Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Milwaukee police officer submitted an affidavit and application for a warrant to search for heroin, guns, items affiliated with heroin or guns, and other evidence that could be used to demonstrate control over the premises. He averred that a reliable confidential informant had seen Reed armed and delivering heroin at the home within the prior 72 hours and that he believed the informant to be credible, based on previous dealings. The informant supplied a physical description of Reed and identified Reed through booking photographs. The officer corroborated the information by verifying that Reed had a prior felony conviction for possession with intent to deliver heroin and that Reed was currently on probation. The district court rejected a challenge to the warrant. Reed was convicted of possession with intent to distribute heroin, possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that there was no probable cause to issue the warrant; that the court erred in allowing the government to present details concerning a 10-year-old conviction for heroin distribution to demonstrate propensity for committing heroin-related crimes; and that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he possessed the guns or drugs seized from the home or that he used the guns in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. View "United States v. Reed" on Justia Law

In 2006 Buechel was incarcerated at FCI-Greenville federal correctional institution, where he contracted Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus, (MRSA), a staph infection resistant to certain antibiotics. Buechel was hospitalized for more than 40 days and was left with serious and permanent damage to his heart and lungs. He sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), alleging that his injuries were caused by the prison’s negligence. The district court issued a pretrial order that limited Buechel’s negligence claim to a theory that he contracted MRSA from contact with one fellow inmate, in the prison laundry in July 2006, or more generally as a result of sloppy procedures in handling infected prison laundry. After a bench trial, the court held that Buechel had not proved that he contracted MRSA from either the inmate or the laundry procedures and entered judgment in favor of the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the finding that Buechel failed to prove that he contracted MRSA from the inmate or as a result of inadequate laundry procedures, but vacated and remanded for consideration of a broader theory. Buechel’s administrative claim and complaint presented a broader theory that the prison was negligent more generally in its failure to adhere to its MRSA-containment policies.View "Buechel v. United States" on Justia Law

From 1993-1999 the Hallahans ran a fraudulent scheme that bilked investors out of more than $1,000,000. In 2000, they pled guilty to conspiracy to commit mail and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371, 1341 & 1344, and conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h), in exchange for dismissal of other charges and recommendation of a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility and of a sentence at the low end of the guidelines. The plea agreements included appeal waivers. They did not appear for sentencing. They were finally arrested in 2012. They pled guilty to willfully failing to appear for sentencing, 18 U.S.C. 3146(a)(1) and argued that the court should use the version of the U.S.S.G. in effect at the time of the offenses, rather than the version in effect at the time of sentencing. The district court calculated the sentencing range using the 2012 Guidelines, arriving at an advisory range of 210 to 262 months for Nelson and 135 to 168 months for Janet. Under the 1998 Guidelines, the range would have been 121 to 151 months for Nelson and 97 to 121 months for Janet. The court imposed a sentence of 270 months on Nelson and 195 months on Janet based after consideration of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Hallahan" on Justia Law

Torres-Chavez was convicted of conspiring with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846; possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); and three counts of using a cellular telephone to facilitate the distribution conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. 843(b). The district court sentenced him to a total of 168 months’ imprisonment, plus five years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the admission of testimony from a co-conspirator concerning that co-conspirator’s prior uncharged drug-dealing activity with Torres-Chavez; denial of the defense motion attacking the sufficiency of the evidence identifying the defendant as the individual recorded on a series of incriminating telephone calls; and the court’s refusal to consider post-verdict statements made by several jurors in subsequent voir dire proceedings concerning their ability to follow the court’s instructions. View "United States v. Torres-Chavez" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers used file‐sharing software to discover that Poulin had been downloading and transmitting child pornography in the basement of his mother’s house. He pled guilty to receipt of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2)(A), (b)(1); and possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2), and received a below-guidelines-range 115‐month prison term, followed by a lifetime term of supervised released subject to various conditions. The Seventh Circuit remanded for resentencing, finding that the district court did not adequately explain the sentence. View "United States v. Poulin" on Justia Law

