Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Chen faced deportation to Fujian Province and claimed to face a significant risk of persecution there because, since coming to the U.S. in 2002, she has given birth to two children in violation of China’s one‐child policy. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied her petition for asylum. The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial, noting that the Chinese government recently announced that it will permit an urban husband and wife, at least one of whom was an only child, to have two children. Chen’s husband is not an only child; Chen testified that her mother‐in‐law was punished for violating the policy. There is no information on whether Chen is an only child or whether the new policy will be applied retroactively. Fujian Province seems to enforce the one‐child policy more strictly. Nonetheless, the BIA noted that forced sterilization has become very rare and noted that Chen could avoid penalty by not registering the children with the government as permanent residents of China. The children would not be entitled to free public education, subsidized health care, and other benefits, but Chen’s failure to present evidence concerning her financial situation “is a fatal weakness in her case.” View "Chen v. Holder" on Justia Law

Wells Fargo sued the Younans for breach of contract. The defendants moved for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction over Sherry Younan because of lack of minimum contacts in Illinois and insufficient service of process. The district court ruled that the opposing parties were not of diverse citizenship and that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Instead of amending, Wells Fargo moved, nine months after filing its original complaint, to be allowed to dismiss without prejudice. The defendants asked that dismissal be conditioned on Wells Fargo’s paying their legal expenses of $56,000. The judge dismissed, conditioned on Wells Fargo reimbursing defendants for $11,000 in legal expenses incurred in seeking dismissal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the defendants did not justify their “extravagant‐seeming request, which included more than $9,000 for two briefs each of which was just half a page long and merely incorporated by reference another lawyer’s brief.” View "Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Younan Props., Inc." on Justia Law

Caira, a published medical researcher, began producing synthetic drugs, including more than 70,000 pills of MDMA (ecstasy). He was indicted and met with U.S. attorneys to discuss a plea bargain. An attorney subsequently contacted the FBI with information that one of her clients (Ruiz) had information about a plot to kill members of the team prosecuting Caira: AUSA Gillers and DEA Agent Bagley. Ruiz told FBI investigators that he had been recruited by Mann to murder the two in exchange for cocaine and lessons on making synthetic drugs. The FBI arrested Mann, who agreed to cooperate. Mann met Caira at a restaurant, wearing a wire. Although the wire malfunctioned, Caira was arrested. Agents seized Caira’s cell phone and found text messages between Caira and Mann. Caira was indicted for conspiracy to commit murder of a U.S. official (18 U.S.C. 1117) and solicitation of a violent felony (18 U.S.C. 373). The government’s case rested primarily on testimony from Mann and Ruiz and the text messages. Caira’s defense was that the plot was Mann’s idea and that Caira never intended that anyone be hurt. He testified at trial. The parties collaborated on jury instructions. The jury found Caira guilty and he was sentenced to life in prison plus 20 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that his Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to testify against himself was violated and that he was prejudiced by improper jury instructions.View "United States v. Caira" on Justia Law

Convicted in 1990 for aggravated criminal sexual abuse, Shah was ordered removed to India in 2005. He did not seek judicial review, but unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, arguing that he should have been granted a waiver of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1182(c) as it existed before its 1996 repeal. Shah has lived in India since 2007. In 2012 he moved to reopen the proceedings and, after the BIA denied that motion, brought a motion to reconsider. The BIA recognized that it had authority to reopen but remarked that Shah’s situation did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion, because of the nature of his crime and also because Shah is no longer in the U.S. The Seventh Circuit dismissed petitions for review, noting the 90-day deadline for motions to reopen. An IJ and the BIA concluded in 2005 that, as a matter of administrative discretion, Shah would not receive section 212(c) relief even if he were in the category of those still eligible for consideration because of the nature of his crime against a child. View "Shah v. Holder" on Justia Law

