Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Safety National sold an excess liability insurance policy to TKK, to cover excess losses resulting from liability imposed “by the Workers’ Compensation or Employers’ Liability Laws” of Illinois. The widow of a former TKK employee sued, alleging that TKK’s negligence caused the employee to become ill with and die from mesothelioma. The claim was subject to an affirmative defense: the Illinois Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act bars common law claims by or on behalf of an employee against a covered employer “on account of damage, disability or death caused or contributed to by any disease contracted or sustained in the course of the employment.” After Safety National denied coverage, TKK filed suit. The district court granted TKK summary judgment for its costs in defending and settling the widow’s suit, reasoning that the reference to “Employers’ Liability Laws” included the common law negligence claim even if the claim ultimately must fail because of the statutory bar. The court denied TKK’s claim for attorney fees and costs in the coverage lawsuit itself, except a modest award for what the court considered a vexatious motion to reconsider. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The key policy term, “Employers’ Liability Laws,” is broad enough to include claims under the common law, including “groundless” claims. View "TKK USA, Inc. v. Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp." on Justia Law

Okoro was arrested without a warrant on suspicion of a misdemeanor property crime. For unknown reasons, Okoro never received a “Gerstein hearing” to determine probable cause during his two months of incarceration. Okoro, then 23, had Type I diabetes, which he could control by monitoring his blood sugar levels. While he was in college, however, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia, which compromised his ability to care for his diabetes. Immediately after his arrest, Okoro’s relatives began calling to inform correctional employees and medical staff of his conditions. Okoro was detained in his cell, usually in isolation, and was dependent on jail employees and medical staff to monitor his blood sugar level and provide insulin shots. On December 23, 2008, Okoro collapsed in his cell. An autopsy revealed that Okoro’s death was the result of diabetic ketoacidosis, a buildup of acidic ketones in the bloodstream that occurs when the body runs out of insulin. A doctor and a nurse, employed by the healthcare company that contracts with the jail, moved for dismissal of the estate’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied their qualified immunity claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the record easily supports a finding of deliberate indifference to Okoro’s serious medical condition. View "Currie v. Chhabra" on Justia Law

In 2005, 10‐year‐old “Jessica” reported that she had been sexually assaulted by a man named “Ron” several years earlier. Based on her description, where she lived at the time, and the sleeping arrangements of the home, Jessica’s mother identified McElvaney, who had been her live‐in boyfriend and estimated that the assault occurred between August 2001 and February 2002. Based on additional information, McElvaney was charged with assaulting Jessica between September 26, 2001, and December 19, 2001. McElvaney’s attorney Celebre, moved to require the district attorney to indicate with greater particularity the time of the alleged assault and to prohibit modification of the time period at trial so that McElvaney could formulate an alibi and identify potential supporting witnesses. At a hearing, Celebre conceded that the state had authority to allege the three‐month date range. The trial court judge said that he would not allow the state to amend at trial. Convicted under Wisconsin law, McElvaney was sentenced to 15 years. Wisconsin courts rejected appeals asserting ineffective assistance of counsel based on Celebre’s failure to object to the way in which Jessica’s videotaped testimony was presented. State courts then denied post-conviction relief based on failure to pursue the more-specific-date issue. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of a federal habeas petition. View "McElvaney v. Pollard" on Justia Law

Norman Green was convicted of first-degree murder. While an inmate, Green decided to adopt a spiritual name: Prince Atum-Ra Uhuru Mutawakkil. Atum-Ra was an Egyptian deity representing a fusion of the gods Atum and Ra; uhuru is the Swahili word for freedom; and al-Mutawakkil was an Abbasid caliph who ruled in Samarra. The addition of “Prince” is a mystery. He does not contend that he chose the name as part of his devotion to a particular faith. Wisconsin’s current policy is to permit an inmate to use the name on the conviction (the committed name), or the committed name in conjunction with a second name, but not to use a second name by itself unless a court grants a petition for change of name. Green claims that he suffers injury because, for example, a letter addressed to “Prince Atum-Ra Uhuru Mutawakkil” will be returned to the sender, while a letter addressed to “Norman Green” or to both names will be delivered to him. The Seventh Circuit rejected an equal protection claim and a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, finding that the policy does not create a “substantial burden.” View "Green. v. Huibregtse" on Justia Law

Cooney divorced; she obtained sole custody of their sons. Later, her ex‐husband petitioned for change of custody. A court‐appointed expert diagnosed Cooney as having Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, in which a person produces or feigns physical or emotional symptoms in another person under her care. A therapist reported to the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services that Cooney was abusing the children; DCFS investigated and entered an indicated finding of mental injury. Cooney filed an appeal, during which the ALJ recorded proceedings on microcassettes. Cooney retained a private court‐reporting company to transcribe the hearing as it occurred, creating the “Fishman transcripts.” After the appeal was denied, Cooney sought judicial review. Ultimately, Cooney filed a federal complaint, alleging that the DCFS representatives conspired to deprive her of her due process rights, 42 U.S.C. 1983; she claimed that the DCFS transcripts were “altered” at defendants’ direction, and that this caused delay and expense to convince the court to use the Fishman transcripts. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that no reasonable jury could infer conspiracy from the mere existence of discrepancies in the transcripts, and ordered Cooney to show cause why a Rule 38 award should not be entered against her. View "Cooney v. Casady" on Justia Law

