Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gray’s friend Johnson offered to act as co‐borrower to help Gray buy a house, if Gray promised that she would only be on the loan as a co‐borrower for two years. In return, Johnson received a finder’s fee from the daughter of the builder-seller (Hinrichs). Mortgage broker Bowling sent their application to Fremont, a federally insured lender specializing in stated‐income loans, with which the lender typically did not verify financial information supplied by applicants. Bowling testified that he told both women that they would be listed as occupants, that their incomes would be inflated, and what the monthly payment would be. The closing proceeded; Gray and Johnson received a $273,700 mortgage from Fremont and, on paper, a $48,300 second mortgage from Hinrichs. Gray and Johnson acknowledge that the application that they signed contained several false statements. Bowling became the subject of a federal investigation. Sentenced to 51 months’ imprisonment, he agreed to testify against his clients. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of Gray and Johnson under 18 U.S.C. 1014, which prohibits “knowingly” making false statements to influence the action of a federally insured institution. Rejecting an argument that the district court erred by denying an opportunity to present testimony to show Bowling’s history of duping clients, the court stated that his prior wrongdoing was not very probative of Gray’s and Johnson’s guilt. View "United States v. Gray" on Justia Law

The FBI obtained court orders for wiretaps on two of Atkins’s phones and began recording his telephone conversations. Agents intercepted several calls between Atkins and Claybrooks, concerning the details of various cocaine transactions. A grand jury indicted Claybrooks for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1) and distribution of 500 grams or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). At trial, the prosecution relied heavily on testimony from Atkins, who testified that he began supplying Claybrooks with cocaine in 2001,that he distributed between 20 and 30 kilograms of cocaine to Claybrooks during their relationship, that Claybrooks supplied him with kilograms of cocaine on three or four occasions, and that Claybrooks occasionally brokered cocaine sales between Atkins and Claybrooks’s customers. Claybrooks was convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit rejected a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim and affirmed the conviction, but remanded for resentencing, finding that the district court did not make a determination regarding the amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy. View "United States v. Claybrooks" on Justia Law

The inmate filed suit against prison officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for using excessive force on multiple occasions. The trial court dismissed. He sought an order that he be given the trial transcript for free, to aid him in his appeal. The Seventh Circuit denied the motion, reasoning that he is not entitled to a transcript without charge as an appellant proceeding in forma pauperis. Regardless of poverty, he has three strikes (suits without merit) and has not shown that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury, as described in 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). View "Maus v. Baker" on Justia Law

After being rejected for a mortgage because Hall had a bankruptcy and their joint income was too low, Hall and Phillips applied with Bowling, a mortgage broker, under the “stated income loan program.” Bowling prepared an application that omitted Hall’s name, attributed double their combined income to Phillips, and falsely claimed that Phillips was a manager. Phillips signed the application and employment verification form. Fremont extended credit. They could not make the payments; the lender foreclosed. Bowling repeated this process often. He pleaded guilty to bank fraud and, to lower his sentence, assisted in prosecution of his clients. Phillips and Hall were convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1014. The district court prohibited them from eliciting testimony that Bowling assured them that the program was lawful and from arguing mistake of fact in signing the documents. The Seventh Circuit first affirmed, but granted rehearing en banc to clarify elements of the crime and their application to charges of mortgage fraud and reversed. The judge excluded evidence that, if believed, might have convinced a jury that any false statements made by the defendants were not known by them to be false and might also have rebutted an inference of intent to influence the bank. View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Wilson worked as an admissions representative, recruiting students to enroll in CEC’s culinary arts college. CEC admissions representatives worked under a contract that gave them a bonus for each student they recruited, above a threshold, who completed a full course or a year of study. In 2010, the U.S. Department of Education issued regulations prohibiting this kind of arrangement; new rules were scheduled to take effect in July 2011. CEC decided announced to its admissions representatives that it would cease paying bonuses at the end of February 2011 and that no bonuses would be regarded as earned by that date unless the relevant student had completed the year of study or course by that time. Wilson sued, asserting that CEC owed him bonuses for “pipeline” students, whom he had recruited and who were on target to complete a full course or year of study between March and June 2011. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Wilson successfully pleaded that CEC exercised its right to terminate the agreement in bad faith and in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. View "Wilson v. Career Educ. Corp," on Justia Law

