Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

According to the 2010 Census, Hazel Crest was 85.2% black and 10.2% white, but had no black supervisory police officers until 2005. Garofalo and Peers, both white, were sergeants on the police force and were among four front-runners considered for a deputy police chief position, which ultimately went to a black officer who was not one of those four candidates. They claimed that the village discriminated against them by promoting a black officer they contend is unqualified and sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, and under Illinois state law. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Garofalo and Peers failed to present sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that they were the object of unlawful discrimination. Defendants offered evidence that Garofalo suffered from a lack of leadership and deficiencies in decision-making abilities. Peers had a reputation for a “volatile and unstable personality,” and did not have the respect of the men he supervised. Garofalo and Peers did not present evidence to counter that explanation and permit a finding of pretext. View "Garofalo v. Vill. of Hazel Crest" on Justia Law

Trump Tower Chicago is a 92-story building with 486 residential condominium units, 339 hotel condominium units, retail space, a health club, ballrooms, meeting rooms, restaurants, a hair salon, and other facilities. When the owner of a hotel condominium unit is not occupying the unit, building management can rent it to a visitor; rental income is divided with the owner’s share credited against his annual maintenance fee. Plaintiff, an 80-year-old CPA and financial planner, agreed to buy two hotel condominium units in 2006 for $2.2 million. She bought them as an investment and already owned other investment condominium units, including a residential unit in Trump Tower Chicago. The agreement gave TrumpOrg “the right, in its sole and absolute discretion, to modify the Condominium Documents.” Plaintiff asked TrumpOrg to give her the right to terminate the agreement and get her deposit back if she disapproved of any such changes. TrumpOrg refused. Plaintiff signed the agreement, even though TrumpOrg had already made three changes. The next year, TrumpOrg made changes that greatly curtailed owners’ rights in the hotel facilities. Plaintiff refused to close. TrumpOrg did not seek to compel her to close, but did not return her down payment, $516,000 and canceled the purchase agreement. Plaintiff sought damages under the common law of contracts, the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, the Condominium Property Act, and Illinois Securities Law. The district court ruled in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Goldberg v. 401 N. Wabash Venture, L.L.C., " on Justia Law

The Chippewa County Highway Department employed Kvapil as a seasonal employee, 2006-2008. When he was hired, Kvapil completed a New Employee Orientation for Limited Term Employees Form that advised him of work rules. Kvapil acknowledged receiving the Employment Handbook by signing a receipt that stated that all county employees are employees at will; the Handbook also contained a provision entitled “At Will Employment.” Kvapil owns property in the Town of Wheaton, Chippewa County. From 2000 until 2008, Clary, the County Planning and Zoning Administrator, contacted Kvapil about Kvapil storing unlicensed and inoperable vehicles on that property. During the zoning dispute, Kvapil made threats of violence to Clary. After Kvapil failed to comply, a warrant issued and officers searched the Wheaton property. The county issued a citation. Kvapil visited the Planning and Zoning Department’s Office demanding documents and became hostile, tore up the warrant, threw it at Clary, and said “you’re going down.” After a series of emails discussing the county’s “zero tolerance policy towards any violence or threat,” Kvapil was suspended for one day. A letter notified Kvapil that further infractions would subject him to more severe discipline, including discharge. Subsequently, there was a report that Kvapil had run a private citizen off the road. After his termination, Kvapil filed suit, alleging a property interest in his seasonal work, absent commission of an infraction specified in the handbook. The district court rejected the argument. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Kvapil v. Chippewa Cnty." on Justia Law

Petty was arrested on the suspicion that he, along with another person, shot and killed Counsel and wounded two others. Petty was identified as the shooter and was indicted for murder, but was found not guilty. After his acquittal, Petty filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the city and individual Chicago Police Department officers arguing that the officers violated his due process rights by intentionally mishandling the shooting investigation and prosecuting him for murder based on falsified evidence. Petty alleged that officers held a witness, Tarver, in a room for more than 13 hours without food, water, or access to a bathroom until he implicated him. He also alleged that they concealed evidence and failed to disclose their misconduct in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The district court rejected the claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Petty was aware of the alleged misconduct before trial and had ample opportunity to make use of the information at trial. Petty’s “coerced evidence” claim was not cognizable under the Due Process Clause. Petty did not suffer a constitutional injury sufficient to support his claim that the city was liable for the officers’ conduct because it had a policy of detaining people believed to be witnesses for extended periods against their will. View "Petty v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Purham ran a crack cocaine distribution ring in Quincy, Illinois. With the help of his brother he continued to manage the conspiracy while incarcerated following a 2006 felon-in-possession conviction. Purham talked to Howard using the prison telephones, giving him advice on how to manage the conspiracy and avoid detection by the police. Federal agents charged both with conspiring to distribute crack cocaine, based in part on the brothers’ recorded phone calls. Purham pled guilty and was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence, finding that the district court clearly erred in including certain prior conduct as relevant conduct. While the government may well have evidence to establish a link between Purham’s 2008 drug transportation and the later distribution activity with which he was charged, it did not present that evidence. The court upheld a “leadership” enhancement. . View "United States v. Purham" on Justia Law

