Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Anobah was an Illinois-licensed loan officer, employed by AFFC, and acted as a loan officer for at least two fraudulent schemes. Developers Brown and Adams recruited Mason to act as a nominee buyer of a property and referred Mason to Anobah for preparation of a fraudulent loan application. The application contained numerous material falsehoods concerning Mason’s employment, assets, and income, and intent to occupy the property. Anobah, Brown, and others created fraudulent supporting documents. AFFC issued two loans in the amount of $760,000 for the property and ultimately lost about $290,000 on those loans. In the course of the scheme, AFFC wired funds from an account in Alabama to a bank in Chicago, providing the basis for a wire fraud charge. Anobah played a similar role in other loan applications for other properties and ultimately pled guilty to one count of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The district court sentenced him to 36 months of imprisonment, five months below the low end of the calculated guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding application of guidelines enhancements for abuse of a position of trust and for use of sophisticated means in committing the fraud. View "United States v. Anobah" on Justia Law

Serino was employed as a soccer coach at Oakland City University in Indiana. In September 2008, the university’s Vice President informed Serino that he was suspended from his position then contacted Hensley, Chief of the Oakland City Police Department, and told him to come to the university athletic center to speak to Serino. Hensley complied. He confronted Serino and told him that he was trespassing. Serino refused to leave and Hensley then arrested him. Serino was arraigned on charges of trespass and resisting law enforcement. The state ultimately dismissed both charges. In 2012 Serino sued Hensley and Oakland City, 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming false arrest and malicious prosecution, with Indiana tort claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed, finding the section 1983 and state‐law false arrest claims time‐barred; that the section 1983 malicious prosecution claim was not cognizable as a constitutional claim; and that his state‐law claims for malicious prosecution and IIED were barred by the defendants’ immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Serino v. Hensley" on Justia Law

Devbrow, an Indiana prisoner, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 asserting that prison officials denied him access to the courts by confiscating and destroying his legal papers in retaliation for a prior lawsuit (concerning medical care) he filed. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Devbrow failed to show that prison officials actually destroyed his legal documents or took his papers for retaliatory reasons. The court noted testimony that Devbrow had created a fire hazard by stacking excess property by his bed, that prison officials had allowed him to keep some legal materials by his bed, that Devbrow stored the rest of them, and that the officials were unaware of Devbrow’s pending litigation. The court further reasoned that Devbrow did not suffer any actual injury from the alleged actions: Devbrow’s medical indifference suit had been terminated not on the merits, but on grounds of untimeliness and that Devbrow had not submitted any admissible evidence to discredit the officers’ explanation that they had removed his property from the dorm room because it was a fire hazard. View "Devbrow v. Gallego" on Justia Law

Titan purchased an Illinois tire manufacturing facility, then entered into labor agreements with Local 745, which represented the Titan workers. Titan paid the full union salaries of Local 745's President and Benefit Representative for about two years, although they were on leave of absence from Titan. Titan then concluded such payments violated Section 302(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which prohibits an employer from paying money to union representatives. Titan reasoned that Local 745 also represented a bargaining unit at the school district, the union representatives were not working full-time from the Titan facility, and were not subject to Titan’s control. The union filed a grievance, arguing that such payments were exempt from Section 302(a) by Section 302(c), because the two were current or former Titan employees and the payments were “by reason of” their service. An arbitrator found the payments lawful. The district court granted enforcement. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Paying the full-time union salaries of the two representatives was so incommensurate with their former Titan employment as not to qualify as payments in compensation for or by reason of that employment. These payments are “by reason of” service to Local 745 members, including both Titan and school district employees. The court noted the statutory purpose of preventing conflicts of interest. View "Titan Tire Corp. of Freeport, Inc. v. United Steel, Paper & Forest, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. Serv. Workers Int'l Union" on Justia Law

A 1980 fire in a Chicago apartment building killed 10 children. Kidd became a suspect following his arrest on unrelated charges. At his 1987 trial on charges of arson and 10 counts of murder, Strunck, a public defender, represented him. Kidd was convicted and sentenced to death. In 1992, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. At his new trial, Kidd waived assistance of counsel and represented himself, despite the judge’s repeated warnings and advice. Kidd expressed dissatisfaction with the public defender and requested that Dan Webb or Jenner & Block represent him. Kidd was unable to find private counsel. Strunck represented him at the penalty phase and presented evidence that Kidd was borderline mentally retarded. Kidd was convicted again and is serving a life sentence. In unsuccessful state postconviction proceedings, before the same judge who presided over his trial, Kidd argued that the court should have ordered a formal competency hearing because Kidd was taking psychotropic drugs under medical direction and that his waiver of counsel was not voluntary. The state denied his habeas petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Sixth Amendment arguments. View "Kidd v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the Indiana Unclaimed Property Act, Ind. Code 32‐34‐1‐1, as authorizing confiscation of private property without compensation. The Act states that property is presumed abandoned if the apparent owner has not communicated in writing with the holder or otherwise indicated interest in the property within a specified period. When the presumption applied, the holder (here, a bank) is required to try to notify the owner and to submit, within 60-120 days after that, a report including the owner’s last known address to the state attorney general, and to simultaneously transfer the property to the attorney general. The following year, the attorney general must attempt notice by publication. Notice is also posted on an official website. The owner can reclaim the property from the state for 25 years after its delivery before it escheats to the state. An owner who files a valid claim is entitled only to principal, and not to any interest earned on it. Plaintiff’s ward had an interest‐bearing account. The presumption of abandonment applied in 2006, three years after the last communication. Because the statute does not require individualized notice if the value of the account is less than $50, plaintiff (guardian) did not learn about the account until 2011. The district court dismissed her challenge to the “taking” of interest on the account. The Seventh Circuit reversed. View "Cerajeski v. Zoeller" on Justia Law

