Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Tian, a 48‐year old Chinese citizen, was admitted to the U.S.in 2001, on a non‐immigrant visa, to participate in an international exchange program. He overstayed and, in 2007, was questioned during an investigation of human trafficking. There were in no charges, but Tian was placed in removal hearings. While the matter was pending, Tian pled guilty to drawing and passing a check with intent to defraud and was ordered to pay $100,000 in restitution; his sentence was suspended. Tian sought asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture protection, asserting that, in 1989, he participated in demonstrations and was detained by the police for 10 days, repeatedly assaulted, and undressed and tied to a tree for an entire day. After his release Tian had report to the Public Security Bureau regularly. Tian asserted that he was demoted from being a hotel manager to being a kitchen helper, and that his wife divorced him, because of persecution for his participation in the prodemocracy movement. He claimed that he failed to timely apply for asylum because of “language barriers” and “ignorance of U.S. laws.” Tian did not have documentation of participation in the demonstration, or his detention, or of subsequent medical treatment. The IJ and BIA rejected his claims. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, the conclusion that Tian’s asylum application was time‐barred. Because Tian did not exhaust administrative remedies with regard to his CAT claim, the court denied that claim. Tian failed to establish eligibility for withholding of removal.View "Tian v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2008, Shields, an Illinois prisoner was lifting weights and ruptured the pectoralis tendon in his left shoulder. Although he received some medical attention, he did not receive the prompt surgery needed for effective treatment. Due to oversights and delays by those responsible for his medical care, too much time passed for surgery to do any good. He has serious and permanent impairment that could have been avoided. After his release from prison, Shields filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that several defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Shields was the victim not of any one person’s deliberate indifference, but of a system of medical care that diffused responsibility for his care to the point that no single individual was responsible for seeing that he timely received the care he needed. As a result, no one person can be held liable for any constitutional violation. Shields’ efforts to rely on state medical malpractice law against certain private defendants also failed. View "Shields v. IL Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Beginning in 2007, Mississippi Valley agreed to sell cattle to Swift, planning to fulfill that agreement in part with cattle it had received from J&R. Mississippi Valley was merely the holder of J&R’s cattle, not the purchaser or owner. Because the relationship between Swift and J&R had soured, Mississippi Valley did not inform Swift that some of the cattle were actually J&R’s. Swift paid for the purchases with checks made out to Mississippi Valley, which deposited the checks in its general operating account and periodically sent J&R checks for sales of J&R cattle. Mississippi Valley stopped making timely payments. As the debt mounted, J&R sent increasingly frantic demands for payment. Mississippi Valley sent seven checks to J&R totaling $862,747.31. Less than 90 days later, creditors filed an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition against Mississippi Valley. The bankruptcy trustee sought to avoid the seven payments as preferential transfers, 11 U.S.C. 547(b), but J&R argued that Mississippi Valley never had a property interest in the funds but only held the sale proceeds for J&R’s benefit. The bankruptcy court granted J&R summary judgment. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that it is unclear how much money could properly be traced to a constructive trust in favor of J&R.View "In re: MS Livestock, Inc." on Justia Law

Crompton began working as a railroad conductor for BNSF in 2001. In 2011, he was working on BNSF 5695, travelling from Paducah, Kentucky, to Centralia, Illinois. Before the train departed on the day at issue, a BNSF engineer performed the required daily inspection and found no defects with the locomotive, including its doors and latches. During the trip, Crompton exited the front cab door several times, and found nothing wrong with the door or its latch. As the train approached Neilson Junction, traveling downhill, Crompton exited the front cab door to throw a switch. He claims that he closed and latched the front cab door before he stepped out onto the platform. The door remained closed for 51 seconds, and then suddenly flew open, knocking Crompton off the train. He suffered injuries to his head, neck, and back. He sued under the Federal Employment Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51-60 and the Locomotive Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. 20701, claiming that BNSF failed to keep the locomotive and its parts in good working order, and that he was injured due to BNSF’s negligence. A jury awarded damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to establish negligence.View "Crompton v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

McMillan, a law student, posted an ad on craigslist entitled “sell me your teenage daughter” that solicited sexual acts for pay. Investigator Andrews of the Benton, Illinois, police department saw the ad while working undercover online and began to correspond with McMillan about a fictional teenager who was willing to engage in sex. Andrews and a state employee, playing the role of his daughter, met McMillan at a theater, where McMillan requested nude pictures. A search of his computer revealed other, similar correspondence. McMillan was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), which prohibits knowingly persuading or enticing a person under the age of 18 to engage in criminal sexual activity. He was convicted and sentenced to 132 months’ imprisonment, five years’ supervised release, and a $500 fine. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the court erred in admitting certain evidence. The district court erred by failing to evaluate some of the evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, but any error was harmless. View "United States v. McMillan" on Justia Law

