Carter inquired. The clerk’s office incorrectly responded: “As of this date, the Court has taken no further action on the requested case. When an order is entered, you will be promptly notified by mail.” The district court had actually denied Carter’s petition in February 2011. The opinion was not sent or otherwise made available to Carter. After more than a year, Carter again wrote the clerk and was correctly informed that his petition had been denied two years earlier. Fewer than 30 days later, Carter filed a notice of appeal and a petition for a certificate of appealability. The district court did not docket his papers until about six weeks later. The Seventh Circuit allowed an appeal. While Federal Rule 58(c)(2)(B) provides that a judgment is deemed entered 150 days after the court’s decision, it does not set an appeal deadline. A jurisdictional rule is not waivable, but the Rule is subject to equitable tolling. View "Carter v. Hodge" on Justia Law

Greenblatt, the “bad boy of Chicago arbitrage” became involved in litigation concerning use of his “web of corporations,” including Loop Corporation and Banco. In 2000, Banco extended a $9.9 million line of credit in exchange for a blanket lien over Loop’s assets. Loop defaulted; nevertheless, Banco expanded the line of credit by several million dollars in 2002 and continued lending Loop money until 2004. Banco lost senior creditor status when the district court voided the lien in an earlier case. In 2001 Loop purchased millions of shares of EZ Links stock from Golf Venture, giving a promissory note. Loop defaulted; Golf Venture won a judgment of $1.2 million. Also in 2001, a failed margin transaction left Loop indebted to its brokerage firm, Wachovia, in the amount of $1,885,751. Wachovia took Loop to arbitration and won a $2,349,000 award in 2005. Wachovia is still trying to collect. Loop had transferred almost all of its valuable assets to another Greenblatt company, leaving only the EZ Links stock, in possession of Banco, and Banco claimed to have creditor priority over Wachovia. The district vourt pierced Loop’s corporate veil, allowing Wachovia to reach Greenblatt’s assets, and voiding Banco’s lien, and ordered the sale of Loop’s only asset, EZ Links stock. Banco attempted to contest the d decisions. The Seventh Circuit dismissed Banco’s appeal for lack of standing. View "Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Loop Corp." on Justia Law

Bank of America lost approximately $34 million when the Knight companies went bankrupt. BOA sued, claiming that Knight’s directors and managers looted the firm and that its accountants failed to detect the embezzlement. The district court dismissed. The accountants invoked the protection of Illinois law, 225 ILCS 450/30.1, which provides that an accountant is liable only to its clients unless the accountant itself committed fraud (not alleged in this case) or “was aware that a primary intent of the client was for the professional services to benefit or influence the particular person bringing the action” The court found that BOA did not plausibly allege that the accountants knew that Knight’s “primary intent” was to benefit the Bank in alleging that the accountants knew that Knight would furnish copies of the financial statements to lenders. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting BOA’s choice not to pursue its claims in the bankruptcy process. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Knight" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claim that Lockheed breached its fiduciary duty to its retirement savings plan, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(2). The Plan is a defined-contribution plan, (401(k)); employees direct part of their earnings to a tax-deferred savings account. Participants may allocate funds as they choose. Among the investment options Lockheed offered was a “stable-value fund” (SVF). SVFs typically invest in a mix of short- and intermediate-term securities, such as Treasury securities, corporate bonds, and mortgage-backed securities. Holding longer-term instruments, SVFs generally outperform money market funds. For stability, SVFs are provided through “wrap” contracts with banks or insurance companies that guarantee the fund’s principal and shield it from interest-rate volatility. Plaintiffs allege that the Lockheed SVF was heavily invested in short-term money market investments, with a low rate of return that did “not beat inflation by a sufficient margin to provide a meaningful retirement asset.” The district court granted Lockheed summary judgment with respect to some claims. The SVF claim survived. The district court initially certified two classes under FRCP 23(b)(1)(A). On remand, the court declined to certify further narrowed classes. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that the plaintiffs carefully limited the class to plan participants who invested in the SVF during the class period and employed reasonable means to exclude from the class persons who did not experience injury. View "Abbott v. Lockheed Martin Corp." on Justia Law

Part of Crosby’s finger was amputated while using a “kicking method” of removing metal from bundles. His employer, Cooper, discouraged that method as dangerous. Crosby claimed medical and temporary total disability benefits under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act. When he returned, Crosby stated that he would continue using the “kicking method.” Cooper suspended him for three days and stated that any future safety policy violation would result in immediate termination. The president of Crosby’s union, Zimmerman, filed a grievance on Crosby’s behalf. After returning from suspension, Crosby was given additional training during which, he alleges, Cooper introduced new safety rules and procedures. Within hours of Crosby’s return to work, Cooper’s safety specialist accused him of violating a new safety rule by tossing a pallet. Crosby denied doing so. Zimmerman notified Crosby that Cooper had decided to fire him and suggested that Crosby ask Cooper to call the decision a “permanent layoff with no recall rights,” so that Crosby would be eligible for unemployment benefits and a neutral job reference. Cooper accepted on the condition that Crosby dismiss the grievance. Crosby later claimed that the settlement was a sham and that he was fired for filing a workers’ compensation claim. Cooper removed his retaliatory discharge suit to federal court, claiming that the suit was a disguised action under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, which preempts state‐law claims that require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Cooper asserted that the suit should be dismissed for failure to exhaust remedies under the CBA. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court and remanded to state court, rejecting the claim of complete preemption. View "Crosby v. Cooper B-Line, Inc." on Justia Law