Waupaca manufactures iron castings and provides its foundry employees with personal protective equipment (PPE), including hard hats, safety glasses, ear protection, steel-toed footwear, and a fire-retardant uniform. Waupaca requires these employees to wear PPE while working; failure to comply can result in discipline. Waupaca provides locker rooms with showers. Typically, foundry workers finish their shift, clock out and proceed to locker rooms, where they remove their PPE, shower, and change into street clothes. Because of hazards associated with chemicals and dust to which some workers are exposed, Waupaca recommends that employees shower and remove their PPE on-site. Not all employees do so. Employees, representing a class of more than 400 (an opt-in class, 29 .S.C. 216(b)) alleged that Waupaca violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, by not paying for time spent showering and changing clothes at work. The district court granted Waupaca summary judgment, ruling that those activities were not compensable under the FLSA because the Occupational Safety and Health Administration had not mandated that foundry workers shower and change clothes on-site. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that OSHA’s decision not to promulgate a rule requiring such activities does not bar a party from presenting evidence as to compensability under the FLSA and that factual disputes otherwise precluded summary judgment.View "DeKeyser v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca, Inc." on Justia Law

Med‐1 buys delinquent debts and purchased Suesz’s debt from Community Hospital. In 2012 it filed a collection suit in small claims court and received a judgment against Suesz for $1,280. Suesz lives one county over from Marion. Though he incurred the debt in Marion County, he did so in Lawrence Township, where Community is located, and not in Pike Township, the location of the small claims court. Suesz says that it is Med‐1’s practice to file claims in Pike Township regardless of the origins of the dispute and filed a purported class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act venue provision requiring debt collectors to bring suit in the “judicial district” where the contract was signed or where the consumer resides, 15 U.S.C. 1692i(a)(2). The district court dismissed after finding Marion County Small Claims Courts were not judicial districts for the purposes of the FDCPA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

Wells Fargo and Hindman were creditors of Clark, whose president and CEO was Hindman’s son. Wells Fargo agreed to extend credit to the companies if Hindman agreed to become a subordinated creditor. Hindman executed subordination agreements. In 2010 Hindman authorized a wire transfer of $750,000 from his personal investment account at Wells Fargo to Clark at the request of his son. By that time, however, his son purportedly had been stripped of authority to make business decisions by Clark. When authorized decision makers learned about the purported loan, they ordered Hindman’s son to reject the funds. Hindman’s son promptly instructed a Wells Fargo Bank vice‐president to stop the transaction, but $750,000 arrived in Clark’s accounts and was automatically used to pay down its Wells Fargo line of credit. Days later, the same Wells Fargo vice‐president transferred $750,000 from Clark’s account to Hindman’s account at a Florida bank at Hindman’s request. Wells Fargo claimed that Hindman’s receipt of the $750,000 violated subordination agreements because Clark repaid a debt to Hindman while it had outstanding obligations to Wells Fargo. Hindman maintained that a valid loan was never consummated because his son could not bind the company and authorized decision makers rejected the proposed loan. The Seventh Circuit vacated summary judgment, reasoning that the district court failed to explain its rejection of Hindman’s plausible arguments. View "Wells Fargo Bus. Credit v. Hindman" on Justia Law

Woodboro has about 750 residents on 21,857 acres, within Oneida County. Woodboro’s 1998 Land Use Plan encourages low density single family residential development for waterfront properties and maintaining rural character. The 2009 Woodboro Comprehensive Plan incorporates that language. There are 177 parcels on Squash Lake, all but seven zoned for single-family uses. The seven parcels zoned for business were pre-existing uses under initial zoning in 1976. In 2001, Woodboro voluntarily subjected itself to the Oneida County Zoning and Shoreland Protection Ordinance, under which religious uses are permitted throughout the County and Woodboro. Year-round recreational and seasonal camps are permitted in 36 and 72 percent of the County; churches and religious schools are allowed on 60 percent of the land in the County. Churches and schools are permitted on 43 percent of Woodboro land; campgrounds (religious or secular) on about 57 percent. Eagle Cove sought to construct a Bible camp on 34 acres on Squash Lake in Woodboro, asserting that their religion mandates that the camp be on the subject property and operate year-round. The property is zoned Single Family Residential and Residential and Farming. Woodboro recommended denial. The County denied rezoning based on conflict with single-family usage. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the municipalities. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and the Wisconsin Constitution. View "Eagle Cove Camp & Conference Ctr., Inc. v. Town of Woodboro, WI" on Justia Law