Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Greving has lived and farmed in southeastern Wisconsin since 1971. In 2003 he began contracting to sell his grain to Northern Grain, an Illinois-based grain buyer. Northern Grain claimed that Greving repudiated several contracts formed years after the parties first began contracting and sought almost $1 million in damages. When Greving refused to arbitrate, Northern Grain sought an order compelling arbitration. The Illinois district court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Greving lacks minimum contacts with Illinois that would permit the district court, consistent with the due process clause, to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over him. Greving only set foot in Illinois once, to attend a seed-corn meeting in 2003, months before the parties entered into the first of their contracts, where he met Wilson, who became his contact with Northern Grain. Even assuming that his attendance at the meeting would enter the “personal-jurisdiction calculus for the later-formed contracts at issue,” there is no indication that Greving attended the meeting in an effort to find grain buyers. Virtually everything else about Greving’s contractual relationship with Northern Grain was based in Wisconsin. View "N. Grain Mktg., LLC v. Greving" on Justia Law

Convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), Molton was sentenced to 108 months’ imprisonment, which is substantially higher than the advisory guidelines range of 63 to 78 months. The judge determined that a guideline sentence was insufficient punishment for a 23-year-old convicted of his third firearm offense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and the sentence, rejecting arguments that the district court should have excluded evidence of Molton’s gang affiliation, and that his above‐guidelines sentence was substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Molton" on Justia Law

Officer Prado of the Chicago Police Department, while on duty, funneled towing business to certain tow truck companies in exchange for bribes. After an FBI investigation, Prado was indicted on three counts and pled guilty to one count of attempting to commit extortion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951. At sentencing, Prado asked the court to consider the sentence of another former officer, Wodnicki, whom Prado believed was similarly situated. The district court refused to consider Prado’s argument because it believed it could only consider sentencing disparities if they were presented on a nationwide basis and prevented Prado and the prosecutor from introducing information related to Wodnicki’s sentence. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The procedural error in the court not realizing that it had the discretion to deviate from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and could consider others’ individual sentences was not harmless. It is impossible to determine whether Prado would have received the same sentence absent the error. View "United States v. Prado" on Justia Law

In 2008, defendant faxed tens of thousands of unsolicited advertisements, violating the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227. After defendant’s insurer intervened, a second proposed class action settlement was reached. The insurer, Continental, agreed to make $6.1 million available to class members. The total is approximately equal to the number of faxes sent (110,853) times per-fax damages offered by Continental ($55.03) with an attorney fee award of 1/3 the total amount: $2,033,333.33. The district court preliminarily approved the settlement and 24,389 of the 28,879 class members were successfully notified; five requested exclusion. None objected. Only 1,820 returned a claim form, seeking damages for 7,222 unlawful fax transmissions, so that Continental would pay out only $397,426.66 of the $6.1 million, with the remainder, less attorney fees and incentive awards, to revert. Despite the relatively meager final payout to class members, plaintiffs’ attorneys continued to demand more than $2 million. The district court employed the lodestar method, rather than the percentage method, applying a risk multiplier of 1.5 to arrive at a final fee award of $1,147,698.70. After arguments on appeal, the attorneys sought to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit declined to dismiss and affirmed the reduced fee award. View "Americana Art China Co., Inc. v. Foxfire Printing & Packaging, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2003, Perry shared child pornography with an internet group. A search of his apartment uncovered discs containing hundreds of child pornography images. Perry pleaded guilty to violations of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1) and (a)(5)(B). The district court sentenced Perry to 60 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release with a concurrent 46- month term and three years of supervised release on the second count, and imposed 15 standard conditions of supervised release and six special conditions. In 2009, Perry was in the unsupervised company of a 12-year-old female in violation of those terms. He admitted fault and was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment and four years of supervised release. In 2013, a probation officer found child pornography on Perry’s computer, a violation of supervised release. Perry admitted the violation. The probation officer (mistakenly) reported that Perry was subject to the statutory minimum five-year term mandated by 18 U.S.C. 3583(k). Perry’s attorney and the prosecution agreed. The district court orally sentenced Perry to five years’ imprisonment plus 10 years of supervised release. In its written judgment, the court added four special conditions of supervision that were not mentioned at the revocation hearing. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to sentence Perry to no more than two years’ imprisonment and to determine Perry’s conditions of supervision. View "United States v. Perry" on Justia Law

