Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, alleging claims of retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. Plaintiff also alleged that her employer and several managers retaliated against her in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 28 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court rejected the idea that the passage of a particular amount of time between protected activity and retaliation can bar the claim as a matter of law. In this case, plaintiff has offered evidence of other retaliatory behavior between her 2003 sexual harassment complaint and the 2006 reorganizations and demotion that bridged the gap between the two events, leaving the issues of causation for a jury. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for trial. View "Malin v. Hospira, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

CEnergy filed suit against Glenmore claiming a denial of its right under the Fourteenth Amendment to substantive due process and a violation of the town's state law obligation to deal in good faith. While CEnergy obtained a conditional use permit from Glenmore to develop a wind farm, the company failed to obtain required building permits in time to take advantage of a lucrative opportunity to sell electricity generated by wind turbines to a Wisconsin power company. The court concluded that the town board's decision to delay action on CEnergy's building permit requests could not have been arbitrary in the constitutional sense. Even if the board's treatment of the building permit applications had been arbitrary in the constitutional sense, CEnergy still would have failed to state a substantive due process claim where a plaintiff who ignores potential state law remedies cannot state a substantive due process claim based on a state-created property right. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "CEnergy-Glenmore Wind Farm #1 v. Town of Glenmore" on Justia Law

Hayssen and its employees were parties to a Plant Closing Agreement that promised medical benefits upon retirement. In 1996, Bemis acquired Hayssen and assumed its obligations. Bemis reduced benefits under the Agreement: increasing co-pays and deductibles and eliminating its prescription drug program. Former employees sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1132, and the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a). The court certified a class, but granted summary judgment to Bemis, reasoning that the Agreement did not establish a lifetime interest in a certain level of benefits. About a month later, Bemis eliminated all medical benefits under the Agreement. The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the parties intended to provide lifetime medical coverage. On remand, the court granted a preliminary injunction forcing Bemis to restore the benefits eliminated in 2009 and provide a basic Medicare Part D drug benefit. The court awarded fees and costs, finding that the company’s position was not substantially justified. The judge struck billing entries that were vague or for time not reasonably expended on the case, concluded that the lawyers’ billing rates were reasonable, and calculated the lodestar amount to reach an award of $403,053.75, for four years of advocacy, including an appeal and trial preparation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Temme v. Bemis Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Before entering his mother’s wedding reception, Miller smoked marijuana. At the reception, Miller drank three shots of vodka in an hour and a half. Miller then dropped off his girlfriend and went to a Kenosha bar. He smoked more marijuana and had three beers. He left for another bar, where he drank more beer, then bought a final Heineken for the road. He drove to a gas station to use a phone to call his girlfriend. At the same time, Kenosha police received a call about a stabbing that occurred two blocks away from the same gas station. Responding to an inquiry by Officer Gonzalez, Miller denied seeing anyone running. Gonzalez asked Miller his name. Miller, who was driving without a license and had been seen exiting his car with a beer, replied with the fake name. Miller admitted that he was on probation for burglary and disorderly conduct. Gonzalez told Miller, who was becoming increasingly fidgety and nervous, to take his hands out of his front pockets and not to run. Miller took off running with Gonzalez in pursuit. Another officer captured Miller, who was on the ground when Gonzalez jumped a fence and landed on him, breaking his jaw. The district court rejected Miller’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Miller, if believed, presented evidence from which a rational jury could determine that Gonzalez deliberately inflicted the blow that broke his jaw. View "Miller v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Albu, a Romanian citizen, applied for asylum in 2003. His application would have been deficient in a number of ways, but at the prompting of his attorney (who was subsequently convicted of asylum fraud) he engaged in deception, lying about religious persecution, his date of entry, and his home address. When his lies came to light, he was subject to 8 U.S.C. 1158(d)(6), which makes any person who files a frivolous asylum application permanently ineligible for any immigration benefits. He was placed in removal proceedings. Both the Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration Appeals applied the statutory bar and denied him cancellation of removal. The Seventh Circuit denied an appeal. View "Albu v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2003, Light was convicted in Minnesota district court of firearm possession by a felon. The presentence report suggested that Light was subject the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The PSR referred to two qualifying juvenile acts of violence and prior adult convictions for criminal vehicular operation resulting in substantial bodily harm, third-degree burglary, a third-degree controlled substances crime, and a felony conviction for fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle. The court used a guideline imprisonment range of 235 to 293 months, rather than the 120-150 months range without the ACCA enhancement. In sentencing Light to 235 months, the court did not specify which three convictions supported the armed career criminal designation. After unsuccessful direct appeal, Light filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition, challenging the use of the drug offense as a predicate offense. The court held that Light’s “criminal history include[d] a sufficient number of other predicate offenses to support an armed career criminal status without any reliance upon the objected to offense.” In 2008, the Supreme Court decided Begay v. United States, concluding that driving under the influence of alcohol is not a “violent felony” under the ACCA. The Eighth Circuit denied leave to file successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 petitions. He then filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in Indiana, where he is incarcerated, claiming that, under Begay, he was entitled to sentence reduction. The district court dismissed, stating that relief under section 2255 had been available to him and had not been “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Light v. Caraway" on Justia Law

