Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Four white male Chicago police officers, in plain clothes, in an unmarked car, were driving in a high-crime area that is largely nonwhite. A woman signaled them and, when they stopped, stated that men were gathered in a lot nearby and one of them, wearing a white jacket, was selling “rocks” (crack cocaine). The officers drove past the lot and saw a juvenile and three men; Morrow, age 20, wearing what appeared to be a white jacket. Officer May parked and watched the men, through binoculars, from across the street. May saw Morrow selling drugs and Bell, age 14, collecting money. Passersby were attracted by the yells of “rocks, rocks” from two older men. The drugs were in a vial on the ground. After about 20 minutes with three sales, May radioed the other officers and told them to arrest the group. May picked up the vial. At the police station the four were searched. Bell had $100 on him. All were charged. Morrow was charged with felony possession of an illegal drug. After being acquitted, Morrow sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unlawful search and seizure and conspiracy. A jury exonerated all the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of procedural error.View "Morrow v. May" on Justia Law

Balthazar lived in one of two apartments on the third floor. Police had a warrant to search the other apartment. Both had rear doors about opening on a common landing. The officers climbed the stairs to the landing and used a battering ram on the door of Balthazar’s apartment. According to Balthazar they entered the apartment, screaming profanities and pointing guns; handcuffed Balthazar and her cousin; ransacked the apartment, dumping food on the floor, opening drawers, flipping mattresses, and throwing clothing; and left after about 15 minutes when another officer appeared and said they were in the wrong apartment. The officers claim that, while they did hit the wrong door, they immediately realized the mistake and none of them entered Balthazar’s apartment. Balthazar’s attorney later claimed that even looking inside the apartment constituted an illegal search. Neither a claims adjuster who visited the apartment the day of the incident, nor the Independent Police Review Authority employee who took a report, noted complaints about anything other than damage to the door. A jury rejected Balthazar’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A search resulting from an innocent mistake is not unreasonable and does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Even accepting Balthazar’s alternative theory, simply looking inside does not always constitute a search. View "Balthazar v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

After discovering that she had lung cancer that had spread to her brain, Killian underwent aggressive treatment on the advice of her doctor. The treatment was unsuccessful and she died. Her husband submitted medical bills for the cost of the treatments to her health insurance company. The company denied coverage on most of the expenses because the provider was not covered by the insurance plan network. The husband filed suit, seeking benefits for incurred medical expenses, relief for breach of fiduciary duty, and statutory damages for failure to produce plan documents. The district court dismissed denial-of-benefits and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims, but awarded minimal statutory damages against the plan administrator. In 2012, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissals, rejecting an argument that the plan documents were in conflict, but remanded for recalculation of the statutory damages award. On rehearing, en banc, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of benefits and statutory penalties holdings, but reversed on the breach of fiduciary duty claim. The instructions given in plan documents were deficient and a reasonable trier of fact could rule in favor of Killian, based on telephone conversations in which Killian attempt to determine whether the physicians who were about to perform surgery were within the network. View "Killian v. Concert Health Plan" on Justia Law

In 1999 Brumfield was hired as a nonprobationary police officer. In 2006 she began to experience unspecified “psychological problems.” The city required her to submit to four psychological examinations. Each time Brumfield was found capable of continuing her work. Brumfield sued, alleging that subjecting her to psychological examinations amounted to discrimination on account of race, sex, and sexual orientation. The city suspended Brumfield without pay pending discharge proceedings. The Police Board rejected the discharge recommendation but suspended Brumfield without pay for 180 days. Before the suspension expired the city again suspended Brumfield pending discharge proceedings. Before the Police Board issued its second suspension order and before Brumfield returned to work, the city initiated a third discharge proceeding. Brumfield filed another lawsuit, under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a) and dismissed the first case. The district court dismissed, holding that the complaint failed to state a claim under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. Brumfield filed a third suit, alleging violation of Title I of the ADA, which was dismissed as barred by res judicata. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Title II of the ADA does not cover disability discrimination in public employment; such a claim must be brought under Title I, but Brumfield waived her challenge to dismissal of her Title I suit. The Rehabilitation Act claim fails because Brumfield has not alleged that she was suspended or fired by reason of disability.View "Brumfield v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Grandberry sought habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 from a disciplinary sanction, loss of “good time” credits, imposed against him by a state prison. He claimed that the Indiana prison’s disciplinary proceedings failed to provide him with minimal due process protections. The district court denied the petition on the merits. The Seventh Circuit held that a certificate of appealability was not required in a habeas case challenging state prison disciplinary proceedings because in such cases, “the detention complained of” is the additional time the prisoner must stay in prison as a result of the disciplinary proceedings. The detention does not “arise out of process issued by a State court.” View "Grandberry v. Knight" on Justia Law

