Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2007 Hobart, Wisconsin passed an ordinance assessing stormwater management fees on all parcels in the village, including land owned by the Oneida Nation of Wisconsin, an Indian tribe, to finance construction and operation of a stormwater management system. Title to 148 parcels in Hobart, about 1400 acres or 6.6 percent of the village’s total land, is held by the United States in trust for the Oneida tribe (25 U.S.C. 465). Tribal land is interspersed with non-tribal land in a “checkerboard” pattern. The tribe sought a declaratory judgment that the assessment could not lawfully be imposed on it. Hobart argued that if that were true, the federal government must pay the fees; it filed a third‐party complaint against the United States. The district court entered summary judgment for the tribe and dismissed the third‐party claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the federal Clean Water Act did not submit the land to state taxing jurisdiction and that the government’s status as trustee rather than merely donor of tribal lands is designed to preserve tribal sovereignty, not to make the federal government pay tribal debts. View "Oneida Tribe of Indians of WI v. Village of Hobart, WI" on Justia Law

Davis was driving his tractor‐trailer on I-70 through Illinois toward St. Louis. The sleeping compartment had a hidden compartment in which Davis was hiding $304,980 in cash. Davis passed an unmarked police vehicle containing officers assigned to a DEA drug interdiction task force. The officers followed him until they observed Davis following another truck too closely and initiated a traffic stop. Preparing to issue a warning, the officers examined Davis’s log‐book and became suspicious because Davis had gone without work for long periods, but had expensive aftermarket parts on his truck. The officers then learned that Davis’s truck had previously been used in criminal activity. After Davis orally consented to a search, an officer handed Davis a written consent form to read and sign. Davis used his remote to unlock the truck for the officers, who began searching. Davis became agitated, but responded to the officers’ question of whether they still had consent, by scrawling something on the form and handing it over. After discovering the hidden cash, the officers found that Davis had scrawled “under protest.” Drug-sniffing dogs alerted to the cash. Davis was released, but the government sought forfeiture of the truck and money. The district court denied a motion to suppress, finding that Davis consented to the search. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding the search consensual. View "Davis v. $304,980.00 in U. S. Currency" on Justia Law

Manpower, an international staffing firm, is the parent of Right Management in Paris, France. A building in which Right leased space collapsed, so that Right’s offices were inaccessible. Right relocated without having access and incurred replacement costs and lost income from the interruption of operations. A local insurance policy, issued by ISOP’s French affiliate, provided primary coverage, and a master policy, issued by ISOP and covering Manpower’s operations worldwide, provided excess coverage over the local policy’s limits. Right received $250,000 under the local policy pursuant to a provision covering losses caused by lack of access by order of a civil authority. Another $250,000 was paid under the master policy, exhausting the $500,000 sublimit under a similar lack‐of‐access provision. Manpower also claimed that, under the master policy, it was entitled to reimbursement for business interruption losses and the loss of business personal property: about $12 million. ISOP denied the claim. The district court held that Manpower was covered under the master policy for business interruption losses and loss of business personal property and improvements, but excluded Manpower’s accounting expert, without whom Manpower could not establish those damages and held that the master policy was not triggered because the losses were also covered under the local policy, which had to be fully exhausted before master policy coverage was available. The Seventh Circuit reversed exclusion of the expert and entry of judgment against Manpower on the business interruption claim, but affirmed judgment for ISOP on the property loss claim. The master policy did not provide coverage for Manpower’s property losses.View "Manpower, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of the State of PA" on Justia Law

Soto entered the U.S. in 1978 as an infant and became a lawful permanent resident in 1991 at age 13. She was convicted of theft in 2002, of passing a worthless check in 2003, and of possessing methamphetamine in 2005, a felony under Kansas law. In 2005, immigration authorities initiated removal on grounds of commission of an aggravated felony, of two crimes involving moral turpitude, and of a controlled substance offense, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (a)(2)(A)(iii), and (a)(2)(B)(i). At the time, the circuits were split on whether a drug possession conviction that was a state law felony but that would be a federal misdemeanor should be considered an aggravated felony for purposes of immigration. In 2006 the Seventh Circuit held that such convictions were not aggravated felonies for immigration purposes. Soto claims that an immigration officer and a legal aid organization stated that she had no chance of avoiding removal, so she signed a stipulation with an admission of the factual allegations, waiver of any right to seek relief from removal, and an acknowledgment that she signed voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Three weeks after removal, Soto returned to the U.S. illegally to live with her four U.S.‐born children and their U.S.‐citizen father, whom she married in 2009. In 2010 authorities discovered Soto and reinstated the 2005 order of removal using an expedited process. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed her appeal, filed from Mexico. The Tenth Circuit ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to review the 2005 order. Soto moved to reopen the 2005 removal order, arguing that the 90‐day deadline did not apply or was equitably tolled. The IJ and BIA rejected her arguments. The Seventh Circuit held that that her illegal reentry after her 2005 removal permanently bars reopening that earlier removal order.View "Cordova-Soto v. Holder" on Justia Law

