Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Over 40 years, Rachuy accumulated almost 30 convictions, mostly for fraud. In a recent scheme, he “purchased” six vehicles by writing bad checks drawn on bank accounts that he knew were closed or had no funds. He was indicted for five counts of transporting stolen vehicles across state lines, 18 U.S.C. 2312, and pled guilty to one count in exchange for the government’s agreement to recommend that the court calculate loss amount based only on checks returned on four bank accounts involved in the purchase of the vehicles; recommend a five‐year prison sentence; and not oppose Rachuy’s request for the return of his property held by authorities. The district court rejected the parties’ recommendation, sentenced him to 90 months’ imprisonment based on its determination that he “is the epitome of a career offender.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the government breached the plea agreement: by referencing Rachuy’s lengthy criminal history, by failing to recommend that his loss amount be based solely on the checks used to purchase the vehicles charged in the superseding indictment; and by reminding the court that it did not have the power to command local and state authorities to release Rachuy’s property. View "United States v. Rachuy" on Justia Law

Richard worked for GPI for 25 years until his 2009 death. He had a basic life insurance policy through GPI’s health and welfare plan and paid for an optional supplemental life insurance policy through GPI for several years. His wife, Maureen, was the beneficiary of both policies. At the end of 2008, Richard’s supplemental life insurance policy was cancelled. Richard’s pay stubs reflected the change, beginning in January 2009. When Richard died a few months later, GPI’s insurer, ABC, paid benefits on the basic life insurance policy. Richard had been diagnosed with stage 4 cancer in September 2008. Soon after Richard’s death, Maureen’s attorney requested information regarding Richard’s supplemental life insurance policy. The company refused the request, citing its confidentiality policy, indicating that the information would only be produced in response to a subpoena. Almost two years later, Maureen filed suit, claiming that either GPI or ABC breached the policy by terminating it without Richard’s consent, in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001. The district court awarded the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no material issue of fact as to whether Richard cancelled his supplemental policy. Although Maureen speculated that someone other than Richard terminated the policy, she presented no evidence to support her assertion. View "Herzog v. Graphic Packaging Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

Portis called 911 because Boyce was “going crazy” and had a gun. The operator said, “He has a gun?” Portis responded, “I think so.” The operator said, “Come on,” Portis said, “Yes!” twice. To “Did you see one?” Portis replied, “Yes!” The operator cautioned about perjury. Portis responded, “I’m positive.” After describing Boyce, Portis stated that she didn’t know whether Boyce had left. Officers responded. After determining Boyce was not in the apartment, they interviewed Portis and went to their car to complete a report. They saw Boyce return and call Portis’s name. Boyce ran from the officers. Officer Cummings chased him and saw Boyce reach toward his midsection, retrieve a handgun, and toss it into a yard. After catching Boyce, officers found a handgun in the area where Boyce threw a gun and found matching bullets in Boyce’s pocket. Charged as a felon in possession of a firearm and of ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1), Boyce sent a letter requesting that Portis recant her statement, providing the story he wanted her to use. They also spoke about “our story” by phone while he was in jail. Portis did not testify; the government played a recording of her 911 call. After his conviction, the district court concluded that Boyce had three prior violent felonies or serious drug offenses that mandated a minimum term of 15 years’ imprisonment under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), and sentenced him to 210 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Boyce’s civil rights had been restored. The court upheld admission of the 911 call under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule because they were made while under the stress of a domestic battery and related to it.View "United States v. Boyce" on Justia Law

Johnson pled guilty to failure to register as a sex offender, and the sentencing memorandum requested an enhancement for committing a sex offense on the basis that Johnson sexually assaulted his former girlfriend, S.W. Unexpectedly for both the prosecution and defense counsel, S.W. appeared at his sentencing hearing and stated she wanted to testify. The judge exercised his authority to call S.W. to the stand. She testified that although she did not want Johnson to perform oral sex on her on the date in question, he did so but did not use force. The judge relied on S.W.’s testimony and imposed a U.S.S.G. 2A3.5(b)(1)(A) enhancement for committing a sex offense while in failure to register status. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence. The crimes of criminal sexual assault and abuse in Illinois require the use or threat of force in such a situation. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Riney was found in the vicinity of a shooting, immediately after the incident occurred, and matched the general description of the shooter. When he exited his car and walked away from the officers, they saw what they believed to be a gun in his waistband. A gun was found during a pat-down. Riney was convicted of possession of a firearm after previously having been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Riney had many felony convictions for violent crimes, though from many years earlier, to qualify as an armed career criminal under both 18 U.S.C. 924(e) and U.S. Sentencing Guideline 4B1.4. The district court sentenced Riney to 204 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed both his conviction and sentence, rejecting claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence and in applying a two‐level enhancement for obstruction of justice to the offense level in its sentencing guideline calculation. View "United States v. Riney" on Justia Law