In 2012 the Seventh Circuit invalidated provisions of the Illinois gun law, 720 ILCS 5/24‐1,‐1.6, which, with limited exceptions, prohibited a person from carrying a ready-to-use gun outside his property or the property of someone who has granted permission. The court ordered its mandate stayed for 180 days to allow the state to craft a new gun law and extended the stay for an additional 30 days. In July 2013, the Illinois legislature, overriding a veto, enacted, the Firearms Concealed Carry Act, 430 ILCS 66/1, authorizing issuance of licenses for carrying guns outside the home. The Act requires an applicant to be at least 21 years old; have 16 hours of approved firearms training; have a currently valid Firearm Owner’s Identification Card; not have been convicted of assault, drunk driving, or certain other offenses or be in pending proceedings; and not have been treated recently for alcoholism or drug addiction. The state moved to dismiss the underlying cases as moot. Plaintiffs, upset by the new law’s delay of 270 days between its enactment and issuance of the first permits, requested that the state be ordered, until the Act is fully implemented, to allow any resident to carry a gun outside the home with only a FOID card. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of relief, stating that if plaintiffs “don’t like the new law, and wish to invalidate it, they must bring a new suit.” There was no prior order except a deadline for the state to enact a new law. It met the deadline. View "Shepard v. Madigan" on Justia Law

Sasafrasnet, an authorized distributor of BP products, provided Joseph with notice of its intent to terminate his franchise based on three occasions when Sasafrasnet attempted to debit Joseph’s bank account to pay for fuel deliveries but payment was denied for insufficient funds. The district court denied Joseph a preliminary injunction, finding that Joseph failed to meet his burden for a preliminary injunction under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act 15 U.S.C. 2805(b)(2)(A)(ii). After a remand, the district court found that two of Joseph’s NSFs should count as “failures” under the PMPA justifying termination, at least for purposes of showing that he was not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Joseph’s bank account was not adequately funded for the debit on two occasions because Joseph had decided to change banks, circumstances entirely within Joseph’s control. Given Joseph’s history of making late payments in substantial amounts because of insufficient funds (each was more than $22,000), the delinquent payments were not “technical” or “unimportant.” View "Joseph v. Sasafrasnet, LLC" on Justia Law

In a proposed class action, Schilke alleged that Wachovia, her lender and holder of a mortgage on her home, fraudulently placed insurance on her property when her homeowner’s policy lapsed. Wachovia secured the replacement coverage from ASI and charged her for it, as specifically permitted by her loan agreement. The premium was more than twice what she had paid for her own policy and included a commission to Wachovia’s insurance-agency affiliate, also as permitted under the loan agreement. Schilke calls the commission a “kickback” and asserted statutory and common-law claims, most sounding in fraud or contract. The district court dismissed based on federal preemption and the filed-rate doctrine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The loan agreement and related disclosures and notices conclusively show that there was no deception at work. Wachovia fully disclosed that lender-placed insurance could be significantly more expensive than her own policy and could include a fee or other compensation to the bank and its insurance-agency affiliate. Maintaining property insurance was Schilke’s contractual obligation and she failed to fulfill it. . View "Schilke v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Brookfield owns a shopping center that is subject to a first mortgage of $8,900,000, held by a trust, and a second mortgage for $2,539,375 that has been transferred to ValStone, which also serves as attorney in fact for the trust. Outside of bankruptcy, state law would allow ValStone to foreclose upon default on the second mortgage; ValStone could bid on the property at auction or receive proceeds from its sale. The second mortgage is a nonrecourse loan; if the proceeds of sale were not enough to repay the first mortgage or repay the second mortgage in full, ValStone could not pursue a deficiency claim for the outstanding debt. ValStone did not initiate foreclosure. Brookfield filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. Under its reorganization plan, Brookfield elected to retain ownership of the property, requiring the bankruptcy court to establish a judicial value by means of independent appraisals. The value is expected to be less than the amount of the first mortgage, which will leave the second mortgage unsecured by any equity. ValStone argued that 11 U.S.C. 1111(b)(1)(A) treats the claim as if it had recourse, so that its unsecured deficiency claim should be allowed. Brookfield argued that the claim should be disallowed because neither state law nor 11 U.S.C. 1111(b) give ValStone a deficiency claim against Brookfield. The bankruptcy court and the district court held that the claim was valid. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "B.R. Brookfield Commons No. 1 v. Valstone Asset Mgmt,, LLC" on Justia Law

Prison official Meyerhoff wrote a disciplinary report on inmate Hardaway, charging damage or misuse of property, forgery, and trading or trafficking of official electronics contract forms. Hardaway was sentenced to six months of disciplinary segregation, demotion in status, and revocation of commissary rights. Due to a childhood incident involving rape and abuse, which Hardaway associates with closed metal doors, Hardaway requested a cell with bars. Prison officials denied this request. Hardaway initiated a grievance, contending that he knew nothing about the sale of the electronics contracts, the charge was based solely on information provided by a confidential informant, the disciplinary report failed to state a specific time, place, or date, and that the disciplinary committee denied him the opportunity to view the forged contracts or argue any defense during the hearing. His second grievance was considered by the Illinois Administrative Review Board, which recommended remand for more specific information. Meyerhoff failed to revise the report, so the ARB upheld Hardaway’s grievance and concluded that the charge should be expunged. Hardaway had already served his segregation time, and claims that he experienced mental anguish as a result of the solid door; was physically attacked by his cell mate; and was only released from his cell once per week to shower and use the yard. The district court rejected his suit (42 U.S.C. 1983), finding that the defendants enjoyed qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hardaway v. Meyerhoff" on Justia Law