Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

DEA agents arrested Washington at the home of a suspected drug dealer they had been investigating and seized approximately 1.765 kilograms of cocaine from the residence. Washington admitted that he was attempting to purchase cocaine. He pled guilty to a single count of attempting to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and, with a sentencing guidelines range of 97 to 121 months’ imprisonment, was sentenced to 97 months. The judge said only that he had “considered all the factors of 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)” and noted that Washington had been “involved in a serious crime, a serious crime in the sense of what it is doing to so many people in our society, not only the dealing of the drugs, but also the using of them.” The court also imposed a $500 fine. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing, finding the “truncated explanation” insufficient. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

The district court certified a class of waiters, bartenders, and other tipped employees at defendant restaurants. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 203(d), and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law their employer is not required to pay tipped employees full federal or state minimum wage. If tipped employees also perform unrelated non‐tipped duties such as washing dishes, preparing food, or cleaning bathrooms, they are entitled to full minimum wage for time spent at that work. After the court amended the class definition to employees “who worked as tipped employees earning a sub‐minimum, tip credit wage rate,” the last remaining defendant sought permission to appeal for a second time. The Seventh Circuit denied the petition. While the definition is overinclusive because it says nothing about untipped work, the defendant did not challenge the definition. The change to the definition since denial of the previous petition does not open the door to a challenge to the initial grant of class certification on grounds derived from developments since that grant, including rulings by the district court. To justify a second appeal from grant or denial of class certification the order appealed from must have materially altered a previous order granting or denying certification. View "Smith v. Driver" on Justia Law

New Energy operated a South Bend ethanol plant. In bankruptcy, it proposed to sell assets by auction, which was held in 2013. A joint venture, New Energy, submitted the winning bid of $2.5 million. New Energy, the trustee, and the Department of Energy, the largest creditor, asked the bankruptcy court to confirm this result. Natural Chem, which had not participated in the auction, opposed confirmation, arguing that establishment of the joint venture amounted to collusion. The Bankruptcy Court confirmed the sale. Natural Chem did not seek a stay and the sale closed. A district judge affirmed, observing that after the closing only a protest by the trustee permits a sale to be undone on grounds that “the sale price was controlled by an agreement among potential bidders,” 11 U.S.C.363(n). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that Natural Chem did not suffer an injury and that, under section 363, any injury would not be redressable. Collusion is a form of monopsony that depresses the price realized at auctions and would have made it easier for Natural Chem to secure the property. A reduction in the bid would have harmed New Energy’s creditors, not Natural Chem, which is why the trustee rather than a bidder is the right party to protest collusive sales. View "In re: New Energy Corp." on Justia Law

Contractors Cargo, engaged in heavy-haul operations, commissioned Empire Bucket to fabricate a steel deck to be used with Cargo’s specialized rail freight car for transporting oversized loads. A third party designed the deck, specifying that the deck be fabricated from T-1 high-strength steel and that welding be performed to American Welding Society specifications. The deck was designed to transport up to 800,000 pounds. Empire fabricated the deck, which passed inspection by an outside agency and all nondestructive tests, and delivered it. Cargo connected the deck to its railcar and loaded it to 820,000 pounds. The next morning, an employee observed that the deck had dropped about three inches. Cargo attempted to raise it with a hydraulic jacking system, but the deck fractured. Cargo hired a metallurgical engineer, who determined that a portion of the weld was composed of material with properties different from the properties of the material in the rest of the weld where the crack originated. Cargo refused to pay the full purchase price. Empire sued and Cargo filed counterclaims. The district court granted Empire’s motion in limine to exclude testimony concerning one test performed on the deck after it failed. The jury returned a verdict for Empire. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that, given testimony admitted at trial, the excluded evidence would have added little to the implied warranty claims. View "Empire Bucket, Inc. v. Contractors Cargo Co." on Justia Law