Andrews, a white woman, started working at a Cracker Barrel restaurant in 1999. In 2002 she filed a discrimination claim, which settled. Stewart, a black man, then an associate manager, told Andrews that if he became manager, he would fire her. After Stewart became general manager in 2006, he said he was going to make the restaurant the first all-black Cracker Barrel. He also made daily comments about Andrews’s age, calling her “old woman” and “grandma.” Andrews complained to an associate manager and attempted to complain to the district manager, but the person responsible for scheduling an appointment never did so. In 2007 Andrews complained to an Employee Relations Specialist, who determined that no action needed to be taken. Eventually Andrews asked Stewart to initiate her transfer to another restaurant. She claims he told her that the transfer went through, but he denies doing so. She never made contact with the other restaurant and, after three weeks during which she did not work, the company’s system listed her as having quit. In the meantime, Stewart was fired for violating an asset-protection policy. The district court rejected claims that Stewart fired Andrews because of her sex, age, and race and that he retaliated for her prior Title VII suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Andrews did not suffer an adverse employment action, but quit in anticipation of a transfer that never occurred. View "Andrews v. CBOCS West, Inc." on Justia Law

More than 13 years ago, lawyers around the country began class actions challenging the installation of fiberoptic cable on property without landowners’ consent. The cases began to settle on a state-by-state basis, leaving the lawyers to allocate awarded and expected attorney’s fees. The lawyers informally grouped themselves based on their negotiation and litigation positions. The Susman Group participated in mediation and agreed to a fee division, but balked at signing a written agreement, ostensibly because Susman disliked its enforcement terms. The district court held that Susman is bound by the agreement despite his failure to sign. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that, given the parties’ lengthy course of dealing, Susman’s failure to promptly object to the written agreement can objectively be construed as assent. A finding that Susman’s refusal to sign was a case of “buyer’s remorse” rather than a genuine objection to the enforcement terms in the agreement was supported by the record. View "McDaniel v. Qwest Commc'ns Corp." on Justia Law

Phillips worked at CTA as a trucker for 22 years, until, in 2010, he visited CTA’s onsite health services department to report that his fingers went numb at work and to initiate a workers’ compensation claim. CTA had a written substance abuse policy that required drug testing in certain situations, including initiation of workers’ compensation claim. Refusal to submit to testing was cause for immediate suspension pending termination. An injured employee could receive medical treatment in the health services department and return to work without being required to submit to a drug test if the employee did not seek to initiate a workers’ compensation claim and the situation did not fall into one of the other categories for which drug testing was required. Phillips was advised that if he didn’t take the drug test, his employment would be terminated. He refused to take the drug test and was terminated for refusing to submit to drug testing upon his initiation of a workers’ compensation claim. Phillips did file a workers’ compensation claim and eventually received benefits. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting his claim that his termination was retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Phillips v. Cont'l Tire Americas, LLC" on Justia Law

Pineda was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and was sentenced to 115 months of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court violated his right to a fair jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments when it struck the sole Hispanic member of the jury for cause and replaced him with an alternate during trial and committed procedural error by failing to adequately consider all of the factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(1) at sentencing. View "United States v. Pineda" on Justia Law

Sanders pleaded guilty to possessing more than 50 grams of cocaine base with intent to distribute. The district judge found that he possessed more than 500 grams of cocaine or cocaine base and calculated an offense level of 26, producing a recommended range of 110 to 137 months’ imprisonment, and sentenced Sanders to 120 months. Most of the cocaine that was included for the purpose of calculating the offense level had been seized from Sanders’s home, which the police searched with a warrant following his arrest. The district judge concluded that the warrant was invalid and ruled that the evidence seized from his home could not be used against Sanders at trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the judge should have also prohibited use of that evidence at sentencing. All evidence is admissible at sentencing under 18 U.S.C. 3661. View "United States v. Sanders" on Justia Law