Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Steidl and Whitlock were convicted of 1987 murders, largely based on testimony by two supposed eyewitnesses. Long after the convictions, an investigation revealed that much of the testimony was perjured and that exculpatory evidence had been withheld. The revelations led to the release of the men and dismissal of all charges. Steidl had spent almost 17 years in prison; Whitlock had spent close to 21 years. They sued. By 2013, both had settled with all defendants. Because the defendants were public officials and public entities, disputes arose over responsibility for defense costs. National Casualty sought a declaratory judgment that it was not liable for the defense of former State’s Attorney, McFatridge, or Edgar County, agreeing to pay their costs under a reservation of rights until the issue was resolved. The Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of National Casualty. In another case McFatridge sought a state court order that the Illinois Attorney General approve his reasonable expenses and fees; the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the claim. In a third case, National Casualty sought a declaratory judgment that another insurer was liable for costs it had advanced. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the other company is liable. It would be inequitable for that company to benefit from National’s attempt to do the right thing, especially since it did not do the right thing and contribute to the defense costs under a reservation of rights. View "Nat'l Cas. Co. v. White Mountains Reinsurance Co." on Justia Law

Foster was charged with distributing crack cocaine and a separate conspiracy-to-distribute charge. Against the advice of appointed counsel, Kupsis, Foster rejected two proposed plea agreements, each of which would have resulted in a sentence of about 20 years imprisonment. Foster faced a possibility of a life sentence, if convicted of the conspiracy charge. The government filed an information, pursuant to 21 U.S.C 851, 10 days before trial, stating that Foster had a prior felony drug conviction, which increased the mandatory minimum penalty on each count from 10 to 20 years. Kupsis had not anticipated the information and had not advised Foster that it was a possibility. After receiving notice of the information, Kupsis suggested to Foster that they attempt to revive one of the earlier proposed plea agreements. Foster refused. Kupsis successfully defended Foster against the conspiracy charge, but he was convicted on the distribution count and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. Foster filed a Section 2255 motion, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court held that Foster could not establish that he was prejudiced by Kupsis’ representation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Foster v. United States" on Justia Law

Through their companies, Pilon and her husband falsely represented that one investment program would generate significant returns that Pilon would use to pay off the investors’ mortgages within two years, and make a bonus cash payment to investors. Many investors refinanced mortgages to invest. With respect to another investment program, Pilon falsely represented that money would be invested in a high-yield fund and that investors would receive 100 percent on their investments within about 90 days. Pilon hinted at religious and humanitarian purposes. Pilon paid early investors’ mortgages with later investors’ money (a Ponzi scheme). About 40 people invested $4,000 to $110,000, losing a total of $967,702. The Illinois Department of Securities ordered Pilon to cease offering investments; she ignored the order. When the scheme unraveled and investors lost their homes, Pilon was indicted for wire fraud. Pilon, a member of a sovereign citizen movement, unsuccessfully moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Immediately before jury selection, Pilon stated her intent to plead guilty; when the government proffered the facts, Pilon denied everything. After testimony by eight government witnesses, Pilon admitted to the scheme and pleaded guilty. In calculating Pilon’s guideline range, the court applied an enhancement for abuse of a position of trust, declined to credit Pilon for acceptance of responsibility, and sentenced Pilon to 78 months’ incarceration, in the middle of the range, and imposed $967,702 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Pilon" on Justia Law

Mead Johnson, purchased a primary Commercial General Liability policy from National Union, with a limit of $2 million for liability for “personal and advertising injury” and an excess liability policy from Lexington, with a limit of $25 million. Mead’s main product, Enfamil infant formula, is sold worldwide. Mead’s competitor, PBM, sued Mead for false advertising and consumer fraud and Mead sued PBM for trade dress infringement. PBM claimed that Mead had falsely asserted that PBM’s generic formula lacked key fats that promote brain and eye development. The suit sought $500 million in damages for product disparagement, a tort that the policies cover as a form of “advertising injury.” Mead did not notify the insurers of the suit until December 2009, after the suit ended in the $13.5 million verdict against Mead. Mead wanted its insurers to pay that judgment, plus a $15 million settlement that it made to resolve the class action suit. The insurers obtained declaratory judgments that they were not required to pay. The Seventh Circuit reversed the summary judgment in favor of the insurers in the suit relating to the PBM litigation, but affirmed the judgment in favor of National Union in the suit arising from the class action against Mead. View "Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Mead Johnson & Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Cornejo’s father came to the U.S. in 1983 and, in 1994, brought his family to this country without admission. At age 18, Cornejo began having trouble with the law, including charges of driving without a license, possession of a controlled substance and paraphernalia, first degree criminal trespass, theft and criminal mischief, and violation of probation. Between 2002 and 2005, Cornejo avoided legal problems, but in 2005 he was charged with domestic battery and criminal damage to property. In 2006 he pled guilty to aggravated unlawful use of a weapon after he brandished a firearm during an argument with a neighbor. During immigration proceedings, Cornejo had four domestic battery charges and was twice arrested for DUI. After his conviction for the weapons violation, DHS initiated removal based on his illegal presence and his conviction for a crime of moral turpitude. During proceedings, Cornejo married a citizen and a petition for an alien relative was filed on his behalf. The IJ determined that Cornejo had not shown that his removal would result in extreme hardship to a qualified relative and that, even if he had made a showing, he did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion. The BIA affirmed. Cornejo moved to reopen based on new evidence of hardship to his U.S.-citizen daughter. The BIA denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit denied review.View "Reyes-Cornejo v. Holder" on Justia Law