After selling guns to a confidential informant, the defendant was prosecuted as a felon in possession of firearms. The purchases provided evidence of guilt, although the $1200 that the defendant had received from the confidential informant in payment for the guns was never recovered. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 16 months in prison followed by 24 months of supervised release with a condition that he repay the buy money to the government at a minimum rate of $50 per month. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the imposition of the condition View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Reed, a trackman with NSR, experienced a bout of severe abdominal pain while working. He claimed that the company was reluctant to provide medical treatment and pressured him into signing a statement that he had not been “injured on or at work.” Reed was on medical leave for seven months. After he returned, a company claims agent urged him to state whether the incident was work‐related. Reed stated that, notwithstanding his earlier attestation, he felt that his work did play a role in his injury. NSR fired Reed for making inconsistent statements and for violating an internal rule requiring same‐day reporting of on‐site injuries. Reed and his union believed that his termination violated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Pursuant to the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153, Reed appealed his dismissal. While arbitration proceedings before the Board were pending, Reed filed a complaint with OSHA, alleging violation of the Federal Railroad Safety Act, which prohibits discriminating against employees who “notify, or attempt to notify, the railroad carrier … of a work‐related personal injury,” 49 U.S.C. 20109(a)(4). After an appropriate period, Reed filed in district court. The Board awarded him reinstatement without back pay. The district court denied NSR’s motion for summary judgment under the FRSA election-of-remedies provision, reasoning that the arbitration proceedings were not an “election” of remedies because arbitration was mandatory, and that a collective bargaining agreement was not “another provision of law.” The Seventh Circuit reversed. View "Reed v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co." on Justia Law

In 2004 Spurling began working for C&M as a packer assigned to the third (night) shift. In 2009, she began to experience decreased consciousness and alertness, for which she received several disciplinary warnings. Spurling received a Final Warning/Suspension in February 2010 after she left her work site to use the restroom and did not return for more than 20 minutes. After her suspension, Spurling met with her manager and supervisors and indicated that her sleep issues were caused by a prescribed medication; she produced a note to the same effect. Spurling continued to experience difficulty remaining conscious at work and received a Final Warning/Suspension, Spurling informed human resources that her performance issues might be related to a medical condition. Although her doctor indicated that she had a disability, C&M concluded that she did not and terminated her employment. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of C&M, rejecting claims of violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and of the Family and Medical Leave Act. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Spurling established disputed issues of material facts as to whether C&M failed to properly engage in the interactive process required by the ADA, but did not provide sufficient notice to establish a claim under the FMLA.View "Spurling v. C&M Fine Pack, Inc." on Justia Law

Pierce claimed that she injured her lower back in 2004 while moving cases of glassware at her waitressing job. She quit her job and sought medical treatment. An MRI showed signs of disc degeneration. She received chiropractic and electric-shock treatments to her back. She also took prescription pain medication. After her back improved, she started a new job at a café. In March 2006 (her alleged onset date for disability), Pierce re-injured her back to the point that she could no longer sit or stand comfortably, and she had to quit her new job. The injury disrupted her sleep, caused numbness in her legs, and prevented her from being able to sit, stand, lift, or bend for long periods. She could not work for more than five hours without pain. An ALJ found that Pierce, then more than 55 years old, was not disabled. The Seventh Circuit remanded for further proceedings, finding the ALJ’s assessment of Pierce’s credibility was flawed in several respects. View "Pierce v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Valdez pled guilty to possessing heroin with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and admitted responsibility for 700 grams of heroin. Given the amount of heroin he acknowledged, he faced a statutory minimum of five years in prison and a statutory maximum of 40 years, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B)(i). In applying the Sentencing Guidelines, the district court held him accountable for more than three kilograms and imposed a within-guidelines sentence of 140 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the drug quantity finding violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, that the finding was based on unreliable evidence, and that the court failed to address an argument he made in mitigation against undue reliance on drug quantity.View "United States v. Valdez" on Justia Law

Under surveillance, Cureton sold crack cocaine to a confidential informant who used recorded bills. A marked bill was found in Cureton’s wallet during a warrant search of Cureton’s home. Cureton’s fingerprints were found on a bag containing pistols and on the scale found at the location a controlled buy. Cureton had also used a gun to steal $9,500 from one of his customers, who reported the robbery. Knowing that the police had visited his home in his absence, Cureton instructed his roommate to bring $9,000 in cash to a park. The roommate failed to do so and Cureton kidnapped her, assaulted her, held a gun to her to her head, and demanded that she call relatives to obtain cash. Her relatives contacted police. Cureton was convicted of attempted extortion and interstate communication of a ransom request, and three counts of drug distribution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that, in light of overwhelming evidence, any error in admitting evidence that Cureton had obtained the cash by robbing drug customers at gunpoint was harmless. The court vacated one of two 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1) convictions for using a firearm in connection with a violent felony; both were based on the same conduct—Cureton pointing a gun at his roommate and demanding she make calls to obtain money. View "United States v. Cureton" on Justia Law