Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After being acquitted in a state court of aggravated battery, the plaintiff sued two Chicago police officers and the City of Chicago, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for malicious prosecution. He claimed that the officers had prepared false police reports and used them to persuade a state prosecutor to file the charge. The district court dismissed, reasoning that a federal suit for malicious prosecution by state officers is permissible only if the state in which the plaintiff had been prosecuted does not provide an adequate remedy, which Illinois does. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a federal suit for malicious prosecution can be based on the Fourth Amendment rather than on the due process clause, and that all that the plaintiff has to prove in order to establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment is that he was wrongfully in detention at some point. Because the initial seizure was supported by probable cause and did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the fact that the deprivation of liberty lasted longer than it should have, is irrelevant. The Fourth Amendment does not regulate the length of detentions. View "Llovet v. City of Chicago " on Justia Law

Ashburn was convicted in Illinois state court of the first degree murder of Muckenstrum. After appealing his conviction and filing a collateral challenge in Illinois state court, Ashburn filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court. The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Ashburn’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel was violated because his state appellate counsel did not raise a speedy trial claim; that Ashburn was denied due process because of the admission of a knife unrelated to the murder; that Ashburn was denied due process by the state’s purported use of perjured testimony; and that Ashburn was denied due process by the giving of an accountability instruction to the jury. View "Ashburn v. Atchison" on Justia Law

Webster was convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death. His guilt is not contested. At trial Webster introduced evidence from experts who concluded that his IQ is less than 70 and that he is retarded. The prosecutor responded with evidence from other experts who concluded that Webster is not retarded and was malingering to evade punishment. After unsuccessful direct appeal, the Fifth Circuit, where the crime and trial occurred, denied Webster’s application for permission to pursue a second collateral attack. Webster asked for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in the Indiana, where he is confined. Current counsel acquired records from his Social Security Administration application for disability benefits, before his trial. The SSA psychologist, plus two consulting physicians, concluded that he is retarded. The SSA nonetheless classified him as not disabled. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia, (2002), that the Constitution forbids the execution of persons who are retarded or unable to understand what capital punishment means and why they have been sentenced to die, Webster does not contend that the law or his mental condition have changed since the Fifth Circuit’s decisions on direct and collateral review. View "Webster v. Caraway" on Justia Law

JAB designs, manufactures, and sells men’s clothing and accessories and has 31 Illinois retail locations. In July 2012, Camasta went to the Deer Park JAB store. Before making his purchases, Camasta contends that he saw an advertisement about “sale prices.” At the time of Camasta’s visit, JAB customers were offered a promotion: “buy one shirt, get two shirts free.” Camasta paid $79.50 for one shirt getting two similar shirts for free, and bought another shirt for $87.50 allowing him to receive two more shirts for free. After this purchase, Camasta claims that he learned the JAB “sale” was not actually a reduced price, but was the JAB practice to advertise normal prices as temporary price reductions. Camasta asserts that but for his belief that the advertised sale was a limited time offer, he would not have purchased the six shirts. On behalf of himself and a putative class, Camasta filed a complaint, accusing JAB of violating the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act based on the company’s “sales practice of advertising the normal retail price as a temporary price reduction.” The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting Camasta's "sparse" and "conclusory" allegations. View "Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc." on Justia Law

Davis and others were indicted for conspiracy to distribute 280 or more grams of crack cocaine between 2008 and 2010, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. Later, Davis was charged in an information for conspiracy to distribute 28 or more grams of crack cocaine between 2008 and 2010. That same day, Davis entered into a written agreement, which stated that Davis would plead guilty to the information and waive prosecution by indictment; the government would dismiss the indictment and recommend: the relevant conduct attributable to Davis is at least 196 grams but less than 280 grams of a mixture and substance containing cocaine base in the form of crack cocaine; an applicable base offense level of 30; a two-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility and an additional one-level decrease for timely notice of his intention to plead guilty; and a sentencing recommendation at the low end of the applicable guideline range. The Presentence Report, incorporating the recommendations, assigned a total offense level of 27 (base level of 30 minus a three-level decrease) resulting in a range of 130–162 months. Davis made efforts to withdraw his plea, complicated by his switching lawyers, and repeated disputes about the facts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his 120- month sentence, rejecting claims that the statements made by the government ran counter to the agreed-to recommendations.View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

FBI surveillance of Terre Haute neighbors Denny and Miller included recording activities of those homes, using a camera mounted on a utility pole. The camera captured a live feed, but skipped every few seconds and did not produce a fluid, continuous video. Agents monitored the live feed. On February 8, the camera recorded Constantino, a security guard, arriving at Denny’s residence in Constantino’s company car, entering Denny’s residence, and later leaving. Denny cooperated with the FBI and later revealed that Constantino sold him methamphetamine inside his home that day. Agents followed Constantino to a restaurant and saw him carrying a handgun on his hip. The camera showed Constantino return to Denny’s residence on February 14, with his brother Nicholas, who walked to a toolbox attached to their truck. The video records the toolbox open and then shut, with Nicholas beside it, but does not show him removing anything. The brothers entered the home. Denny later testified that they placed methamphetamine in his microwave and received $8,000 from him. Agents stopped them, seized a loaded gun from Constantino’s waistband, and found another gun and $8,000 cash in the toolbox. Both were indicted for conspiring to supply more than 500 grams of meth; possession and distribution of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine; and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Affirming their convictions, the Seventh Circuit held that the video was an accurate depiction of events; skips did not render it inadmissible. Nothing about the video would cause a reasonable jury to decide the case on an improper basis. Two predicate drug offenses involving distinct conduct were sufficient to support two firearms convictions; the mandatory 25 year sentence for a second conviction does not violate double jeopardy. View "United States v. Cejas" on Justia Law

