Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1983, Birkelbach founded Birkelbach Investment Securities (BIS) and served as its president. Birkelbach was registered as a general securities representative and principal, a municipal securities representative and principal, an options principal, and a financial and operations principal. Birckelbach supervised Murphy’s control of one account held by an unsophisticated investor with assets of $1.7 million, while Murphy generated more than a million dollars in commissions, incurred substantial losses, and engaged in transactions that were not part of the investor-authorized strategy. The investor was unable to understand her statements, many of which included errors that overvalued the account. Lowry similarly mishandled, and Birkelbach supervised, the management of the smaller account of a college student/member of the U.S. military. Birkelbach knew that Murphy had been previously censured, suspended, and fined by the Chicago Board Options Exchange, for trading without authorization and had a history of customer complaints. Birkelbach also had a previous disciplinary history. He had been sanctioned by the Illinois Securities Department and, in 2005, additional supervision of Murphy had been requested by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), a self-regulatory organization formed under the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78o-3. Birkelbach did not do so. After FINRA investigated BIS and recommended sanctions, the Securities and Exchange Commission barred Birkelbach from participation in the securities industry for life. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, rejecting arguments that the original disciplinary complaint was untimely and the lifetime bar was an excessive punishment.View "Birkelbach v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Until the early 1970s, CBS (formerly Westinghouse) manufactured electrical capacitors at a Bloomington plant, using insulating fluid containing PCBs, which are carcinogens to humans and wildlife. CBS deposited defective capacitors at landfills where PCBs escaped and entered the environment and discharged PCB-laden water to a local sewage treatment plant. After PCB contamination was discovered and traced to six sites, federal, state, and municipal governments filed a Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9600, enforcement action, which resulted in a 1985 consent decree requiring CBS to dig up all PCB-contaminated materials at the sites and destroy them in a high-temperature incinerator. The Indiana legislature blocked the plan. The parties agreed on modified remedies for three sites but were unable to agree on remedies for the Lemon and Neal Landfills and Bennett’s Dump, all on CERCLA’s National Priorities List. The parties negotiated in stages to allow clean up to begin before resolution of all issues and established three phases. Stage 1 required CBS to remove sediment from the landfill contamination hot spots, to clean sediment at Bennett’s Dump to “industrial standards,” and to install caps at all three sites. After CBS completed Stage 1 in 2000, tests showed that PCBs had migrated into the bedrock and were still being released from into water and sediment. Stages 2 and 3 address current and future contamination of groundwater and sediment. In 2009 the district court approved a consent amendment in the ongoing CERCLA action and rejected citizens’ claims with respect to phases two and three. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Section 113(h)(4) prevents the courts from reviewing claims about stages in progress, but does not bar judicial review of claims about the first remedial stage that are not affected by continuing clean-up efforts.View "Frey v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

Olson shared a cell with Russell for about a week in 2007. Olson approached Sergeant Schneider and stated: “[M]y celly, Russell, has twice tried to swing off on me and I want him moved … I fear he’s gonna try to do it again … he isn’t taking his meds and hears voices that tell him to attack people.” Schneider asked other officers about Russell, but nobody had heard of any problems or of any issues with Russell’s medication. Schneider asked the officer supervising distribution to be sure Russell took his medication. The next evening Russell attacked Olson, damaging one of Olson’s teeth. The nurse on duty recommended that the tooth be pulled, but about a month passed before Olson saw a dentist. Olson filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 lawsuit, alleging deliberate indifference to the risk of an attack by Russell and to his dental needs. The district court declined to appoint counsel, finding that Olson was a competent pro se litigant and that his claims were not complex, and ultimately granted summary judgment against Olson on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that there was no evidence that Schneider was subjectively aware that Russell was dangerous or that the staff failed to act promptly once aware of Olson’s serious medical needs.View "Olson v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Haldar, an Indian citizen, came to the U.S. in 1999 and has been a permanent resident since 2006. He founded GVS-Milwaukee, a Hare Krishna religious society and, from 2004 to 2007, GVS sponsored 25 applicants for religious-worker “R-1 visas,” 8 C.F.R. 214.2(r)(1), 17 of which were approved. In 2007 the State Department advised the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that GVS-Milwaukee might be involved in visa fraud. DHS also received a similar anonymous tip and began an investigation that included temple visits, surveillance, searches of Haldar’s luggage on international trips, and interviews with GVS-sponsored visa recipients. In 2010 Haldar was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. under 18 U.S.C. 371. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments (not raised in the district court) that certain statements from the prosecutor and a government witness improperly called into question the validity of his temple and were unfairly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403; the prosecutor misrepresented testimony during his closing argument and relied on facts outside the record; and the district court on its own initiative should have instructed the jury not to scrutinize the religious qualifications of the visa recipients. View "United States v. Haldar" on Justia Law

A 13-year-old girl reported that she had been molested by Carroll, her father’s co-worker, when she was eight years old. Detective Spivey presented a search warrant affidavit in which he explained his 16 years of experience; that child pornography collectors retain their collections because the images supply sexual gratification, are difficult to obtain, and are used to obtain new images, so that it is common to find discarded or outdated computers; and that deleted images may be retrieved years later. The victim reported that Carroll had touched her in a sexual way and shown her sexual images of younger children on his camera. She believed he had taken pictures of her bare genitalia. She did not open her eyes, but Carroll and her father were the only adults in the residence and Carroll was a professional photographer. The father indicated that Carroll took his camera from the office to his residence on a daily basis and used electronic devices in conjunction with one another. The judge found probable cause and issued the warrant. Analysis of Carroll’s computer and other digital media found in his residence revealed numerous images of the victim in various states of undress engaged in sexually explicit conduct. During the search Carroll made incriminating statements. Carroll unsuccessfully moved to suppress, arguing that the information in Spivey’s affidavit was stale. He then pled guilty to possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B), and six counts of sexual exploitation of a child, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and was sentenced to 360 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Carroll" on Justia Law

