Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) investigated Burkhardt, a correctional officer at LCC and determined that Burkhardt had taken his cell phone inside and used it to make 30 calls from inside the facility, in violation of IDOC policies and of Illinois law. State’s Attorney Hahn filed felony charges against Burkhardt. A few days later, another correctional officer told other employees that Burkhardt was being prosecuted for accidentally bringing a cell phone into LCC. In response, Volkman, a casework supervisor, called Hahn and left a message that “as a citizen” he did not believe that incarceration should be pursued in Burkhardt’s case, and that Hahn should consider allowing the matter to be handled through the IDOC disciplinary process. Hahn called Volkman back. News of the conversation reached the internal affairs investigator at LCC, who investigated. Volkman received a written reprimand and was suspended for five days. Volkman sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that he was retaliated against for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment. The district court found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and that, even if they were not, Volkman had not proven his case as a matter of law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Volkman v. Ryker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was sued by Asset Acceptance, a debt collector, for a debt arising from her purchase of natural gas for household use. She sued, claiming that Asset Acceptance sued after the statute of limitations on the creditor’s claim had run, in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692. Plaintiff moved to certify a class of debtors sued, after the limitations period, by Asset Acceptance for debts from sale of natural gas to consumers. The district judge waited 25 months and denied the motion. The class would have 793 members, of whom 343 reside in Illinois; 290 were sued four to five years after the claims accrued and 45 were sued more than five years after accrual. The judge shrank the class to 45, then to 23, ruling that suing to collect a debt but failing to serve the defendant did not violate the Act even if the suit was untimely, and concluded that 23 was too small a number to justify a class action. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that all 343 Illinois residents were proper class members because the applicable statute of limitations is four years. Certification need not be limited to Illinois residents or to claims under the federal Act. View "Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2005, Standard introduced a new financial product into the 403(b) and 457 markets. Blanchar was hired as Director of Institutional Sales/Product Manager for those products. His responsibilities included training staff, doing what was needed to make Standard’s products competitive, suggesting product enhancements, and promoting the sales of special markets retirement plans. In 2007, his title changed to Special Markets Director for Retirement Plans business unit. Blanchar identified his major duties as working with the sales team. His supervisor, Baumgarten, identified one of Blanchar’s key goals as representing Standard in the marketplace as the product manager and expert on Special Markets,” and noted that Blanchar was considered “the 403(b)/457 answer man.” Blanchar was not involved in direct sales, but conducted webinars and spoke at conferences, using materials that he had personally created. Although Blanchar had no final decision-making authority, Baumgarten typically sought advice from Blanchar. The district court rejected Blanchar’s action to recover overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, finding that Blanchar qualified as a bona fide administrative employee, and was exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Blanchar v. Standard Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Sikhism is an Indian religion. Most Sikhs live in the Indian state of Punjab. The state’s highest official is Badal. SFJ, a U.S.‐based human rights group, accuses Badal of overseeing police and others implicated in killings and torture in Punjab, in violation of international law and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. 1350. SFJ filed a class action suit in Milwaukee, based on the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350, which confers jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” The district court dismissed on the ground that the defendant had not been served. SFJ had learned that Badal was coming to Milwaukee to attend a wedding and anticipated that he would attend a commemorative gathering because six people had been killed in an attack on a Wisconsin Sikh temple two days earlier. At that event, a special process server served some individual of the same general description (who later testified to receiving the papers and not understanding their significance), but Badal claimed that it was mistaken identity and that he attended a different memorial service. Badal’s security detail agreed that he had not been served. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Sikhs for Justice v. Badal" on Justia Law

Attorney Stilp represented Miller in claims concerning the construction of Miller’s house by contractor Herman. The district court dismissed. Stilp recommended that Miller terminate the action based on state law. Miller told Stilp that needed time to consider whether to refile., Herman filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Herman’s bankruptcy attorney, Jones, prepared schedules listing the addresses of all creditors. Miller was listed as a creditor on the bankruptcy schedules and creditor matrix, but his address was listed as “c/o Thomas Stilp, Attorney” at Stilp’s office address. Notice of the bankruptcy was delivered to Stilp’s office but was routed to another attorney. Neither Stilp nor Miller was informed of the notice. Miller subsequently informed Stilp that he wanted to refile his complaint against Herman. Stilp then discovered that Herman had filed for bankruptcy protection. Miller did not take immediate action and, about a month later, the bankruptcy court entered a discharge order. About 13 months after he learned of Herman’s bankruptcy petition, Miller moved to reopen the case (11 U.S.C. 727(a)(4)(A)). The bankruptcy court denied the motion. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Miller had been properly served when notice was delivered to Stilp’s firm.View "Miller v. Herman" on Justia Law

