Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bryn Mawr Chicago nursing home, a Medicaid provider, is subject to Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH) inspections. In 2010, IDPH inspected the facility following allegations that a resident had been sexually assaulted. Bryn Mawr was eventually cited for three deficiencies, 42 C.F.R. 488.301, two based on sexual abuse and one based on failure to sufficiently monitor a resident. Bryn Mawr challenged the findings by Informal Dispute Resolution, which involved exchange of written information without a live hearing. IDPH simultaneously conducted internal review and found that the deficiencies based on allegations of sexual abuse were not sufficiently supported by credible evidence, but the third party upheld the deficiency findings. Ultimately IDPH maintained the deficiency findings. Meanwhile, Bryn Mawr also engaged in a parallel process to “correct” deficiencies. At the follow-up inspection, IDPH determined that the deficiencies had been corrected, so that remedies would not be imposed. IDPH passed the deficiency findings on to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, which published them on its website and factored them into its 5-Star Rating System. Bryn Mawr’s rating was supposed to fall from five to four stars because of the deficiencies, but CMS mistakenly reduced it to two stars. Regardless of a partial correction, Bryn Mawr was displeased that it had not had the opportunity to challenge the findings at a hearing and sued to compel a hearing. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Bryn Mawr Care, Inc. v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

May and Collier sold crack cocaine to an FBI informant three times. For each sale, May and the informant discussed quantity and price and May told the informant to pick up the cocaine at Collier’s house. May instructed Collier to accept payment and waited outside until each sale was complete. Collier turned the money over to May, who gave Collier a share but kept a larger portion for himself. May pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. The plea agreement noted that May satisfied four of five requirements for safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C. 3553(f), but noted the parties’ disagreement over whether May was an “organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor,” eligible for a two-level adjustment under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1. The probation officer argued for the safety-valve reduction, so that May would not be subject to the 10-year statutory minimum, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). The district court found that May held a supervisory role in the offense and applied the adjustment, holding that May did not qualify for the safety-valve provision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that May was a supervisor and rejecting an argument that the safety valve remains available to a defendant who supervised only one person. View "United States v. May" on Justia Law

Cabrera entered the U.S. without inspection in 2001. After a 2009 arrest, he applied for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1231 saying that he feared return to Mexico because of threats and mistreatment by his wife, who holds local office. Cabrera stated that he feared his wife would use political influence to have people cause him harm, including torture at the hands of Mexican law enforcement. He asserted membership in a particular social group: “individuals who face persecution by corrupt governmental and law enforcement authorities instigated by a politically connected spouse” and applied for protection under the Convention Against Torture. The immigration judge found his testimony credible but denied his applications, finding that Cabrera had not proposed a valid social group because he did not identify a shared characteristic aside from persecution and had not shown that he would be harmed based on his membership in that group. The judge concluded that his wife had “a personal vendetta” and that Cabrera could not show a likelihood of torture because he had not been injured and had not shown that his wife ever followed through on her threats. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied review. A “particular social group” must be linked by something more than persecution. Substantial evidence supports a conclusion that his wife tried to hurt Cabrera out of personal animosity. View "Ruiz-Cabrera v. Holder" on Justia Law

From 2008 to 2011, Valdovinos obtained cocaine from Mexico and delivered it to Gonzalez’s Chicago house. At Gonzalez’s direction, others picked up the cocaine, sold it, and returned to pay Valdovinos. In 2010 Gonzalez went to Mexico for six months and instructed Barahono, who primarily transported the cocaine, to work directly with Valdovinos. Officers stopped Barahono for a supposed traffic violation, searched the vehicle, and seized $205,000 in cash. Later traffic stops yielded $85,000 and $91,000. Valdovinos suspected that the reported seizures were a ruse hatched by Barahono and Gonzalez to keep the cash. He threatened them, but gave Gonzalez money to return to the U.S. All 23 co-conspirators were arrested in 2011. Valdovinos pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute cocaine and to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1). The presentence report recommended a three-level upward adjustment under Sentencing Guideline 3B1.1(b) on the ground that Valdovinos was a supervisor or manager. The judge found that he had exercised control and played an organizing role, based on transcripts of calls between Valdovinos and others, Barahono’s testimony that Valdovinos gave orders during Gonzalez’s absence, and on Valdovinos’s threats to his co-conspirators. The judge also applied a two-level upward adjustment for credible threats of violence, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(2), found that multiple threats warranted more, and imposed an above-guideline sentence of 327 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed application of the section 3B1.1 adjustment. View "United States v. Ruelas-Valdovino" on Justia Law