The underlying suit began 28 years ago and has been to the Supreme Court three times. Defendants who did not settle prevailed and applied for costs under 28 U.S.C. 1920 and were awarded most of what they sought after a district judge held the request under advisement for three years and then retired. The newly assigned judge awarded $63,391.45, less than $2,300 per year of litigation. On appeal, plaintiffs claimed that the defendants took too long to request costs; did not establish that transcripts and copies were “necessarily obtained for use in the case” under 28 U.S.C. 1920; and did not nudge the original judge to rule before he retired. The Seventh Circuit rejected the arguments, stating that the obligation to render timely rulings rests on the judiciary, not the parties. “This litigation has lasted far too long. At last it is over.” View "Nat'l Org. for Women v. Scheidler" on Justia Law

Lee was convicted of first-degree reckless homicide plus two counts of armed robbery, based on evidence that he and Thomas traveled to Meyers’s residence in Oshkosh, to collect a drug debt. Four people were present when they arrived: Meyers’s half-brother Johnston, Meyers’s friend Paez and her two-year-old daughter, and Meyers. A fight broke out; Lee pulled a gun and fatally shot Meyers in the abdomen. Lee and Thomas left the apartment and drove to Milwaukee where they met with Johnson. Johnson drove them to a gas station and then dropped Lee off at a street corner. Shortly thereafter, Johnson and Thomas were pulled over by Milwaukee police and arrested. Lee was apprehended in Chicago a month later. Lee’s conviction was affirmed by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. State courts denied post-conviction relief. The federal district court denied habeas corpus relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that an in-court identification of Lee violated his rights to due process and that admission of an out-of-court statement at trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. An adequate and independent state ground precluded consideration of Lee’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Lee v. Baenen" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs invested $3 million in a multi‐use real‐estate project in Caseyville, Illinois, called Forest Lake, having previously worked with the developers. Their agreement with the developers promised a first‐priority mortgage, but they received only a junior mortgage. Meridian Bank had acquired a mortgage on Forest Lakes ($20 million) in 2005. When the bank foreclosed in 2009, the plaintiffs lost everything. They sued Belco, which had been created to carry out title work for the Forest Lakes transactions, including the Meridian mortgage. None of the plaintiffs’ $3 million were ever escrowed with Belco, but went directly to the developer. Belco never contacted the plaintiffs, before, during, or after the closing. After the development failed, the plaintiffs alleged Illinois state‐law claims of breach of fiduciary duty against Belco, claiming that as the “closing agent” for the transaction, Belco owed a duty to disclose that they were not receiving the first‐priority mortgage. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment for Belco, finding that Belco was the plaintiffs’ agent for the purposes of the escrow and closing, but, under Illinois law, owed only the very limited duty “to act only according to the terms of the escrow instructions.” Belco complied with the terms of the escrow agreement in that the funds were disbursed according to the agreement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Edelman v. Belco Title & Escrow, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Candidates for Chicago mayor, city treasurer, or city clerk must submit signatures from 12,500 “legal voters of the city” to have their name printed on the ballot, 65 ILCS 20/21-28(b). This number is just under 1% of the 1.3 million registered Chicago voters. As a proportion of active voters, the number is higher. Candidates are advised to allow some margin for error, in case of challenges. They have 90 days in which to gather signatures. Voters may not sign more than one nominating petition for the same office in a single election cycle. Chicago’s most recent general election took place in February 2011; 20 candidates submitted petitions to run for mayor, including four of the plaintiffs. Only Walls gathered enough signatures to appear on the ballot. The plaintiffs challenged the 12,500-signature requirement. The district court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction. While an interlocutory appeal was pending Rahm Emanuel was elected mayor. Walls came in sixth. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. The plaintiffs amended their complaint to also challenge the 90-day limitation and the rule that a voter cannot sign more than one candidate’s petition in any election cycle. The district court concluded that their claims had been “soundly rejected by extensive Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent” and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Stone v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs for the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Macon runs group homes for disabled individuals and has a policy requiring any employee who “witnesses, is told of, or has reason to believe an incident of abuse or neglect … has occurred” to report the incident. A 2009 Illinois law requires a report to a state agency. Baker, hired in 1991, twice saw a coworker, Carter, use his finger to flick a resident’s neck. She told supervisors. A decade later state officials investigated allegations that Carter had abused the same resident. Cross, a 39-year-old caregiver, told investigators that she had seen the resident agitated and gesturing at his genitals after Carter had worked the overnight shift. Cross asked the resident “who did that to him,” but could not understand his answer. A week later, she overheard Carter state, “Yes, I pulled it,” and a month later, she saw the resident point to his genitals and toward Carter. Though Cross and Baker discussed Cross’s observations, Cross did not report. Baker and a third caregiver described seeing Carter flick the resident in the neck. The third caregiver told investigators that she had heard Carter “joking” about squeezing the resident’s testicles. The report concluded that the resident had been abused and recommended that Macon address the failure of the employees to comply state law. A disciplinary report for Cross observed that she had “direct evidence” of and “suspected” abuse. The report for Baker and the third worker found that each had been “an eyewitness” and failed to report. Macon fired Baker, age 56, and a 61-year-old caregiver, but suspended Cross for three days. Baker sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit reversed; a jury reasonably could find that Macon discriminated based on age by treating a younger employee more leniently.View "Baker v. Macon Res., Inc." on Justia Law