ATF agent Foreman investigated Wiseman’s purchase of eight handguns at Indiana outdoor‐gear retail stores. Wiseman told Foreman that she purchased the guns for Ghiassi, who was prohibited from possessing firearms because he had prior felony convictions for stalking and taking another person’s vehicle without consent; he was also the subject of a protective order. Wiseman stated that Ghiassi wanted to sell an AK‐47 assault rifle. Foreman arranged an undercover purchase, using Wiseman as an intermediary. After Ghiassi turned the weapon over to Foreman, a search of Ghiassi’s vehicle produced multiple weapons that had been purchased by Wiseman. Ghiassi admitted that Wiseman had illegally purchased weapons for him, but did not acknowledge any particular number of weapons. Foreman also reviewed surveillance footage in which Ghiassi could be seen at the firearms counter looking over guns with Wiseman. Ghiassi pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court imposed a sentence of 70 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court erred in finding Ghiassi responsible for eight or more firearms and deprived him of due process by relying, in substantial part, on his co‐defendant’s testimony at her sentencing to make that finding. View "United States v. Ghiassi" on Justia Law

Wiza was staking out a parking lot, to arrest Johnson for an attack at a bar and as a suspect in a recent shooting. A van known to be associated with Johnson arrived. Johnson exited the vehicle with Carthans; Wiza exited his vehicle and drew his gun. Howard and Williams then exited the van. Wiza ordered the men to the ground. Officer O’Keefe arrived, and while O’Keefe attempted to handcuff Johnson, Carthans fled. Howard and Williams were compliant. O’Keefe found 11 grams of crack cocaine in Johnson’s pocket. All of the men had bloodstains on their clothing. The officers frisked the men and, in Howard’s pocket, found half an ounce of crack cocaine. Wiza searched the van and found a baseball bat and a gun wrapped in a bloody shirt. Soon after, Madison police arrived and said that the men were suspects in an armed robbery that had occurred in Madison less than an hour earlier. Howard later told police that he used the shirt to wipe the robbery victim’s blood off the gun at Johnson’s request. The district judge concluded that the stop and the frisk were reasonable to protect the officers during an unexpectedly chaotic encounter and refused to suppress the drugs or Howard’s statement. Howard entered a conditional plea of guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 18U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Once Howard was stopped, the discovery of the drugs in his pocket became inevitable. View "United States v. Howard" on Justia Law

Laskin worked for Jefco from 1966-1974 and participated in the company pension plan, accumulating a fully vested retirement account balance of $5,976.09. Soon after she left the company Laskin contacted Siegel, a trustee of the pension plan, and asked whether she could withdraw the funds to buy real estate. Siegel sent Laskin a letter explaining that her account would accrue interest at the passbook rate and that the plan had been amended in 1975, raising the retirement eligibility age from 55 to 65. Over the next 10 years, Laskin received statements, indicating that she was receiving from 5% to 5.5% interest on her balance. In 1988, a statement indicated that her balance was $12,602.86. The pension plan dissolved on December 31, 1991. In 2008, Laskin contacted Siegel’s son (who had purchased his father’s interest in Jefco) and was told that pension funds had been completely disbursed and that she did not receive a payout because she could not be located. The district court dismissed her claims as barred by the limitations period in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1113. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Laskin v. Siegel" on Justia Law

Laskin worked for Jefco from 1966-1974 and participated in the company pension plan, accumulating a fully vested retirement account balance of $5,976.09. Soon after she left the company Laskin contacted Siegel, a trustee of the pension plan, and asked whether she could withdraw the funds to buy real estate. Siegel sent Laskin a letter explaining that her account would accrue interest at the passbook rate and that the plan had been amended in 1975, raising the retirement eligibility age from 55 to 65. Over the next 10 years, Laskin received statements, indicating that she was receiving from 5% to 5.5% interest on her balance. In 1988, a statement indicated that her balance was $12,602.86. The pension plan dissolved on December 31, 1991. In 2008, Laskin contacted Siegel’s son (who had purchased his father’s interest in Jefco) and was told that pension funds had been completely disbursed and that she did not receive a payout because she could not be located. The district court dismissed her claims as barred by the limitations period in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1113. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Laskin v. Siegel" on Justia Law

Aponte sued four officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He brought one claim against each officer for unreasonably executing a warrant, and one against each for failing to prevent an unreasonable search and a state‐law claim for indemnification against the City of Chicago. See 745 ILCS 10/9‐102.) He claimed that because of damage done during the search, $9,462 was spent refurnishing his home. He also sought damages for emotional distress and punitive damages. The jury was instructed about compensatory damages and that if they found “in favor of Plaintiff but find that Plaintiff has failed to prove compensatory damages, you must return a verdict for Plaintiff in the amount of one dollar ($1.00).” The jury form, however, had no space identified for the “one dollar” verdict. The jury found for Aponte on one claim against only one officer and awarded Aponte $100, which it recorded in the space designated for “compensatory damages.” Aponte sought attorney’s fees of $116,435 for 450 hours under 42 U.S.C. 1988, as a “prevailing party.” The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the verdict as a mere nominal victory with no public benefit. View "Aponte v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law