Agent Lombardi received a tip from a confidential informant that he had seen “Cap” in possession of cocaine. The CI, who was familiar with cocaine distribution and had previously provided information that resulted in an arrest, provided the address at which he had seen “Cap.” Lombardi searched the name “Cap” in a law enforcement database. Todd Sutton was listed as a match for that alias. Lombardi obtained a booking photo of Sutton and showed it to the CI, who confirmed that “Cap” was Sutton. Lombardi drove the CI past the address. The CI confirmed the location and stated that the tenant was Foster, whom the CI believed to be Sutton’s girlfriend. A law enforcement database confirmed that Foster was the tenant; Lombardi later discovered that she was Sutton’s cousin. Lombardi took the CI before a judge; the CI signed a “John Doe” affidavit in support of a search warrant. During the ensuing search, agents found: 63 grams of crack cocaine in a bedroom closet; male clothing and shoes in the same closet; a digital scale with white powder residue and other items frequently used to cook crack cocaine in the kitchen; a handwritten letter on the kitchen table referring to “Cap”; and a computer, on which agents viewed a video showing Sutton in the apartment. Only Sutton and Foster had keys to the apartment; she rarely entered the bedroom where the cocaine was found. Sutton pleaded guilty, retaining the right to appeal denial of his motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. Sutton" on Justia Law

Until 1998, Vanaria was employed by the Cook County Probation Department. He was terminated following investigation of allegations that he had sought sexual favors in exchange for looser conditions of probation. In 2002 the county rehired Vanaria, who was a political operative. He began working at a county hospital in a position excluded from decrees prohibiting hiring decisions based on politics. The hospital did not conduct background investigations of patronage hires. A pharmaceutical representative alleged that Vanaria had attempted to condition her participation in a hospital program on her giving him a massage. An investigation resulted in oral counseling for Vanaria, but no discipline. In 2007, Vanaria offered Krystal, an unemployed massage therapist, a position as a physical therapist. When she stated that she was not qualified as a physical therapist, he explained that he could make things happen because people owed him favors. He provided her with legitimate application forms and insurance paperwork. When Krystal returned to his office with her Social Security card, Vanaria asked Krystal to close the door and told her that if she truly wanted the job, she had to kiss and massage him. Krystal agreed to have Vanaria visit her at her home massage studio, where they had sexual contact. Krystal eventually called the hospital’s HR department and learned that no position had ever existed, Vanaria eventually pled guilty to official misconduct and bribery. The district court rejected Krystal’s Title VII (42 U.S.C. 2000e), equal protection, and due process claims and state law claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Wilson v. Cook County" on Justia Law

Alforookh manages and operates restaurants under franchise agreements with IHOP. He created companies to hold the franchises, including A&F. Alforookh and A&F are in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. Their primary assets are 17 IHOP franchise agreements and corresponding building and equipment leases. Generally, Chapter 11 debtors may assume or reject executory contracts any time before confirmation of a plan, 11 U.S.C. 365(d)(2). Unexpired leases of nonresidential real property, however, must be assumed within 120 days, subject to a 90-day extension. A&F did not assume the building leases within 120 days or seek an extension, so IHOP claims that those leases were rejected and that the franchise agreements and equipment leases expired. A&F argued that because the building leases are just one part of the larger franchise arrangement, section 365(d)(2)’s more generous time limit applies to the whole arrangement, including the building leases. The bankruptcy judge deemed the building leases rejected and the franchise agreements and equipment leases expired. A&F’s request for a stay pending appeal was rejected by the bankruptcy and district courts. The Seventh Circuit granted an emergency motion and issued a stay order freezing the status quo during the pendency of the appeal and subsequently held that a continued stay was warranted. View "A&F Enters., Inc. II v. IHOP Franchising, LLC" on Justia Law

Williams pleaded guilty to misusing social security numbers, 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(7)(B), identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(7), making a false statement to an IRS agent, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2), and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1). The district court used the guidelines in effect at sentencing to calculate his imprisonment range, sentencing him to 56 months’ imprisonment, in addition to 24 months imposed for aggravated identity theft. Because of an upward adjustment for involving more than 10 victims, his guidelines range was higher than it would have been if calculated under the guidelines in effect when Williams committed his crimes. The defense did not raise the issue at sentencing. While his case was on appeal the Supreme Court held that applying the guidelines in effect at sentencing violates the ex post facto clause if it raises the defendant’s imprisonment range. Because the trial judge did not say that he would have given the same sentence if the range had been lower, the Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Officers arrived at Helman’s residence to execute warrants for his arrest. They hoped for a peaceful surrender. Helman exited the home and spoke with officers. In response to questions as to whether he was armed, Helman lifted his shirt to show a semi-automatic handgun. Helman handed the officers papers and returned to his house. The officers informed other members of the state police that Helman was carrying a loaded firearm. A six-hour stalemate followed, after which Helman walked into his yard carrying water and a cup. The Emergency Response Team moved in to prevent him from retreating back into his home and activated a flash bang device to distract Helmanhim. According to the officers, Helman turned, and, seeing the ERT, attempted to draw his handgun. Officers shot Helman multiple times. Helman claims that he did not reach for his weapon until after that device went off and shots were fired. Helman pled guilty in state court to resisting law enforcement with a deadly weapon. Helman sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. The district court rejected the suit on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Helman’s version of the facts would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and, under the facts found in that conviction, the response of the officers was reasonable. View "Helman v. Smeltzley" on Justia Law