Henderson was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). On appeal, he argued that the district court abused its discretion in excluding an out‐of‐court statement of an unavailable declarant regarding the gun that Henderson was charged with possessing. The gun was found between the driver’s seat and seatback of a van in which Henderson and Rogers were travelling. Rosado, the owner of the van, told the prosecution that Rogers had told him that he just found the gun, brought it into the van, and was going to take it to the residence that he and Rosado shared. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court did not err in determining that Henderson failed to point to corroborating circumstances that clearly indicated that Rogers’ hearsay statement was trustworthy. View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Re and Leach owned warehouses in Englewood, Florida. After leasing space in Leach’s warehouse, Daughtry told his agent that he did so because Leach stated that a sewer line essential to Re’s warehouse crossed Leach’s property without permission and lacked permits. The agent shared the information who Re, who hired assailants to beat Leach and threaten worse unless he broke the lease. Re was convicted under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, for using extortion to injure Leach’s business in interstate commerce. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, Re claimed that his lawyers rendered ineffective assistance: trial counsel by stealing from Re and appellate counsel by omitting an argument certain to prevail. The district court denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that threatening someone without “obtaining” money, or value, in return, does not meet the Hobbs Act definition. A jury could find that Re’s goal in having Leach beaten was to obtain Daughtry as a tenant to get rental payments. A post-trial crime by a lawyer against his client does not spoil the trial as a matter of law; prejudice must be shown. Re could not establish prejudice. The lawyer who embezzled his funds played only a peripheral role in the trial. View "Re v. United States" on Justia Law

Since about 2009, Velazco and codefendants coordinated the Chicago distribution of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana for a Mexican drug-trafficking organization. Velazco also assisted with collection and transportation of U.S. currency, primarily as a courier, acting on instructions from higher-ranked members of the organization. After Velazco pled guilty to conspiring to possess five or more kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 846; possessing five or more kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); possessing five kilograms or more of cocaine and one or more kilograms of heroin with the intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); and using a telephone in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 21 U.S.C. 843(b), 846, the Presentence Report stated that he was personally responsible for more than 150 kilograms of cocaine and 8.5 kilograms of heroin. Velazco’s base offense level was 38, as the amount was equivalent to 46,400 kilograms of marijuana. He was granted a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The probation officer indicated that he was fully active in the conspiracy. The district court denied Velazco’s request for a minor role reduction, finding that the most significant factor in assessing culpability for a drug conspiracy is quantity, and sentenced him to 135 months, the lowest sentence in the guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. Sandoval-Velazco" on Justia Law

Craig self-published a book of adult relationship advice, “It’s Her Fault,” in which he discussed sexually provocative themes and used sexually explicit terms. Craig’s employer, a school district, learned of the book and terminated his employment because of it. Craig sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging retaliation for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment. The district court dismissed, reasoning that “It’s Her Fault” did not address a matter of public concern and was not entitled to First Amendment protection. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on an alternative basis. The book deals with adult relationship dynamics, an issue with which many members of the public are concerned, but the school district’s interest in ensuring the effective delivery of counseling services outweighed Craig’s speech interest. The district reasonably predicted that “It’s Her Fault” would disrupt the learning environment at Craig’s school because some students, learning of the book’s hypersexualized content would be reluctant to seek Craig’s advice. View "Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In 2007, Professor Ortony of Northwestern University, asked Dean Peterson, for a year’s leave to visit another university. Peterson proposed to authorize paid leave during calendar year 2008 and the 2011–12 academic year, if Ortony would teach during the intervening time and then retire. Peterson’s letter stated: “At your request, I will accept your resignation ... effective with your retirement on August 31, 2012” and specified when Ortony would be on paid leave and when he would carry a full teaching load. Ortony signed the letter in June, 2007. In 2011 Ortony did not want to retire and insisted that he had not agreed to do so. He filed an EEOC charge under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 626, and subsequently filed suit. The district court granted the University judgment on the pleadings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Northwestern did not terminate Ortony: it bought out his tenure by promising him five years’ pay for three years’ work. That he changed his mind does not make the 2007 contract less binding. The court rejected Ortony’s argument that he “construed the [contract] to set out a tentative plan under which he could leave the University, if he chose to do so, in five years.” View "Ortony v. Northwestern Univ." on Justia Law

Bates has suffered from radiating neck pain since 2004, when a truck struck her car. Since then, she has continued to care for her six adopted children and dealt with the loss of her fiancé and her mother. As a result of the stress, Bates sought psychological and psychiatric treatment. She sought Supplemental Security Income. After her application was denied, Bates requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. The ALJ denied her application; the district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for rehearing, finding that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of Bates’s treating psychiatrist and improperly evaluated Bates’s testimony concerning her mental health. View "Bates v. Astrue" on Justia Law