In 2005, Indianapolis and Marion County passed an ordinance prohibiting smoking in most buildings frequented by the general public, with exceptions for bars and taverns with liquor licenses that neither served nor employed people under the age of 18, tobacco bars, and bowling alleys. In 2012, the City-County Council expanded the ordinance by eliminating many exceptions. As amended, the ordinance included exceptions for private residences, retail tobacco stores, tobacco specialty bars, and private clubs that voted to permit smoking. Bar owners affected by the ordinance sought declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting due process, equal protection, takings and freedom of association claims under both the federal and Indiana constitutions. The district court upheld the ban. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Goodpaster v. City of Indianapolis" on Justia Law

The NECA-IBEW Health and Welfare Fund provides health benefits to members of a local union of electrical workers. The Fund negotiated a Local Agreement with Sav-Rx, a provider of prescription-drug benefits, under which Sav-Rx reimburses pharmacies for dispensing medication and then invoices the Fund for some of its costs. The Local Agreement does not call for arbitration. A few months later, Sav-Rx negotiated a different agreement with the national organization of the IBEW, with which the local is affiliated. The National Agreement offers locals reduced charges and more services than the Local Agreement and contains a mandatory arbitration clause. Local unions and funds could opt into the National Agreement, but the Fund's trustees never voted on the matter. Over the next eight years the Fund accepted from Sav-Rx services provided by the National Agreement. The Fund sued Sav-Rx for invoicing the Fund at rates not authorized by either the Local or National Agreement. The district court dismissed, finding that Fund had accepted the benefits of the National Agreement and was bound to it; Sav-Rx established that the Fund knew it was accepting benefits under the National Agreement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "NECA-IBEW Rockford Local Union 364 Health & Welfare Fund v. A&A Drug Co." on Justia Law

Starko pleaded guilty to two counts of producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). He had produced videos of a five-year-old girl. Starko was a friend of the girl’s mother and was living in their home. Investigation revealed that he had also touched the genitals of the child’s seven-year-old sister and his own daughter. A psychiatrist concluded that Starko was competent, but noted “a diagnosis of major depressive episode, recurrent, polysubstance dependence in a controlled environment, and schizotypal personality disorder.” The presentence report calculated a guidelines range as 360 months. Rejecting defense counsel’s argument that: “you can sentence him to 20 years, and that punishes the man for the deed, but it also takes into account the fact that at least part of this is explained by his history, characteristics, and mental illness.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the 360-month sentence.View "United States v. Starko" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a gun, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which carries a maximum sentence of 10 years. The judge found that he had three prior convictions of “violent” felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), and was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years. The defendant argued that the Wisconsin arson statute under which he was previously convicted does not punish only a “violent” felony within the meaning of the ACC A. The statute provides that “whoever, by means of fire, intentionally damages any property of another without the person’s consent, if the property is not a building and has a value of $100 or more, is guilty of a Class I felony,” and carries a maximum sentence of 3½ years. According to the presentence report the defendant stole a car from a parking lot and torched it in a field to erase his fingerprints. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The circumstances of the offense are not relevant, because in deciding whether a conviction represents a “violent felony,” courts look only at the statutory elements of the offense. The ACCA defines “violent felony” as any crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year that “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” View "United States v. Misleveck" on Justia Law

From 1978 to 2000, Cerentano worked as a coal miner. He was injured in 15 mining incidents and received six separate awards of permanent partial disability, but was able to return to work after each injury. In 2000 Cerentano was wrongfully discharged after a false positive drug test. Months later, he was diagnosed with depression due to his firing and treated for dysthymia and anxiety. Eventually, Cerentano found work as a real estate agent and a vehicle transporter. In 2005, Cerentano’s car was hit, causing more injuries. Cerentano was awarded Social Security disability benefits. He was denied disability pension benefits under the United Mine Workers Pension Trust Plan, based on the trustees’ conclusion that there was no causal link between his mine injuries and the award of Social Security benefits. Cerentano sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1332(a)(1)(b). The district court granted summary judgment to the plan. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The trustees should have examined all of the injuries, severe and non‐severe, that the ALJ relied on in finding Cerentano disabled and should have determined which of those injuries were caused by mine accidents and whether, the mine‐related injuries, in combination, comprised “a causal link.” View "Cerentano v. UMWA Health & Retirement Funds" on Justia Law