An Illinois inmate sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that a nurse practitioner and a correctional counselor were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical condition, hypertension (high blood pressure). He had been diagnosed in 2007 at age 22 and did not receive his prescribed medication for a three-week period in 2009. The district judge dismissed, reasoning that the nurse practitioner did not know that plaintiff was not receiving his medication and the correctional counselor, not a member of the prison’s medical staff, assumed the medical staff would deal with it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed after criticizing the failure, by the court and lawyers, to use scientific resources to determine the effect on the plaintiff’s health of a temporary interruption in the medication. “The legal profession must get over its fear and loathing of science.” The court also noted “that this plainly meritless suit was filed … more than four years ago. … A stronger judicial hand on the tiller could have saved a good deal of time, effort, and paper.” View "Jackson v. Pollion" on Justia Law

Patrolling officers spotted a car driven White, with Lyons as a passenger. Officer Dodd recognized White from previous encounters, some of which involved attempts to flee arrest; Dodd knew that White’s license had been suspended and activated the squad’s emergency lights. White accelerated, drove two blocks, and ran a red light before pulling over. Officers Dodd and Burns suspected an attempt to conceal contraband, retrieve a weapon, or get a head start in a foot chase. While others frisked White, Officer Burns observed Lyons, whose hands were shaking and who avoided eye contact. Lyons stated that he did not have any weapons; Burns announced that he intended to frisk Lyons, who then said, “I have a gun.” Burns handcuffed Lyons; Dodd lifted Lyons’s shirt, revealing a loaded firearm in his waistband. Lyons was charged with possession of a firearm as a felon. Denying a motion to suppress, the district court found reasonable suspicion that Lyons illegally possessed a firearm or other dangerous item, triggered by his appearing nervous, his being in a car driven by someone with a suspended license, who attempted to flee, and his association with White. Lyons was sentenced to 210 months, under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, but remanded for resentencing because the court failed to state the reasons supporting its sentence, and incorrectly believed it was required to impose five years of supervised release.View "Unted States v. Lyons" on Justia Law

The Gulfport Mississippi apartment complex was damaged in Hurricane Katrina. Its insurer, RSUI paid actual-cash-value proceeds. The parties began negotiating for additional replacement-cost proceeds. During negotiations, the named-insured contracted to sell the property in its unrepaired state to Edgewood and notified RSUI of its intention to assign the claim for replacement-cost proceeds. RSUI responded that if the property was sold before repair, there could be no recovery of replacement-cost proceeds. The sale closed. The seller and Edgewood sought a declaration that the insurer was obligated to pay the claim with a related breach-of-contract action. Edgewood repaired the property. The litigation continued for years until it became clear that there had been no assignment. The district court dismissed the claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Absent an assignment, Edgewood lacks standing; the seller still owns the claim and remains a proper plaintiff. The seller had an insurable interest when the policy issued and at the time of the loss; the sale of the property in its unrepaired state did not extinguish its right to recover. Although the policy specifies that replacement-cost proceeds will not be paid until the property is repaired, it does not require that the insured complete the repairs itself. View "Southland Mgmt. Corp. v. RSUI Indem. Co." on Justia Law

Williams was returning home from work late at night. He smelled smoke, saw that his neighbor’s house was on fire, and went to the porch of the burning home to rouse anyone who might be inside. Chicago police officers O’Brien and Byrne also spotted the smoke and found Williams on the porch. They arrested him on suspicion of arson. A prosecutor declined to file arson charges that night. Officers O’Brien and Byrne then charged Williams with criminal trespass, but that charge was dismissed. Williams brought suit against O’Brien and Byrne under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging false arrest in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and against the officers and the City of Chicago under state law for malicious prosecution on the trespass charge. The district court granted the defendants’ summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for trial. Whether there was even arguable probable cause to arrest and charge Williams depends on disputed issues of fact. View "Williams v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Lavalais is the only black police officer employed by the Village of Melrose Park, which has about 75 officers. He has been a Melrose Park officer for more than 20 years. In 2010, Lavalais filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging race discrimination. He filed a second charge in January 2011, alleging that he was disciplined for filing the first charge. In early February 2011, Lavalais was promoted to sergeant and placed on the midnight shift. More than a year later, he was denied a requested a change of assignment from the midnight shift, and again filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. The EEOC issued a right‐to‐sue letter. The district court dismissed his claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit vacated dismissal of the discrimination claims, but affirmed dismissal of the retaliation claims. View "Lavalais v. Vill. of Melrose Park" on Justia Law