Boley sought Social Security disability benefits. The agency denied her request initially and on reconsideration. A person dissatisfied with such a decision has 60 days to request a hearing. Boley took about nine months because SSA had notified Boley but not her lawyer (as required by 20 C.F.R.404.1715(a)). Boley was ill at the time, preparing for a double mastectomy, and did not know, until it was too late, that her lawyer was unaware of the decision. An ALJ dismissed an untimely hearing request, finding that Boley lacked “good cause” because she had received notice and could have filed a request herself. A district judge dismissed her petition for judicial review, based on 42 U.S.C. 05(g), which authorizes review of the agency’s final decisions made “after a hearing.” The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, with instructions to decide whether substantial evidence, and appropriate procedures, underlie the decision that Boley lacks “good cause” for her delay in seeking intra-agency review. In doing so, the court overruled its own precedent and noted a divide among the circuits. View "Boley v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Langenbach began stocking shelves for Wal-Mart in 1998. The next year, she was promoted. In 2001, she was again promoted. Langenbach was admitted to Wal-Mart’s Management-In-Training program in 2008. In her first evaluation as an Assistant Manager, she was rated as a “Solid Performer” with noted deficiencies. Later that year, Langenbach was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan. The PIP was never completed. Her managers did not hold the anticipated follow-up meetings. She later received a comment that she was not following management routines and frequently failed to complete her duties on time. At her 2010 review, Langenbach received a competency score of 2.63 out of 5 and a rating of “Development Needed,” noting specific issues. That month, Langenbach needed surgery and was granted leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. Her next evaluation assessed overall competency at 2.26 out of 5 and rated her as “Development Needed.” Langenbach was again placed on a Performance Improvement Plan. At three follow-up sessions, she was rated as “Below Expectations.” She was terminated five months after returning from leave. The district court rejected claims that Wal-Mart retaliated against her for exercising her FMLA rights and discriminated against her by delaying her promotion, paying her less than her male counterparts, and refusing to promote her further. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Langenbach v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2012 the Drug Enforcement Administration seized over $110,000 worth of smokable “incense products” from the Smoke Shop, a Delavan, Wisconsin retailer. At the time of seizure, the DEA believed that the incense products, which contained synthetic cannabinoids, were controlled substance analogues and illegal under federal drug laws. Smoke Shop sought return of its inventory in federal district court. Later, the substances in the incense products were scheduled by the Attorney General, rendering them contraband and eliminating Smoke Shop’s hopes of recovering the goods, so it brought a conversion action for damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The district court dismissed, finding that the government enjoyed sovereign immunity under the detained-goods exception to the FTCA, and, alternatively that Smoke Shop failed to exhaust its administrative remedies because it did not submit a claim for damages to either the DEA or the Department of Justice before filing suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on both grounds. View "Smoke Shop, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

Davis retained Fenton to represent her in a home foreclosure proceeding. Davis later sued Fenton for malpractice. Davis claimed that, although she paid Fenton several thousand dollars, he did virtually nothing to help her and that he targeted her for inferior service based on her race, in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601. That case is stayed pending arbitration. Fenton brought his own lawsuit in state court, against Davis’s lawyers: Dudley and Sidea, alleging that they intentionally spread false information about him to clients and business associates. Fenton also alleged that Sidea, who had previously worked at Fenton’s law office, had improperly obtained confidential information about Fenton’s clients and shared it with Dudley. The complaint claimed conversion, tortious interference with a business relationship, and defamation. Dudley and Sidea filed a notice of removal in federal court, citing the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1441, and the civil rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1443. Days later, despite the ongoing removal proceedings, the Cook County Court entered an ex parte preliminary injunction against Dudley and Sidea. The district court found that the case did not meet the removal requirements under either 28 U.S.C. 1441 or 1443 and remanded, The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Fenton v. Dudley" on Justia Law