Brown was the office manager and accountant for Indiana small businesses owned by the Walker family from 1989 until 2009. The family discovered that Brown was embezzling by using company credit cards and checks to pay for personal items and expenses. Brown stole hundreds of thousands of dollars, putting the businesses in financial straits and destroying their credit. Brown was charged with more than 150 counts of wire fraud, mail fraud, and tax fraud and pleaded guilty to a single count of each crime. The advisory guidelines sentencing range was 21 to 27 months’ imprisonment, but the district judge imposed a sentence of 60 months. Weeks later, without warning, the judge filed an amended judgment and attached a written “statement of reasons” to “supplement” his statements in open court. The judge recalculated the guidelines range, adding upward adjustments based on the amount embezzled, the duration of the scheme, and the vulnerability of one victims so that the range was 41 to 51 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The judge did not violate Fed. R. Crim P. Rule 32(h), which requires “reasonable notice” when the court is “contemplating” a departure from the guidelines; “departures” are obsolete. In addition, the statement was filed after Brown appealed, so the court lacked jurisdiction to substantively alter the sentence. Brown’s sentence did not change; in light of the court’s oral pronouncements, that sentence is reasonable. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Mullin began selling fire trucks and rescue equipment in 1990. In 2006, the employer’s new owner took an account away from Mullin because of criticism by a fire chief. In 2008 and 2009, Mullin won awards for selling the most fire trucks during the preceding fiscal year. In 2009 Mullin’s sales represented 40% of the total number of fire trucks sold in Indiana. In 2009, the employer hired a new Vice President of the Indiana sales division, which was not meeting expectations. In 2010, the employer fired an Indiana sales associate who was in his 50s. Shortly thereafter, the company hired two men, ages 24 and 29, to perform the same contractual duties as Mullin; neither had industry experience. Mullin was subsequently fired. The CEO told Mullin that “[w]e are paying you too much.” In Mullin’s suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, the district court granted the employer summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that Mullin contested the company’s assertions of poor performance and “a string of questionable conduct, from the suspicious timing of personnel decisions to ambiguous statements about age to multiple seemingly inaccurate allegations.” Mullin put forth sufficient evidence that the jury should resolve factual and credibility questions.View "Mullin v. Temco Mach., Inc." on Justia Law

The pro se plaintiff sued her former employer, a private recipient of federal funding, alleging violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, by requiring her to complete certain duties as a dental assistant that she was incapable of performing due to an unspecified disability that limits her strength and mobility, and then firing her because of her disability. The district judge dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A plaintiff under the Rehabilitation Act against a recipient of federal money is not required to exhaust the administrative remedies that the Act provides; an employee or former employee of a private company, such as the plaintiff, is not required Act to even file an administrative charge or complaint. View "Williams v. Milwaukee Health Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

In 1989, Spiller, age 12, was found delinquent for attempted criminal sexual assault. He was convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm in 1995. In 2005, while on parole, Spiller was convicted of aggravated battery of a police officer. He was convicted of possession of heroin in 2006 and of possession of a controlled substance stemming from two arrests in 2007. In 2011, he was charged with two counts of distributing more than 28 grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and selling a loaded firearm to a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(d)(1). The government sought increased punishment under 21 U.S.C. 851(a) based on the prior drug convictions. Spiller pleaded guilty. The presentence report applied the career offender Guideline 4B1.1, which, with the 851 recidivism enhancement, resulted in a Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. Spiller’s counsel argued that the 851 enhancement unreasonably inflated the range, resulting in an unwarranted sentencing disparity. The district court sentenced Spiller to 240 months’ imprisonment. The district court stated that “I am not saying [the 851 enhancement] does not impact [the sentence], but the sentence ... is below the Guidelines, it is what I think is called for in this case … given all of the criteria of 3553 and all of the circumstances.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Spiller" on Justia Law

Under a 2008 master contract, governed by Minnesota law, Lyon, a Minnesota finance firm, had a right of first refusal to provide lease financing for Illinois Paper’s customers. Lyon had the option to purchase office equipment supplied by Illinois Paper and lease the equipment to Illinois Paper’s customers who were interested in that type of financing. Illinois Paper expressly warranted that “all lease transactions presented ... for review are valid and fully enforceable agreements.” Lyon purchased a copy machine from Illinois Paper and leased it to the Village of Bensenville for a term of six years. The Illinois Municipal Code provides that municipal equipment leases may not exceed five years. When the Village stopped paying, Lyon sued Illinois Paper for breach of the contractual warranty. The district court concluded that the warranty was a representation of law, not fact, and was not actionable in a suit for breach of contract or warranty. The Seventh Circuit certified the question to the Minnesota Supreme Court, noting that Minnesota adheres to the maxim that a person may not rely on another’s representation of law, so where reliance is an element of a tort claim (such as fraud), representations of law are not actionable. View "Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc. v. IL Paper & Copier Co." on Justia Law

Augutis had reconstructive surgery on his foot at a VA hospital. Complications led to amputation of his leg. Augutis claims that the amputation was the result of negligent treatment and filed an administrative complaint with the Department of Veterans Affairs. The VA denied the claim. Augutis timely requested reconsideration on March 21, 2011. On October 3, the VA informed him that it had not completed reconsideration, but that suit could be filed or additional time could be permitted to allow it to reach a decision. The letter noted that Federal Tort Claims Act claims are governed by both federal and state law and that some state laws may bar a claim or suit. Days later, the VA denied reconsideration. The letter explained that a claim could be presented to a district court within six months, but again noted that state laws might bar suit. Augutis filed suit on April 3, 2012, more than five years after the surgery, but within six months of the VA’s final dismissal. The district court dismissed under Illinois’s statute of repose, 735 ILCS 5/13‐212(a), which requires that a medical malpractice claim be brought within four years of the date of the alleged malpractice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the state limitations period was preempted by the FTCA period. View "Augutis v. Uniited States" on Justia Law