Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

White, Ford, and Helton were involved in a mortgage fraud scheme through White’s company, EHNS. EHNS offered a “mortgage bailout” program, telling homeowners that they could avoid foreclosure by transferring their homes to EHNS for one year, that EHNS investors would pay the mortgage, that the owners could continue to live in their homes, and that they could reassume their mortgages at the program’s conclusion. EHNS investors actually took title outright. White would pressure appraisers to assess the properties at amounts higher than actual value. EHNS would strip actual and manufactured equity by transaction fees. Clients almost never were able to buy back their homes. Lenders foreclosed on many of the properties. Through fraudulent mortgage loan applications, White obtained financing for straw purchasers. Ford was the closing agent, supposed to act as the lender’s representative, but actually fabricating official documents. Helton was the attorney and “represented” homeowners at White’s behest, pocketing legal fees paid out of the equity proceeds and orchestrating a cover‐up by representing the homeowners in subsequent bankruptcy filings. All were convicted of multiple counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343; Helton was also convicted of bankruptcy fraud, 18 U.S.C. 157. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, challenges to joinder of the defendants and to jury instructions, and a Brady claim. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

In 1994, Norem purchased a “Flexible Premium Variable Life Insurance Policy” from Lincoln Benefit. With variable life insurance, part of the premium is allocated to the insurer’s investment funds, called subaccounts. Policyholders may move their investments within the subaccounts and the death benefit, which is guaranteed not to fall below a certain amount. With variable universal life, the policyholder may easily invest and alter insurance coverage. The policy is comprised of the policy value, which represents the investment component, and its net amount at risk, which represents the insurance component. Norem purchased his policy because he wanted both life insurance and an investment vehicle for the proceeds from the sale of his ownership of a medical business. The policy has a “cost of insurance” (COI) charge deducted monthly from the policy. The policy explains how the COI rate is calculated. Norem filed a putative class action on behalf of himself and other similarly situated policyholders, claiming that Lincoln Benefit breached the terms of its policies in its method of calculating the COI rate.Before deciding on class certification, the district court granted summary judgment to Lincoln Benefit, concluding that its calculation of COI rates did not breach the contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Norem v. Lincoln Benefit Life Co." on Justia Law

As part of an immunity agreement, a confidential informant agreed to pose as an individual looking to buy drugs and met with Quiroz, whom he had known for several years, and three other men: Mendez, Figueroa, and Garcia. The CI wore a wire and secretly recorded conversations about purchasing “ice,” a slang term for methamphetamine, and other drugs. Garcia was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and attempted distribution of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred when it allowed expert testimony about the meaning of “code” phrases and admitted evidence of his prior ecstasy transactions and that the prosecution’s statement, “and he does those things” during rebuttal arguments unfairly prejudiced the jury.View "United States v. Garcia-Avila" on Justia Law

A Caterpillar worker developed epicondylitis, an inflammation of tendons near the elbow. A Department of Labor regulation requires employers to report injuries if “the work environment either caused or contributed to the resulting condition.” The employee worked in a packing department, placing items in boxes for shipping. Caterpillar convened a panel, with three board‐certified specialists in musculoskeletal disorders. Relying on guides issued by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and the American Medical Association that repetitive motion plus force (weight or impact) can cause epicondylitis, and that pronation plus force also can cause the condition, but that repetitive motion alone does not, the panel found that work could not have caused the employee’s epicondylitis. Although Caterpillar presented several witnesses, the ALJ accepted the view of the DOL’s single witness, which ignored epidemiological studies and Caterpillar’s experience. The Seventh Circuit remanded. On remand, the ALJ again held that Caterpillar must pay a penalty for failing to report an injury as work‐related and OSHA declined to review the decision. Caterpillar has filed another petition for judicial review. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Prevailing views, and the data behind them, must be considered; they cannot be ignored on the opinion of any witness. View "Caterpillar Logistics, Inc. v. Soli" on Justia Law

At 2:15 a.m., Officer Snyder observed Jones’s vehicle traveling faster than the posted 35 mph limit, and confirmed by radar that Jones was traveling at 53 mph. Snyder observed Jones swerving in his lane. He turned on his emergency lights. When Jones stopped his car, Snyder approached and observed that Jones had alcohol on his breath, red, watery eyes, and slurred speech. Jones stated that he had consumed one beer at 7:30 p.m. Officers used a portable breath test to determine Jones’s blood alcohol content was 0.096%. During a field sobriety test, Jones could not keep his hands at his sides and swayed. Snyder read the Indiana Implied Consent Notice, explaining that he had probable cause to believe that Jones had been operating a vehicle while intoxicated and, that while Jones had a choice to submit to the chemical test, there would be consequences to refusing to consent to the chemical test. Ultimately Jones sued, claiming that officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, referring to the claims as vague, listing “a series of irrelevant facts untethered to any legal claims.” The only critical fact was that the officers had probable cause .View "Jones v. City of Elkhart" on Justia Law

