Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hicks led a large organization that distributed crack cocaine in Chicago. He oversaw acquisition, processing, and packaging with help from Coprich, Williams, and others. Once processing was complete, Hicks sold the cocaine to distributors, including Long and Island. Hicks often sold drugs to his distributors on credit. The government wiretapped phone conversations between members of the conspiracy and trial evidence also included testimony from participants in Hicks’s organization, including Masuca, Hicks’s former right-hand man, and Williams, Hicks’s former girlfriend. Masuca testified that Long and Island were only customers of the conspiracy, not members of it. The government presented Masuca’s handwritten ledger, which listed the organization’s drug deals over a few months in 2008. The jury convicted the five defendants of conspiracy with intent to distribute over 50 grams of crack cocaine and other offenses. The judge declined to apply the Fair Sentencing Act’s higher quantity thresholds for mandatory minimum sentences and concluded that facts neither included in the indictment nor found by a jury could trigger an increased mandatory minimum sentence. The Seventh Circuit rejected all challenges except relating to application of the Fair Sentencing Act. View "United States v. Long" on Justia Law

Reid and Sears were at-will employees at NACA, a national not-for-profit corporation that helps potential homeowners facing discriminatory or predatory lending. As mortgage consultants, they were licensed under 12 U.S.C. 5103. NACA had a Document Security Policy that required employees to scan documents into a secure digital system and shred the paper originals to protect the client’s information. Paper client files were not to be kept. The policy had been emailed to managers, but it was not enforced in the Chicago office. While working for NACA, Reid and Sears made complaints about NACA’s business practices relating to minimum wage and overtime, as well as violations of state and federal law in handling mortgage applications. At least four other individuals complained about minimum wage and overtime pay, and at least five others complained about splitting commissions between licensed and unlicensed mortgage consultants. None of the others were fired. After a regional manager discovered violations of the file policy during a visit, Reid and Sears were fired. The district court granted NACA summary judgment, finding that they had not offered sufficient evidence that they were discharged in retaliation for their complaints. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Reid v. Neighborhood Assistance Corp. of Am." on Justia Law

Jyotsnaben Patel was admitted to the U.S. in 1992 as a nonimmigrant visitor; her husband, Pravin, entered illegally six months later. They applied for asylum and were charged with removability: Jyotsnaben because she had overstayed her visa, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B), and Pravin under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(I). An immigration judge found them not credible, denied the applications, and granted voluntary departure. The Patels failed to comply, which rendered them inadmissible for 10 years, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A). With no brief on file, the BIA dismissed an appeal in 2004 and ordered them to leave within 30 days. Still in the U.S. seven years later, they sought to stay removal for humanitarian reasons. ICE granted their application permitting them to remain for one year. Instead of seeking to adjust status, the Patels moved to reopen the removal proceedings in May 2013, so that they could seek government consent to have the proceedings administratively closed. After that, the Patels believed, they could seek a provisional waiver of inadmissibility on the basis of their citizen-daughter, then travel abroad to apply for a visa to return legally. DHS opposed and the BIA denied the motion, as filed after the 90-day period for motions to reopen. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. View "Patel v. Holder" on Justia Law

Malone owned a cattle feedlot. He cared for cattle, including some owned by GLS, and worked as an agent of GLS to buy cattle. Anderson was president of GLS, which was owned by others. GLS’s cattle were collateral for its loans. In 2008, the feedlot started losing money, jeopardizing Malone’s business and GLS’s loans. Malone and Anderson began kiting checks; one would write a check to the other, and before it was collected, the other would write a check back to the first. Malone was overdrawn by $400,000 in 2009. Malone and Anderson arranged to sell O’Hern 700 cattle. O’Hern paid $400,000, which Malone deposited to his overdrawn bank account. In reality, there were no cattle. Malone gave O’Hern $115,000. Unsatisfied, O’Hern visited the feedlot and removed cattle that did not belong to Malone; obtained liens on property owned by Malone and Anderson; and filed a state court civil suit. Malone pled guilty to bank fraud and money laundering. He urged the district judge to refrain from ordering restitution, arguing that O’Hern had already received full recovery and that the judge exercise her discretion under 18 U.S.C. 3663A(c)(3)(B), because the need to compensate O’Hern was outweighed by the burden of determining complex issues regarding his losses. The judge imposed restitution of $285,000, stating that she had no discretion under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the award as supported by the preponderance of the evidence regarding O’Hern’s loss and the cash returned to him, the only relevant factors. It would have been error for the judge to consider other amounts O’Hern may be adjudged to owe Malone or Anderson in the state court litigation. View "United States v. Malone" on Justia Law

A business that manages commercial real estate and its owners were sued in a purported class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, for having paid a “fax blaster” (Business to Business Solutions) to send unsolicited fax advertisements. Aggregate statutory damages would be more than $5 million or, if the violation is determined to be willful or knowing, as much as three times greater. The Seventh Circuit denied leave to appeal class certification in the suit, which is more than five years old. The court noted that it had no knowledge of the value of the defendant-business and that, even if the defendants could prove that they will be forced to settle unless class certification is reversed, they would have to demonstrate a significant probability that the order was erroneous. Rejecting challenges concerning individual class members, the court noted that no monetary loss or injury need be shown to entitle junk‐fax recipient to statutory damages. The adequacy of the class representative was not challenged. View "Wagener Equities, Inc. v. Chapman" on Justia Law