In 2007 Donelli’s family rented a house from the elderly Viguses. Donelli falsely told the Viguses that her minor daughter would receive a $750,000 settlement because of a car accident with an oil company employee. She persuaded them to “lend” her money 500 times, signing promissory notes for $443,000. Most was spent on vacations. None was reported to the IRS as income. The Viguses never saw any repayment. Donelli pled guilty to tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. 7201, and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The presentence report said that Donelli sought treatment for drug abuse in 2012 from a psychiatrist, who diagnosed Donelli with “Type II Bipolar Disorder.” The report included no further information about the illness or its impact on Donelli. The court adopted the report, including an uncontested guideline range of 41 to 51 months. Donelli did not submit a sentencing memorandum or any evidence. Donelli orally attributed her crime to her addiction to prescription opioids. The district judge acknowledged the reference to Donelli’s diagnosis of bipolar disorder and imposed a sentence of 60 months, stating that the guidelines did not “capture the extent of the harm here.” Donelli’s lawyer repeated that the guidelines already accounted for the nature of the harm, but did not object to the sufficiency of the court’s explanation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Donelli failed to present her diagnosis as a principal argument in mitigation and waived her claim of a Cunningham procedural error by stating that she had no objection apart from the sentence being above the guideline range. View "United States v. Donelli" on Justia Law

In the 1990s, Specht founded Android Data Corporation, and registered the “Android Data” trademark. The company ceased principal operations in 2002, but the mark remained registered to it. Five years later, Google Inc. introduced its new Android operating system for mobile phones. Specht sued for infringement. Google counterclaimed that Specht had abandoned the mark after 2002, forfeiting his ability to assert rights to it. The district court entered summary judgment for Google. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the undisputed evidence established that Specht abandoned the mark. View "Specht v. Google Inc." on Justia Law

An inmate challenged his conviction, alleging that he was made to wear visible shackles at trial. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial, reasoning that the “sight of a shackled litigant is apt to make jurors think they’re dealing with a mad dog.” There was no indication that other methods of security or concealment would have been infeasible or that the inmate is so violent that he had to be manacled at all. His handcuffs were removed, without incident, when he testified. The “curative instruction” that the judge failed to give would not have eliminated the prejudice arising from the visible manacles, the prison uniforms, and the guards’ uniforms. View "Maus v. Baker" on Justia Law

More than 10 years ago, Vitrano pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon and possessing a firearm while subject to a domestic abuse injunction and was sentenced to 30 years in prison under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), because he had prior convictions for escape and reckless endangerment. In 2008, Vitrano sought a sentence reduction under 28 U.S.C. 2255, because his business partner, Valona, had allegedly found a discharge certificate relating to his 1977 conviction for reckless endangerment, which would have purged that conviction from Vitrano’s criminal history for ACCA purposes. The certificate was not valid. After determining that the certificate was fake, the government charged Vitrano with perjury, 18 U.S.C. 1623(a), attempting to corruptly influence official proceedings, 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2), and threatening a witness, 18 U.S.C. 1512(b)(1). The government presented Valona’s testimony and played two phone calls Vitrano made to Valona from prison. The court ruled the calls admissible, finding that there had been enough testimony to establish that they were Vitrano’s calls and Vitrano was convicted on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a Confrontation Clause challenge. View "United States v. Vitrano" on Justia Law

After she was unable to sell her Henderson, Kentucky house, Hargis solicited Vashaun to burn it down for a payment of $10,000, so that she could collect a settlement from her insurance company. White burned down the house in December 2007, and both were charged with conspiracy to use fire to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 844(m), and unlawful structuring of cash withdrawals, 31 U.S.C. 5313, 5324(a)(3), 5322(a). After first denying her involvement, Hargis pleaded guilty to conspiracy in exchange for the government dismissing the structuring charge. The district court imposed an above-guidelines sentence of 60 months imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court erred when it applied upward adjustments for obstruction of justice, U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, and her aggravating role in the offense, View "United States v. Hargis" on Justia Law

Davis, in prison following a guilty plea, sought federal collateral relief more than a year had expired, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d) had expired. He claimed equitable tolling, asserting that his mental limitations excused untimely filing. A magistrate judge found that ability to make such a motion indicated mental competence. The Seventh Circuit vacated, referring to “Catch 22” reasoning and noting that someone else may have drafted and mailed the motion. Davis claimed that a fellow prisoner had done so. Mental incompetence can support tolling of federal statutes of limitations; the likelihood that mentally marginal prisoners will lack the assistance of guardians or lawyers means that, for them, such tolling is especially important. Something more than general inability to cope with legal matters is required, such as inability to understand the charges and assist in one’s own defense. The court declined to limit the range of possibilities, but noted that a report prepared by Wisconsin’s prison system concluded that he has an IQ of 49, is illiterate and uneducable, and cannot cope with any legal subject. The court remanded to allow the district court can take evidence and determine Davis’s abilities. View "Davis v. Foster" on Justia Law