Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Womack, convicted of distributing more than five grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence. On remand the district court imposed the same sentence; the Seventh Circuit again vacated. On second remand, the district court imposed a sentence of 262 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Womack qualified as a Career Offender based on prior felony convictions, so U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(b)(2) established his offense level at 34. His criminal history category was a 6, so the Sentencing Guidelines recommended a sentence of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments in favor of “progressive sentencing” and that Womack’s prior conviction for aggravated discharge of a firearm was not a crime of violence. View "United States v. Womack" on Justia Law

Bovee contends that his sister, Broom, violated the due process clause when, in her role as guidance counselor at his children’s school, she criticized his parenting methods and called him a “bad father.” Bovee claims that this alienated his children’s affections, violating his fundamental liberty interest in familial relations. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit held that the dismissal should have been on the merits. “The suit is about words, and only words.” Bovee’s lawyer conceded that Broom has not taken any official act adverse to his interests. Defamation, words not accompanied by any other official action, does not violate the due process clause. View "Bovee v. Broom" on Justia Law

Johns was indicted for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. Count One alleged possession of a .20 caliber shotgun in July, Count Two alleged a .45 caliber rifle in September, and Count Three alleged a loaded .38 caliber revolver in November. Johns admitted that he sold the guns to a confidential informant. A presentence report stated that Johns and the CI were members of a motorcycle club; that each knew the other’s criminal history; that Johns knew the CI intended to resell the guns; and that Johns told the CI that he had another gun and intended to retaliate for the murder of another club member and that he could get crack to sell to the CI. The automatic rifle had been stolen. The report recommended a base level of 20 and two enhancement levels because the offense involved three firearms, plus two levels for the stolen rifle, plus four levels for trafficking, plus four levels for transfer with knowledge that it would be used in connection with another felony, minus three levels for acceptance of responsibility. The total offense level, 29, yielded a guidelines range of 97 to 121 months’ imprisonment. The report noted that Johns had eight children from six relationships and owed $46,189 in child support. The district court imposed a sentence of 160 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the court erred by imposing a four‐level “other felony offense” enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).View "United States v. John" on Justia Law

Burris worked in coal mines for 23 years. He twice sought benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 901, abandoning his first claim in 2001, and pursuing a second claim in 2006. After a hearing on the second claim, an Administrative Law Judge determined that Burris was totally disabled by pneumoconiosis arising from his coal mining employment and that he qualified for benefits. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting arguments that the ALJ erred in finding that Burris established a material change in condition following his first, abandoned claim; in concluding that Burris proved 15 years of surface mine employment in conditions substantially similar to those that exist in underground mines; and in rejecting evidence rebutting a presumption of pneumoconiosis. View "Consolidation Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs" on Justia Law

At age 15 Jimenez was convicted of a murder he did not commit. He spent 16 years in prison before he was exonerated. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law against the City of Chicago and former Chicago detective, Bogucki, for violating his constitutional right to due process of law and for malicious prosecution. Bogucki tainted an identification by showing the witness a picture of Jiminez in advance. A jury awarded him $25 million in compensatory damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting a Batson claim because the defendants did not show that a biased juror was seated or any harm. The court properly instructed the jury concerning Jiminez’s Brady claim and was not required to provide the entire transcript of the original trial. View "Jimenez v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Swift, Schaltenbrand, and Siddle entered into an informal partnership arrangement to operate a mail-order pharmacy, divide the profits from that business, and eventually sell the book of customers to another pharmacy. After some initial success, the partners began taking profit distributions that far exceeded agreed‐upon percentages. Swift eventually filed lawsuits against Schaltenbrand and Siddle. The district court listened to 14 days of testimony before ruling against Swift on most of his claims. The court invalidated a copyright registration that Swift’s marketing company obtained for a logo used by the partnership, finding that Swift knowingly misrepresented a material fact in the application to register a copyright in the logo. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, agreeing that Swift failed to prove Schaltenbrand and Siddle breached their obligation to provide him with a share of profits. Swift waived fraud claims by declining to include them in the final pretrial order. The district court erred by invalidating the copyright registration without first consulting the Register of Copyrights as to the significance of the inaccurate information. The Copyright Act requires courts to perform this “curious procedure” before invalidating a registration based on a fraud on the Copyright Office.View "Swift v. Medicate Pharm., Inc." on Justia Law

Schomas, 54 years old, suffers from scoliosis and degenerative disc disease. Following a hearing, the Social Security Administration denied his application for Disability Insurance Benefits. The district court and the Seventh Circuit upheld the denial, rejecting a challenge to the ALJ’s credibility finding and assessment of his residual functional capacity. The court acknowledged that the ALJ’s decision was “problematic,” but concluded that Schomas waived most of his arguments, and that the rest were unfocused or undeveloped. View "Schomas v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Brindley and Thompson entered appearances as counsel for one of two defendants charged with drug offenses. A joint trial was scheduled. Both moved for continuance; the court set a hearing and ordered defendants counsel to be present. Thompson was present; Brindley was not. At a subsequent status conference, the court scheduled a jury trial and set a deadline for pretrial motions. Britton did not file any motions. On November 6, the court set a status conference for November 26 to discuss pretrial motions and ordered Brindley “to be present in person … not through other counsel.” Defendant appeared, but Brindley and Thompson did not and did not contact the court. The court set a show cause hearing; Brindley moved for continuance, claiming that he had not seen the order and had obligations in another trial. He apologized. The district court denied the motion and ordered Brindley to appear on November 30. Brindley appeared, but the court rejected his explanations as lies, held Brindley in contempt under Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b), and remanded him to custody for two days. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The court erred in using Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b)ʹs summary contempt procedures, which apply only when there is a compelling reason for an immediate remedy, contempt occurred in the judge’s presence, and the judge saw or heard the contemptuous conduct. The court noted that if the district court chooses, on remand, to proceed under 18 U.S.C. 401, a different judge will preside. View "United States v. Britton" on Justia Law

Addison filed a class action, alleging that Domino had sent thousands of “junk faxes” in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, and the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, and had committed the tort of conversion. Domino’s insurers refused to defend. Domino negotiated a settlement to protect its own interests; Addison and Domino agreed that the state court should certify a class and enter a judgment of $18 million. Addison agreed that the class would not recover any money from Domino, but that Domino would assign to Addison, as class representative and for the class, whatever claims Domino might have against its insurers. The state court approved the settlement. Addison sought a state court declaratory judgment holding Hartford liable for the judgment. Hartford removed the case to federal court. Addison dismissed the case voluntarily and filed another state court suit, naming Addison as the only plaintiff. Hartford again removed the case under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1453. The district court granted remand, finding that the suit did not fit the CAFA definition. Hartford argued that under the assignment in the underlying settlement, Addison had standing only as a class representative. The Seventh Circuit agreed, reversed, and remanded to state court. View "Addison Automatics, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Todd alleges that in 2012 he received a recorded telephone message from Collecto asking him to call and help the company locate his mother, Terry. He called; a Collecto representative told him that Terry owed AT&T money for cell phone service. Todd stated that he is not Terry, but the representative continued to discuss the alleged debt without asking how to reach Terry or asking Todd to pay the bill. Todd claimed that this interaction harmed him emotionally and violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692b, which permits a debt collector to call a third party for help in locating a “consumer” but prohibits revealing the existence of the consumer’s debt to the third party. Section 1692f prohibits “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” The district court concluded that Todd lacked standing under the Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Todd lacked standing under 1692b and failed to state a claim under 1692f. View "Todd v. Collecto, Inc." on Justia Law