Lightspeed operates online pornography sites and sued a defendant, identified only Internet Protocol address, which was allegedly associated with unlawful viewing of Lightspeed’s content, using a “hacked” password. Lightspeed identified 6,600 others (by IP addresses only) as “co‐conspirators” in a scheme to steal passwords and content. Lightspeed, acting ex parte, served subpoenas on the ISPs (then non‐parties) for the personally identifiable information of each alleged coconspirator, none of whom had been joined as parties. The ISPs moved to quash and for a protective order. The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of the ISPs. Lightspeed amended its complaint to name as co‐conspirator parties the ISPs and unidentified “corporate representatives,” alleging negligence, violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030 and 1030(g), and deceptive practices. Lightspeed issued new subpoenas seeking the personally identifiable information. The ISPs removed the case to federal court. The district judge denied an emergency motion to obtain the identification information. After several “changes” with respect to Lightspeed’s lawyers, the court stated that they “demonstrated willingness to deceive … about their operations, relationships, and financial interests have varied from feigned ignorance to misstatements to outright lies … calculated so that the Court would grant early‐discovery requests, thereby allowing [them] to identify defendants and exact settlement proceeds.” After granting Lightspeed’s motion for voluntary dismissal, the court granted attorney’s fees under 28 U.S.C. 1927, stating that the litigation “smacked of bullying pretense.” Failing to pay, the lawyers were found to be in civil contempt and ordered to pay 10% of the original sanctions award to cover costs for the contempt litigation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Duffy v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 1994, Maranda exposed himself to a six‐year‐old girl, then exposed himself to a drive-through window cashier and attempted to pull her into his car. He pleaded guilty to public indecency and was sentenced to home confinement. Months later, Maranda molested a six‐year‐old. He was released from state prison in 1998 and downloaded child pornography. He was arrested, and pleaded guilty. The district court sentenced him to 40 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release. In 2002, Maranda was released and began serving of supervision. In 2005, he was arrested on an allegation that he molested a nine‐year‐old. He pleaded guilty to aggravated domestic battery. The court revoked supervised release and sentenced him to another 30 months in prison and two years of supervised release. Maranda’s sentence was to expire on March 16, 2008, but the government filed a petition under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 18 U.S.C. 4248, which authorizes detention of a mentally ill, sexually dangerous federal prisoner beyond the date the prisoner would otherwise be released. His release was automatically stayed. His hearing occurred more than four years later. The district court ruled that Maranda was not subject to commitment. He was released in 2012; days later, he began receiving phone calls from another convicted sex offender in violation of a release condition. His probation officer petitioned for a second revocation of supervised release. Maranda moved to dismiss, arguing that supervised release began on the day imprisonment ended. The district court rejected the argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Read together, the supervised‐release provision, 18 U.S.C. 3624(e), and the stay‐of‐release provision in the civil‐commitment statute, 18 U.S.C. 4248(a), establish that he was not “released from imprisonment” while awaiting the outcome of his civil commitment proceedings. View "United States v. Maranda" on Justia Law

Employers that withdraw from underfunded multiemployer pension plans must pay their share of the shortfall. They can seek recalculation of the plans' assessment within 90 days, 29 U.S.C. 1399(b)(2)(A), and within another 60 days, may invoke a process that the Act calls arbitration, though it is neither contractual nor consensual. Central States Pension Fund concluded that US Foods has withdrawn in part and assessed liability in 2008 and in 2009. US Foods timely requested arbitration of the 2009 assessment, but did not timely seek arbitration of the 2008 assessment. In the Fund’s suit to collect the 2008 assessment, US Foods asked the court to order the arbitrator to calculate the amount due for 2008 and 2009 jointly. The court ruled that US Foods had missed the deadline for arbitral resolution of the 2008 assessment. US Foods appealed, relying on 9 U.S.C.16(a)(1)(B), which authorizes an interlocutory appeal from an order “denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed”. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. An order declining to interfere in the conduct of an arbitration is not an order “denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed” under section 16(a)(1)(B). View "Cent. States SE & SW Areas Pension Fund v. US Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former laborer, applied for social security disability benefits, claiming he was unable to work a full 40-hour week because of acute lower back pain that radiates into his right leg. He has had various treatments and takes several medications such as oxycodone and percocet. His application was denied; the Appeals Council and district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, reasoning that the administrative law judge was likely mistaken in believing that one physician’s report refuted the findings of the other physician. What was relevant was not the cause of the pain and numbness but the severity of these symptoms and whether they disabled plaintiff from working full time. Both physicians diagnosed radiculopathy. If the administrative law judge remains skeptical of the claim, he can order a further examination of the plaintiff by a qualified physician instructed to offer a medical opinion (if possible) on the plaintiff’s physical ability to engage in full-time work. The court stated references to the credibility of the applicant are “a recurrent feature of the government’s defense of denials of social security disability benefits” that constitutes “professional misconduct and if it continues we’ll have to impose sanctions.” View "Hanson v. Colvin" on Justia Law