Papazoglou, a citizen of Greece, entered the U.S. on a visitor’s visa in 1986. In 1987, he married a U.S. citizen, Hariklia, and adjusted his status to lawful permanent resident in 1990. He has four children. In 2008, Papazoglou pled guilty to third-degree sexual assault and physical abuse of a child and was sentenced to 2 ½ years’ imprisonment and 4 ½ years of probation. DHS began removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C.A. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Papazoglou sought adjustment of status based on his marriage, 8 U.S.C. 1255(a), and a waiver of inadmissibility arising from that aggravated felony conviction, 8 U.S.C. 1182(h). The IJ granted the waiver and the adjustment of status. The Board of Immigration Review found Papazoglou statutorily ineligible for waiver and that, even if he were eligible for waiver, he would not be entitled to it as a matter of discretion. The Seventh Circuit denied review, upholding the Boar’s interpretation of the statute as applied to Papazoglou and finding that judicial review of discretionary removal decisions based on commission of an aggravated felony is precluded by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C). View "Papazoglou v. Holder" on Justia Law

The Kivers retained C&T, an Illinois law firm, to prepare trusts to benefit their daughters, Diane and Maureen, among others. Maureen and Diane each served as trustee of various trusts. Maureen died in 2007. Her husband, Minor, represents Maureen’s estate, which filed suit against C&T, alleging that C&T failed to disclose the existence and terms of certain trusts to Maureen, to her detriment, and failed to make distributions to her. The estate filed a separate state court suit against Diane, alleging that Diane breached her duties as trustee by failing to disclose the existence of certain trusts to Maureen or make distributions to her. Diane was a client of C&T during the relevant period. The district court entered an agreed protective order governing discovery disclosure to deal with privilege issues and denied the estate’s motion to compel production. The estate violated the protective order. The district court imposed sanctions and dismissed several of the estate’s claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that “The complexity of the multiple trusts … the untimely death of Maureen, the pursuit of concurrent state and federal suits … the length of this litigation, and the disorderly nature of the estate’s presentation… evoke a middle installment of Bleak House." View "Scott v. Chuhak & Tecson, PC" on Justia Law

Canadian immigration officers refused to allow Margulis to “enter” Canada, but when he attempted to return, U.S. customs officers discovered that he had a criminal record and placed him in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2) even though his crimes had resulted in only 30 days of jail time. A lawful permanent resident is removable if he commits nontrivial crimes in the U.S.; if he leaves the U.S. he cannot be readmitted for at least five years, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9), (a)(9)(B). Immigration authorities can waive inadmissibility if the crimes that made the alien deportable are minor, 8 U.S.C. 1182(h) (section 212(h)). Margulis asked that the removal proceedings be terminated and that he be placed in admissibility proceedings. The Board of Immigration Appeals refused, finding that Margulis had never “entered” Canada and so could not have returned to the U.S. The Seventh Circuit remanded, reasoning that immigration officers did not treat Margulis as a lawful entrant, but deemed him already present in the U.S.; if they had thought he was seeking admission they would have placed him in admissibility proceedings rather than removal proceedings. View "Margulis v. Holder" on Justia Law

Reyes, a citizen of Mexico, entered the U.S. in 1979 and was granted lawful permanent resident status in 1989. In 1993, he pled guilty to two felony counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor. He was sentenced to six months in prison and four years of probation. As a result, he was ordered removed in 2000. He later reentered unlawfully. In 2011, he was arrested and the 2000 removal order was reinstated. He asked the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen his removal proceeding, arguing that his initial removal was in error because he was prevented from seeking discretionary relief from removal in 2000, but intervening Supreme Court decisions show that discretionary relief should have been available at that time. The Board denied the motion, finding it untimely and that the 90-day statutory deadline should not be equitably tolled. The Board also found that the discretionary relief he sought was not available to him, despite changes in the law, because he had reentered the country unlawfully. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, citing 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5); Reyes is barred from section 212(c) discretionary relief and his removal proceedings may not be reopened because of his illegal reentry. View "Zambrano v. Holder" on Justia Law

Stollings lost his index finger and portions of other fingers in a table saw accident and sued Ryobi, the saw’s manufacturer, alleging defective design because it failed to equip the saw with either a riving knife, a small blade that holds the wood cut open to prevent kickbacks, or braking technology that automatically stops the saw blade upon contact with human tissue. Stollings contends either feature would have prevented the accident. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Ryobi. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the court erred in failing to stop Ryobi’s counsel from arguing that Stollings’s counsel brought the case as part of a joint venture with the inventor of an automatic braking technology to force saw manufacturers to license the technology, and in admitting hearsay evidence to support that improper argument. The court also erred in excluding the testimony of one of Stollings’s expert witnesses and in giving the jury a sole proximate cause instruction where Ryobi was not asserting a comparative fault defense or blaming a third party. View "Stollings v. Ryobi Techs., Inc." on Justia Law