As a mortgage broker, Chandler was able to falsify documents, close fraudulent loans, and judge what a house would appraise for after cosmetic work. In 2005, Causey and Rainey founded a construction company to make minimal changes to houses. They recruited real estate novices to buy houses. Chandler would fill out a mortgage application, falsifying income, down payments and other information to make the buyer a viable loan candidate. She would order appraisals, title work and pre‐approval from the lender. A “trainee” appraiser reported a greatly inflated price. Chandler gave false information to the lenders on HUD‐1 statements. Chandler made up false construction invoices for the remainder of the loan after expenses were paid. Before the participants were arrested, they had executed the mortgage scheme 25 times. Causey, the only co‐conspirator who did not plead guilty, was convicted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court improperly admitted prejudicial photographs taken of the houses around the time of trial rather than at the time of the sale and evidence of a fraudulent sale that took place outside of the conspiracy. A defense witness’s testimony was properly excluded as undisclosed expert testimony. The court also upheld admission of testimony by a co-conspirator and a two‐level sentencing enhancement for being an “organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor.”View "United States v. Causey" on Justia Law

Carmody worked for the University of Illinois for 25 years until he was fired for reasons involving a security breach of the university’s email system. The breach was connected to a state court lawsuit Carmody was pursuing against a university professor, alleging that the professor had assaulted him. Carmody says that he discovered several printed emails, contradicting affidavits filed in the case, in the newspaper box outside his home. Carmody gave the emails to his lawyer. After unsuccessfully appealing his discharge, Carmody filed, claiming violations of the Due Process Clause and an Illinois statute designed to protect whistle-blowers. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, stating that Carmody has plausibly alleged that his pre-termination opportunity to be heard was meaningless because he could not answer the university’s crucial questions or respond to its accusations without violating a state court order that required him not to discuss the subject. The university fired Carmody on the same day the state court modified its order to allow him to respond to the charges. Carmody also alleged that he was actually fired based in part on a charge for which he had no prior notice and opportunity to be heard. View "Carmody v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of IL" on Justia Law

Sandoval, a Mexican citizen, illegally entered the U.S. in the 1990s. After five illegal reentries and removals, Sandoval again attempted to re-enter and, in 2005, was convicted of attempted illegal entry by means of false misrepresentation. He was removed again. Sandoval illegally re-entered and was arrested after providing a false name during a traffic stop. He was removed, but re-entered in 2006. In 2009, Sandoval met Quinonez at a truck stop to purchase 20 kilograms of cocaine that he believed Quinonez had transported from Texas. Sandoval gave Quinonez $500 for fuel and said that he would pay $300,000 for the cocaine the next day. Quinonez was actually cooperating with law enforcement and the meeting was surreptitiously recorded. After Sandoval took the sham cocaine, law enforcement stopped his vehicle. A search revealed cocaine as well as the bags full of sham cocaine. Sandoval denied knowing what was inside the bags. Sandoval was charged with attempted possession of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841, 846. He gave a false name and continued to invoke the alias at his pretrial services interview, initial appearance, and other court proceedings. The district court granted Sandoval bond and released him on his own recognizance. When the government learned his true identity he was taken into custody. He eventually changed his story and entered a plea. The district court imposed an obstruction of justice enhancement, denied credit for acceptance of responsibility, and denied safety-valve relief from the statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Sandoval" on Justia Law

Grady told Wolf that he wanted to blow up a Planned Parenthood clinic, then drove to a gas station and put some gas in his van and a smaller amount in a bottle. He drove to the clinic, broke a window with a hammer, poured gasoline into the building, and set it on fire. After seeing news reports of the fire, Wolf informed police that Grady may have been responsible. The police questioned Grady in a videotaped interview. Grady admitted that his “intention was to light the building,” and that he told friends that “I thought it f... burned right down.” Grady was charged with arson and intentionally damaging the property of a facility providing reproductive health services. At trial, Grady reiterated his desire to burn the clinic and referred to his anti-abortion views. The parties disputed how to define the term “maliciously” under 18 U.S.C. 844(i) for jury instructions. Neither the Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions nor the court has defined the term. The district court used the government’s definition, explaining that Grady’s proposed instruction would shift the burden to the government to prove that the defendant acted without justification. The jury found Grady guilty. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court’s decision to omit the words “without just cause or reason” from the instruction was supported by the record. A jury instruction should address an issue reasonably raised by the evidence. Grady did not point to any cognizable legal justification for starting the fire. View "United States v. Grady" on Justia Law

Motorola and its foreign subsidiaries buy LCD panels and incorporate them into cellphones. They alleged that foreign LCD panel manufacturers violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, by fixing prices. Only about one percent of the panels were bought by Motorola in the U.S. The other 99 percent were bought by, paid for, and delivered to foreign subsidiaries; 42 percent of the panels were bought by subsidiaries and incorporated into products that were shipped to Motorola in the U.S. for resale. The other 57 percent were incorporated into products that were sold abroad and never became U.S. domestic commerce, subject to the Sherman Act. The district judge ruled that Motorola’s claim regarding the 42 percent was barred by 15 U.S.C. 6a(1)(A): the Act “shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that rampant extraterritorial application of U.S. law “creates a serious risk of interference with a foreign nation’s ability independently to regulate its own commercial affairs.” View "Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp." on Justia Law