In 1999 Obriecht was convicted of attempted second‐degree sexual assault of a child, five counts of fourth‐degree sexual assault and one count of disorderly conduct and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment and probation. He was released pending his appeal, but probation was revoked when he violated its terms. In 2001, he was sentenced to seven years of consecutive imprisonment for the probation revocation. He exhausted direct appeal of the 1999 convictions. In 2002, Obriecht sought habeas relief in the district court, which was denied, because he had not exhausted state remedies. The court warned him concerning deadlines. Obriecht’ attorney apparently believed that an extension granted for appeal of the state parole violation conviction tolled the federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act statute of limitations for the 1999 convictions. Obriecht was the placed in medical segregation and later in a mental health facility. His attorney withdrew and, when declared competent, Obriecht began to act pro se. The district court rejected his habeas petition as untimely and finding that he had not demonstrated entitlement to equitable tolling. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Obriecht could not establish that an extraordinary circumstance prevented his timely filing and that he pursued his rights diligently. View "Obriecht v. Thurmer" on Justia Law

Healix and HHI compete in the business of infusion therapy services: administration of substances such as pharmaceuticals intravenously or by any method other than ingestion. Some medical care providers offer these services to patients in their offices. Healix and HHI provide support. In 2007 Healix recruited the Clinic as a new customer. The Clinic had two members: Keller, a physician, and Porter, a nurse practitioner. Under their five-year contract, Healix would provide services after the Clinic built an in-office pharmacy and hired staff to work there. The Clinic was responsible for the cost of construction. Healix required Keller and Porter to execute personal guarantees and took a security interest in accounts receivable. Four months after signing the contract, the Clinic notified Healix that it would not fulfill its responsibilities. The Clinic was in breach, but Healix did not sue. One month later, the Clinic entered into a contract with HHI. Healix learned of the new contract and sued HHI for copyright and trademark infringement and for tortious interference with a contract. The intellectual property claims were dismissed. After a trial, the district judge rejected the tortious-interference claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding lack of causation because the evidence indicated that the Clinic would have “walked away” regardless of HHI’s actions. View "Healix Infusion Therapy, Inc. v. HHI Infusion Servs., Inc.." on Justia Law

Boika, a Belarusian citizen, entered the U.S. legally in 2006, but overstayed. At her removal proceedings, she applied for asylum under 8 U.S.C. 1158, withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3), and relief pursuant to the Convention Against Torture. Her husband, Zhits, made parallel claims, derivative from Boika’s claims based on their marital status, 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(3)(A). Boika claimed that she could establish a well‐founded fear of future persecution upon return to Belarus, based on past persecution for her political involvement in Belarus, between2004 and 2006. An immigration judge denied her asylum application based on an adverse credibility finding. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied review. Boika moved to reopen based on materially changed country conditions, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), claiming that after Belarusian President Lukashenko’s election in 2010,the Belarusian government’s severe crackdown on political opposition resulted in widespread human rights abuses. She submitted new corroborating evidence about her activity in the Belarusian opposition movement while she has been in the U.S. The Board denied Boika’s motion. The Seventh Circuit granted their petition and remanded. View "Boika v. Holder" on Justia Law

Evans, convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), and of possessing cocaine and marijuana with intent to distribute it, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and (b)(1)(D), was sentenced to 55 months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. Eleven days later he pleaded no contest, in Wisconsin state court, on two charges involving sexual abuse of a minor, and was sentenced to five years of probation to follow his federal term of supervised release. When the federal district court learned of the state convictions two years later, it modified the terms of Evans’s original sentence to require Evans to attend a sex offender assessment and treatment program while on supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court did not have authority to change the terms when he had not violated existing terms and that the court was not authorized to impose sex‐offender treatment because it is unrelated to the crimes of conviction in federal court. Because Evans’s sex‐offense conviction was contemporaneous to his drug and firearm convictions, the goals of rehabilitation and protecting the public justified the decision. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

Baxter’s Colleague Infusion Pump, an electronic device used to deliver intravenous fluids to patients, was known to have a range of defects. The FDA sent Baxter warning letters. Baxter’s response was not satisfactory. In 2005 the FDA sought forfeiture of all Baxter‐owned Pumps. In 2006, Baxter entered into a Consent Decree to stop manufacturing and distributing all models of the Pump within the U.S., and committed to bringing the approximately 200,000 Pumps in the hands of health care professionals into compliance with the FDA Act. Baxter devoted significant resources to fixing the Pumps, but the FDA was not satisfied and ordered a product recall. In a derivative suit, plaintiffs alleged that that Baxter’s directors and officers breached fiduciary duties by consciously disregarding their responsibility to bring about compliance with the Consent Decree, causing Baxter to lose more than $550 million. Plaintiffs did not first ask Baxter’s board of directors to pursue those claims, but alleged futility. The district court dismissed, finding that Westmoreland failed adequately to plead demand futility, as required by FRCP 23.1(b)(3) and Delaware substantive law. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that particularized facts furnished by plaintiffs cast a reasonable doubt that the defendants’ conduct was the product of a valid exercise of business judgment. View "Westmoreland Cnty. Emps. Retirement Sys. v. Parkinson" on Justia Law