Reynolds, a 62-year-old white male with more than 30 years’ experience with the U.S. General Services Administration, was passed over for a promotion from Building Management Specialist, to Building Manager. Bell, a 32-year-old black employee, got the job over Reynolds and three other candidates, all older than 40. Reynolds sued, alleging age discrimination in violation of the “federal sector” provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 633a; he also claimed race, sex, and retaliation discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16. The district court entered summary judgment on the retaliation claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; Reynolds dropped his claims of racial and sex discrimination. After trial, the district court rejected the age-discrimination claim for lack of evidentiary support and refused to allow Reynolds to amend his complaint. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the district court’s findings defeated the age-discrimination claim regardless of whether a “but-for “requirement or a more lenient “mixed motives” standard applied.View "Reynolds v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In 1996, Martha Castro saw a man dressed in black leaning over her husband on the ground outside their home. Martha’s nephew, Varela, ran outside. Varela struck the man, who fired a gun before running into the alley. Castro died from a gunshot wound. Castros’ neighbor, Medina, looked outside when he heard gunfire and saw what happened. Nearby, Santana turned into the alley, where the man in black approached her, gun drawn, and took her car and purse. Police looked for a black male in his early twenties, about five foot seven. Seven months later, Medina identified a picture in a police book as “looking like” the man in black, but asked for a more recent photo. An officer returned with an array of five black-and-white photographs. Medina picked McDowell, as the man he saw standing over Castro. Within days, Santana and Varela identified McDowell’s picture. The three viewed a lineup and identified McDowell. There was no physical evidence connecting McDowell to the crime; McDowell’s close friend testified as an alibi. Convicted and sentenced to 103 years, McDowell exhausted direct appeals and state post-trial remedies, and sought a federal writ of habeas corpus arguing that the processes used to identify him were flawed. The Seventh Circuit denied the petition, finding that he procedurally defaulted the claims by failing to adequately present them before each level of the Illinois courts. View "McDowell v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Williams filed his complaint listing more than 100 defendants, including the state, its Attorney General, and Illinois State University, claiming that university police arrested him without probable cause and that other defendants pursued baseless criminal charges. After 13 months, the magistrate ordered Williams to explain why the defendants had not been served, warning that he was considering recommending dismissal for lack of prosecution. Williams responded that he had been stymied by the university’s refusal to supply names and home addresses of employees and that he had sent university counsel a request for waiver of service. Two more months passed. The magistrate recommended dismissal. When Williams requested summonses, 16 months had elapsed without service on any defendant. The district court dismissed, explaining that Williams had the burden of identifying the names and addresses and that Williams could have served the governmental defendants, but did not. Williams sought to reinstate the case, but the 28-day deadline had passed. On appeal, Williams argued that he had three extra days to ask for reconsideration because he received the dismissal by mail, FED. R. CIV. P. 6(d). The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument, reasoning that the rule enlarges the filing time only when the period for acting runs from service of a notice, not when the time begins after entry of judgment. View "Williams v. State of IL" on Justia Law

Washington was arrested as a suspect in a double homicide. While charges were pending, he filed a civil suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) against Officer Parkinson, alleging that she kicked him in the face and hit him with a flashlight while he was transported. The district court judge conducted voir dire. Juror Evans answered questions concerning his family background without incident. Asked whether he had ever been involved with the civil or criminal justice system, Evans responded, “Not that I know of.” Upon examination, Evans said he did not understand the question. The judge broke the question down and Evans admitted he had been arrested and requested a sidebar. He explained that he had a DUI pending and had suffered head injuries in the accident, but did not have difficulty sitting and listening or any lasting cognitive problems. Evans spoke slowly and frequently closed his eyes. Washington unsuccessfully challenged Evans for cause. At trial, Washington interrupted several times. He fired his appointed counsel and proceeded pro se. The judge asked Washington whether he wanted to continue with jurors who had seen him argue with his attorney. Washington consented to continue with the original jury. He later returned to allowing representation by counsel, who had not left. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Parkinson. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Washington waived his challenge to Juror Evans. View "Washington v. Parkinson" on Justia Law

Chicago police obtained a warrant and searched a two-bedroom apartment leased by Tucker’s mother. Tucker's mother and his niece were present. Officer Edwards found a rifle and documents bearing Tucker’s name under a mattress in a bedroom. Officers found eight clear baggies of heroin inside a potato chip bag and ammunition. Another officer apprehended Tucker a few blocks away and stated that officers had found the gun. Tucker responded that the rifle was not his and that he was holding it for someone. His mother testified that Tucker did not have keys to the apartment, was not listed on the lease, and did not keep possessions there, but only visited. His niece corroborated the testimony, adding that a neighbor brought Tucker’s mail to the apartment. Edwards testified that an officer asked Tucker’s mother which bedroom was Tucker’s, and that she pointed to the bedroom where the rifle was found. Tucker was convicted of possessing a firearm after conviction of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment longer than a year, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims based on sufficiency of the evidence of constructive possession and that Tucker was denied a fair trial because the court indicated it would admit evidence of six prior felonies if he testified. View "United States v. Tucker" on Justia Law