L has lived in the U.S. since 1987 and was a victim of armed kidnapping and sexual assault, in 2006, because of her brother-in-law’s drug dealings. Drugs were subsequently found in her garage and, although she accepted a plea agreement to get probation and remain with her four children (U.S. citizens), she maintains that she was not involved in the drug trade. L applied for a U Visa under the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, 114 Stat. 1464 to forestall her impending removal. The decision whether to grant a U Visa to a crime victim who is otherwise ineligible for admission is discretionary and is exercised through USCIS, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(U). USCIS refused to waive her inadmissibility stemming from her uninspected entry and drug conviction. Facing certain removal, she asked the Immigration Judge to determine independently whether to waive her inadmissibility. The IJ declined and found that USCIS alone had jurisdiction to provide a waiver. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit remanded to the IJ with instructions to consider the waiver request under 8 U.S.C. 1182, noting that ambiguities in the “labyrinthine statutory structure” should be resolved in favor of the alien. View "L. D. G. v. Holder." on Justia Law

Lewis was injured in an automobile accident and her health plan paid $180,000 for her medical treatment Lewis filed a tort suit against the driver (her son-in-law), represented by Georgia lawyer Lashgari, and obtained a $500,000 settlement. Lashgari knew the plan had a subrogation lien, but split the proceeds between himself and Lewis. He claimed that the plan was owed nothing. The plan filed suit under ERISA to enforce the lien, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3). The defendants argued that because the settlement funds have been dissipated, the suit was actually for damages, not authorized by ERISA. The district judge ordered the defendants to place $180,000 in Lashgari’s trust account pending judgment. The defendants did not comply. A year later, the defendants having neither placed any money in a trust account nor produced any evidence of their inability to pay, the judge held them in civil contempt, ordered them to produce records that would establish their financial situations, and ordered Lashgari to documents relating to the contempt to the General Counsel of the State Bar for possible disciplinary proceedings against him. The defendants appealed the contempt order. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, characterizing the appeal as frivolous and the defendants’ conduct as outrageous. View "Cent. States, SE & SW Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Beard pleaded guilty in 2005 to possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Because the offense involved at least 50 grams, he was sentenced to the statutory minimum of 10 years. In 2008, after the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowered offense levels for most crack crimes, Beard requested a reduced sentence under U.S.S.G. 3582(c)(2). The district court denied relief because Beard had been sentenced to a statutorily mandated period that had not changed. In 2012 Beard again sought a reduced sentence, based on the Fair Sentencing Act, which increased the threshold amount of crack necessary to trigger section 841(b)(1)’s enhanced sentences, along with retroactive implementing amendments to the guidelines. The district court denied the motion, stating that FSA relief was foreclosed by Seventh Circuit precedent holding that sentence reduction under 3582(c)(2) is not a form of resentencing that allows a defendant to take advantage of post-sentencing changes in the law, such as the FSA; the retroactive guidelines amendments, although intended to benefit even defendants sentenced before enactment of the FSA, could not help a person like Beard because his sentence was dictated by the statutory minimum. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first noting that the appeal was timely only as to Beard’s motion to reconsider. The district court lacked authority to order the relief sought. View "United States v. Beard" on Justia Law

Aljabri, born in Jordan, married a U.S. citizen in 1997 and became a lawful permanent resident in 2000. In 2003, he sought naturalization under 8 U.S.C. 1430. USCIS conducted an interview and then delayed for nine years. In 2007 Aljabri was convicted of wire fraud, money laundering, and structuring transactions not to trigger financial institution reporting requirements. He was sentenced to 84 months in prison. In 2008 DHS alleged that Aljabri was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), having been convicted of a crime causing victims a loss of more than $10,000. He was ordered removed in absentia. He filed suit, asking the district court either to naturalize him or declare him a U.S. citizen based on the still-pending 2003 application. The district court held that it lacked subject‐matter jurisdiction and dismissed in January, 2012. On May 3, 2012, USCIS denied the naturalization petition, stating that the final order of removal meant that he was no longer a lawful permanent resident and only permanent residents can be naturalized and that Aljabri could not demonstrate the good moral character necessary for naturalization. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court overlooked 8 U.S.C. 1447(b), which gives the court exclusive jurisdiction over the naturalization application until the matter is remanded to the agency. View "Aljabri v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 1984, Richardson was convicted of armed robbery and murder. A Chicago Police Department firearms examiner testified that rounds fired at the scenes of two 1980 Chicago shootings came from the same gun, and eyewitnesses from both scenes identified Richardson as the gunman. The court sentenced Richardson to death. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed without addressing any jury selection issues, although the U.S. Supreme Court had decided Batson in the interim. In post-conviction proceedings, the state lower court found that Richardson had not made out a prima facie case of discriminatory jury selection and that counsel was not ineffective. The Illinois Supreme Court found that Richardson had waived the Batson claim. After a remand, the federal district court granted habeas corpus on the Batson claim. “Other crimes evidence” and ineffective-assistance claims were denied. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to the state’s use of peremptory strikes, finding the claim had been waived. Richardson’s judge conducted voir dire and did not allow the parties to question members of the venire. The judge excused, for cause, 24 of 61 persons questioned. Richardson used 20 peremptory challenges. The state used 16. Richardson did not object to the prosecution’s use of peremptories. The court affirmed rejection of the ineffective assistance claim.View "Richardson v. Hardy" on Justia Law