Woodard was the director of a non‐profit grant organization, Gideon’s Gate, which provided educational and tutoring services to children. The Department of Education, not satisfied with Gideon’s performance, stopped providing funds. Woodard then enrolled Gideon as an Indiana Medicaid provider for outpatient mental health services, but continued to operate as an educational service provider. To fraudulently bill Medicaid, Woodard illegally obtained clients’ personal information from a welfare‐to‐work provider operated by a friend. Woodard submitted 2,437 false claims for $8.9 million worth of services to 378 patients. Woodard was charged with health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347. Before trial Woodard filed several motions to change counsel. After appointing a third attorney, the court ordered a competency examination. A doctor concluded that Woodard was competent to stand trial. Two years later, after more delays and new attorneys, Woodard asked for another competency evaluation, which was denied. She pled guilty and was sentenced to 80 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit remanded for resentencing because the court applied the wrong version of the guidelines, but otherwise affirmed. The district court reached a reasonable conclusion after reviewing a previous psychological evaluation, considered advice from two mental health professionals, and considered Woodard’s interactions with her attorney. Although Woodard claimed that she did not knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty, the record shows that she did and that nothing would have alerted the court to the contrary. View "United States v. Woodard" on Justia Law

Kerr shot his wife’s lover at point‐blank range, turned himself in, was convicted of first degree intentional homicide, and was sentenced to life in prison, with eligibility for parole after 21 years. His petition for habeas corpus claimed that assistant district attorney Williams offered a plea agreement under which Kerr would plead guilty to first degree reckless homicide, a Class B felony. Kerr claims that his attorney, Boyle, failed to advise him correctly about the penalties he would face if he accepted. Kerr says that he rejected the alleged offer because the sentencing range was the same as the one for intentional homicide. Following a remand, the district court heard from four witnesses: Kerr, Williams, Boyle, and Boyle’s co‐counsel, his daughter Bridget Boyle. Boyle and Williams testified that there was no offer at all. Kerr, some of Bridget’s statements, and letters between Bridget and Kerr since his incarceration, supported Kerr’s position. A sealed transcript, created after Kerr’s sentencing, recounted a discussion between Kerr, Williams, Boyle, and the trial judge concerning the issue. The district court found that the state never offered Kerr a plea bargain and again denied Kerr’s petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Kerr v. Dittmann" on Justia Law

Convicted of conspiring to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, Brown was sentenced to life imprisonment based on his criminal history. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the court should have prevented the prosecution from introducing evidence traceable to information gleaned from a GPS monitor that investigators attached to a car in 2006. The Supreme Court held in 2012 that the intrusion on the property interest of a car’s owner is a “search,” valid only if reasonable, but the case did not hold that monitoring a car’s location for an extended time is a search even if the car’s owner consents to installation of the GPS unit, so that no property rights have been invaded. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a gun, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 60 months in prison. He possessed the gun in Indiana. To convict him the prosecution had to prove that the gun had been “shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce” and presented expert testimony by a special agent of the federal ATF that the gun had been manufactured in Connecticut. She had based her research on a search of an ATF database; on other sources, such as the Blue Book of Gun Values; and on a phone conversation and an exchange of emails with the manager of the plant that manufactured the gun. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning the brevity and lack of detail of the expert’s testimony; that the expert was giving impermissible hearsay evidence in testifying to what the manager had told her; and that the manager should have been called to testify. A reasonable jury could, despite the absence of other evidence, conclude from the expert’s testimony that the defendant’s gun was manufactured outside of Indiana. View "United States v. Brownlee" on Justia Law

Kingsley was a pretrial detaineel. A deputy noticed a sheet of yellow paper covering the light above Kingsley’s bed and ordered him to take it down. Kingsley refused, stating that he had not put the paper there. When the deputy later returned, he again ordered Kingsley to remove the paper. During morning rounds, another officer ordered Kingsley to remove the paper. Kingsley did not comply. Minutes later, an officer delivering Kingsley’s medication ordered Kingsley to remove the paper. After several requests, Kingsley still refused. Kingsley refused an order from the administrator, who said jail staff would remove the paper and would transfer Kingsley to another cell in the interim. Five officers arrived, ordered Kingsley to stand up and to back up to the door with his hands behind his back. After being warned to follow the order or be tasered, Kingsley continued to lie facedown on his bunk. The parties dispute what followed, but an officer applied a taser for five second. Kingsley was placed on a medical watch, but refused the attention of a nurse. Months later, Kingsley, pro se, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted partial summary judgment for the defendants; a claim of excessive force against two officers proceeded to trial, resulting in a verdict for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court conflated the standards for excessive force under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and wrongly instructed the jury to consider the defendants’ subjective intent. View "Kingsley v. Hendrickson" on Justia Law