Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After guerillas from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) kidnapped her father and killed her uncle, petitioner fled Colombia. After entering the U.S. legally on a tourist visa, she and her family overstayed their visa and applied for asylum within one year, claiming that they were victims of persecution by the FARC and were in danger of future persecution should they return to Colombia. Petitioner’s husband and daughter filed derivative claims. The immigration judge concluded that petitioner failed to meet her burden of proof that she has suffered past persecution or would suffer from future persecution on the basis of her membership in a social group of land owners or because of her political opinion. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit granted a petition for review and remanded, stating that the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. The question of who is persecuted by FARC threats and whether the government is unable or unwilling to contain them is unresolved. View "N.L.A. v. Holder" on Justia Law

Debenedetto was arrested for transmitting threatening communications (18 U.S.C. 875(c)). The district court ordered a mental competency evaluation. After a hearing, the court determined that Debenedetto suffered from mental disease or defect that rendered him incompetent to stand trial and ordered that he be placed in a federal medical center, Butner. Months later, the court reviewed the result of a second examination and held a hearing regarding the need to medicate Debenedetto without his consent. Defense counsel argued that he believed that Debenedetto, already in custody for 16 months, had already served the guidelines range for his offense and raised concerns regarding the effectiveness of the drugs. After an adjournment, counsel represented that Debenedetto had agreed to go back to Butner and, “if they feel involuntary medication is appropriate, that should be done, but they should also review or consider less intrusive measures.” Debenedetto spoke, expressing concerns that he had previously had seizures and indicated his belief that medication was not necessary. Debenedetto filed a pro se appeal from the subsequent commitment order. After the government indicated intent to execute the order promptly, his attorney moved to stay the order and to withdraw as counsel. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that the hearing and written findings did not establish the elements necessary to justify involuntary medication.View "United States v. Debenedetto" on Justia Law

Bryant, riding his bike on a Chicago street, was stopped by police officers, searched without a warrant, and arrested for possessing a controlled substance. He was arraigned in September, 2010. He was released after the evidence was suppressed and the case dismissed. He is now in custody for a different crime. In 2012, Bryant filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, and state law claims. He sought to compel disclosure of the identities of the police officers. The district court screened Bryant’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (28 U.S.C. 1915A) noting that the section 1983 claims were subject to a two-year limitations period. Bryant had until August 20, 2012, to file his false-arrest claim, September 23 for the false-imprisonment claim and December 13 for the malicious-prosecution claim. The filing date of the complaint was unclear. The court deemed it filed on September 18, the earliest date that Bryant could have given it to jail officials for mailing. The court observed that. Bryant’s malicious prosecution claim was not time-barred, but was not actionable in federal court, and that his remaining federal claims were time-barred. The court expressed doubt that Bryant could identify the arresting officers within the limitations period. The court ultimately dismissed, stating that incarceration did not constitute a disability to toll the limitations period, that Bryant’s “belated attempts” to identify his arresting officers were not grounds for equitable tolling, and that identifying the officers as Doe and Roe was insufficient. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that Bryant exercised reasonable diligence and that the court erred in disregarding his discovery request. View "Larry Bryant v. City of Chicago, et al" on Justia Law

Moore applied for Social Security disability benefits, alleging that she became disabled in 2007. An ALJ concluded that Moore suffered from a number of severe impairments, including migraine headaches, asthma, morbid obesity, and rheumatoid arthritis, and less severe impairments including irritable bowel syndrome, gastroesophageal reflux disease, hypertension, hypothyroid and prolactin irregularities, carpal tunnel syndrome, depression, anxiety, and possible Crohn’s disease. The ALJ found that she was, nonetheless, capable of performing her past work and not entitled to benefits. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The ALJ did not err in considering evidence that Moore’s emergency room visits may have been related to an addiction problem, but the ALJ erred in failing to even acknowledge contrary evidence or to explain the rationale for crediting the identified evidence over contrary evidence. The ALJ never related Moore’s specific limitations to certain impairments. On remand, the ALJ must make those findings and present the limitations to the vocational expert to determine whether Moore is capable of performing her past relevant work. View "Moore v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Peters was a passenger in a Scion on I-70 in Indiana, traveling behind a Denali. Both cars displayed Ohio license plates. The cars aroused the suspicion of Officer Borgman, who followed the Denali and enlisted Deputy Ernstes to watch the Scion. Borgman stopped the Denali, which was found to contain heroin and other evidence of drug trafficking. Ernstes believed that the driver of the Scion, Adams, was following too closely and activated his emergency lights, Adams pulled over, denied that he was traveling with another vehicle, and stated that he had left his license at home. When his passenger, Peters, lowered his window, Ernstes smelled burnt marijuana and saw small green particles that he believed to be marijuana. Peters told the deputy that they were traveling with the Denali and that he had previously been arrested for carrying a concealed weapon. During a pat-down, the deputy recovered $2500 cash from Peters’ pocket. He found a marijuana stem in the front passenger area and encountered a marijuana odor in a storage compartment that had a cracked lid and screws that appeared not to be original equipment. The deputy also found a cordless drill that contained a sticky substance, later found to match a substance found on the screws of a panel concealing a kilogram of heroin in the Denali. Peters and the Denali passenger were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846; and possession with intent to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The district court concluded that probable cause existed and denied a motion to suppress. Peters entered a conditional plea. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Peters" on Justia Law