In 1996, Whitfield applied for an electrician position at Navistar’s plant. Navistar hired 16 electricians while Whitfield’s application was pending. The written job description required that an applicant have either eight years of experience or a journeyman card. Whitfield allegedly had nine years of experience, with four years in the U.S. Navy. A foreman interviewed Whitfield and stated he would hire him if the Union verified the required experience. The Union was allegedly unable to verify his experience through numerous employers, but did not consider Whitfield’s experience in the Navy. Whitfield continued to work elsewhere as an electrician and to provide additional references. In 1998, Whitfield obtained an IBEW card, so there was no doubt that he met the requirements. The Union cleared him for hire, and returned Whitfield’s file to the foreman, who opened his folder and saw that the word “black” written on the cover sheet. While the resubmitted application was pending, Navistar hired five white electricians. Whitfield was never formally rejected but in 1999 the foreman told him that Navistar would not allow him to hire Whitfield. At trial Navistar asserted errors in his resume and lack of PLC experience, an allegedly unstated qualification. In 2001 Whitfield and 26 others sued Navistar under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1). The district court certified the other plaintiffs’ hostile work environment class and ordered that Whitfield’s hiring discrimination claim remain part of the case for discovery, but separated his claim for trial. The hostile work environment action settled during trial. During joint discovery there was extensive evidence showing extreme racial hostility at the plant. At Whitfield’s 2012 trial, the court rejected his submission regarding evidence from the class trial and concluded that his evidence was insufficient to prove discrimination. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting an updated EEOC chart as clear and persuasive evidence that Whitfield was more qualified than many of the white electricians Navistar hired. View "Whitfield v. Int'l Truck & Engine Corp." on Justia Law

Volpendesto’s career in organized crime ended at the age of 87. Wheelchair-bound and in poor health, he was convicted of racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to commit arson, arson, and use of a destructive device in relation to a crime of violence for detonating a bomb in a business in an effort to maintain control over illegal gambling. He and his co-defendants were also responsible for the robbery of two jewelry stores. He was sentenced to prison and to pay $547,597 in restitution to victims. The court also imposed an order of forfeiture in the amount of $1,878,172 in favor of the government and authorized the United States to take over a residential property and all funds in Volpendesto’s name. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1963(l)(1), the order provided that anyone (other than Volpendesto) claiming an interest in the seized property could petition the court within 30 days. Volpendesto appealed, but died before his appeal was heard. The Seventh Circuit held that Volpendesto’s death mooted his case and that the criminal restitution order abated along with everything else covered by the judgment, but noted that victims may sue the estate. View "United States v. Volpendesto" on Justia Law

Clark committed six armed bank robberies in the Milwaukee area in 2008-2010. On October 8, 2010, Milwaukee police officers who knew that Clark was wanted attempted to pull him over. He fled and was apprehended after a two-mile vehicle chase. Four days later, he was charged in state court with the state felony of eluding an officer. That same day, federal authorities brought armed robbery charges against him in federal court for the last bank robbery, on August 18, 2010. A magistrate issued a warrant for Clark’s arrest. The FBI used that warrant to file a detainer with the Milwaukee Sheriff, who was holding Clark, who was convicted of the state offense and sentenced to seven months in jail on November 23, 2010. While he was incarcerated for that crime, a federal grand jury returned a 12-count indictment on February 8, 2011, charging him with armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. 2213(a) and (d)), and using a firearm in furtherance of an armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)). He was arraigned on February 25 and convicted on all counts and sentenced to an aggregate of 1,951 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of violations of the Speedy Trial Act and the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. View "United States v. Clark" on Justia Law

From 2005-2008, Arojojoye and seven codefendants operated an identity theft and bank fraud operation that resulted in over a million dollars in losses to financial institutions and adversely impacted people whose identities were stolen. Arojojoye acquired information, including social security numbers, and manufactured false identification documents and created fictitious businesses. He opened fraudulent credit card accounts and bank accounts, and completed fraudulent transactions. He bought valid credit card numbers from internet hackers and ran up fraudulent charges using credit card processing machines provided to him on the mistaken belief that he was operating legitimate businesses, created false invoices, and stole checks. Arojojoye was arrested after presenting a stolen credit card and fraudulent driver’s license to purchase money orders and prepaid phone cards at Wal‐Mart. An inventory search of his Mercedes produced voluminous evidence of fraud and identity theft. A grand jury returned a 42‐count indictment, Arojojoye pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1344 and to one count of aggravated identify theft under 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1). The district court imposed a below‐Guidelines sentence of 85 months’ imprisonment on the bank fraud count and 24 months on the identity theft count, to be served consecutively. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "United States v. Arojojoye" on Justia Law

A 2006 class action against Pella, a window manufacturer, alleged that certain windows had a design defect that allowed water to enter behind exterior aluminum cladding and damage the wooden frame and the house itself. The district judge certified a class for customers who had already replaced or repaired their windows, seeking damages and limited to six states, and another for those who had not, seeking only declaratory relief nationwide. Initially, there was one named plaintiff, Saltzman. His son-in-law, Weiss, was lead class counsel. Weiss is under investigation for multiple improprieties. The Seventh Circuit upheld the certifications. Class counsel negotiated a settlement in 2011 that directed Pella to pay $11 million in attorneys’ fees based on an assertion that the settlement was worth $90 million to the class. In 2013, before the deadline for filing claims, the district judge approved the settlement, which purports to bind a single nation-wide class of all owners of defective windows, whether or not they have replaced or repaired the windows. The agreement gave lead class counsel “sole discretion” to allocate attorneys’ fees; Weiss proposed to allocate 73 percent to his own firm. Weiss removed four original class representatives who opposed the settlement; their replacements joined Saltzman in supporting it. Named plaintiffs were each compensated $5,000 or $10,000 for their services, if they supported the settlement. Saltzman, as lead class representative, was to receive $10,000. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reversed, referring to “eight largely wasted years,” the need to remove Saltzman, Weiss, and Weiss’s firm as class representative and as class counsel, and to reinstate the four named plaintiffs. View "Riva v. Pella Corp." on Justia Law