The police saw Johnson with a gun. He threw it away, but the police recovered it and charged him as a felon-in-possession. Prosecutors charged that at least three of his convictions were for “violent felonies” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). After Johnson pleaded guilty, the district judge determined that his convictions for robbery, domestic battery, and resisting law enforcement met the Act’s definition of violent felony and sentenced Johnson to 180 months’ imprisonment, the statutory minimum. But for his history of violent felonies, the maximum would have been 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting a claim that only a jury can determine whether a person’s criminal history justifies an enhanced penalty. A 1997 conviction for resisting law enforcement was not too old to count under the Act. A conviction for domestic battery in the presence of a child, in violation of Ind. Code 35-42-2-1.3, was a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B). Although Indiana law does not require a serious injury, the court looked at statistics and determined that domestic battery is at least as dangerous to its victims as purse snatching or attempted burglary and is properly classified as “violent.” View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Hunter, Adams, Gill, and Bostic were charged (with 10 others) in a multi-count indictment with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and distribution of 1000 grams or more of substances containing a detectable amount of heroin (21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1)). All four pleaded guilty, but appealed either their convictions or their sentences. Because Hunter entered a blind plea, waiving his right to appeal pre-trial rulings, the Seventh Circuit dismissed his appeal. The court also rejected Adams’s contention that the district court erred in calculating the quantity of heroin for which he was responsible. The court remanded for resentencing of Gill and Bostic because the court erred in enhancing their guideline offense levels for maintaining a “stash house.” That guideline provision was not in effect during the commission of their offenses. The court rejected Bostic’s attempt to challenge his plea; the change of plea hearing established that his plea was knowing and voluntary. The court also rejected his assertion that the court erred in considering, as a sentencing factor, violence engaged in by his gang without specifying what acts of violence it was holding him responsible for. A district court is not required to make specific findings concerning the section 3553 factors; the court clearly considered those factors. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

The claimant alleges that Father Hanser, a former pastor at a Catholic Parish in Brookfield,Wisconsin, sexually abused him in the late 1970s when he was seven years old. In 2007 the claimant participated in a voluntary mediation program conducted by the Archdiocese to address claims of sexual abuse by priests. The mediation produced a settlement. The Archdiocese paid the claimant $100,000, and he released the Archdiocese from all claims relating to abuse by Father Hanser. When the Archdiocese filed its Chapter 11 petition four years later, the claimant submitted a claim based on the same allegations of abuse by Father Hanser, claiming that an Archdiocesan representative had fraudulently induced him to settle by giving him inaccurate information about when the Archdiocese first received reports of abuse by Father Hanser. The bankruptcy judge refused to set the agreement aside because the claimant had not shown that but for the alleged misrepresentations, he would not have accepted the settlement. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The claimant failed to show that the alleged misrepresentations were a substantial factor in his decision to accept the settlement and never made an offer of proof explaining what an expanded record would show. View " Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee" on Justia Law

Castaldi, involved in fraudulent schemes since high school, operated a Ponzi scheme that collapsed in 2008. Net losses to investors and the IRS totaled about $40 million. When the scheme was near collapse, Castaldi turned himself in to the government. He eventually pled guilty to just one count of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and one count of corruptly impeding the IRS, 26 U.S.C. 7212(a). The district court imposed the longest prison sentence possible under the plea agreement: consecutive sentences of 20 years on the mail fraud charge and three years on the tax charge, about 50percent longer than the high end of the agreed Sentencing Guideline range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence, finding that the court adequately considered the fact that Castaldi told the government about his scheme and cooperated with its investigation, but also considered the devastating financial harm Castaldi inflicted on family members, friends, and neighbors of modest financial means. View "United States v. Castaldi" on Justia Law

A.H.’s Greensburg, Indiana school has a policy: Hair Styles which create problems of health and sanitation, obstruct vision, or call undue attention to the athlete are not acceptable….. Each varsity head coach will be responsible for determining acceptable length of hair for a particular sport. The head varsity basketball coach has established an unwritten hair-length policy, providing that each player’s hair must be cut above the ears, eyebrows, and collar, to promote “team unity” and project a “clean cut” image. The boys’ baseball teams have a similar policy; the track and football teams do not. No girls’ team is subject to a hair-length policy. When A.H. refused to comply, he was removed from the team. The district court denied a preliminary injunction and rejected substantive due process claim, acknowledging that one’s choice of hairstyle is an element of liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, but noting that public schools have authority to enact and enforce dress and grooming policies and may condition participation in interscholastic sports upon a greater degree of regulation than imposed on students generally. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, reasoning that the policy treats boys and girls differently; there was no evidence of comparable grooming standards applied to girls playing basketball. The evidence supported the sex discrimination claims.View "Hayden v. Greensburg Cmty Sch. Corp." on Justia Law