Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wisconsin’s Door Peninsula Winery began selling a spiced apple wine called “Hallowine” in 1998. Sales were brisk, and Door Peninsula expanded operations to Illinois later that year. Illinois River Winery began selling its own Hallowine in 2005 and sought to register the Hallowine mark in 2006. Door Peninsula initiated opposition proceedings at the PTO. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ruled in its favor, finding that Door Peninsula had priority in the Hallowine mark. Illinois River continued to sell its Hallowine despite the ruling. Door Peninsula filed suit in 2012, asserting infringement of its common law trademark rights and infringement of unregistered marks under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Illinois River asserted 27 affirmative defenses. The district court granted summary judgment, dismissing Illinois River’s affirmative defenses and a finding that Illinois River was liable for trademark infringement damages in the amount of $508,864.26. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Illinois River only raised arguments that were not before the district court. View "C&N Corp. v. Kane" on Justia Law

In 2002, Alexander was 55 years old and weighed 138 pounds. He had a limp and suffered from emphysema. Jones was 33 years old and weighed 230 pounds. Jones and Harris were using crack cocaine at Alexander’s Indianapolis apartment when Alexander asked them to leave. Harris left. Harris later saw Jones carrying Alexander’s television. Jones sold the television. Police discovered Alexander’s body. After identifying Jones as the person last seen in Alexander’s apartment, police discovered that Jones was wanted on outstanding warrants. Jones was arrested and signed an advice and waiver of rights, and agreed to give police his clothing and shoes. He admitted that he had spent the weekend at Alexander’s apartment. Changing his story, he later stated that Alexander had given Jones his television in exchange for drugs; that Alexander became angry and came at him with a pocketknife; that he pushed Alexander; that Alexander’s head hit the wall; that Jones hit him in the head; that Alexander was unconscious; that Jones left; that he returned and took the television; and that he returned again and bound Alexander’s hands and feet. At trial, Jones’s counsel argued self-defense. Counsel did not move to suppress admission of Jones’s clothing, his admissions, or a laboratory report tying Jones’s clothing to the crime scene. The court entered a conviction for felony murder and sentenced Jones to 65 years’ imprisonment. Direct appeal, arguing insufficient evidence, was unsuccessful, as was a state petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance for failing to seek suppression of the clothing. A federal district court denied habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective under “Pirtle.”View "Jones v. Brown" on Justia Law

Freed and Weiss were the sole managing members of a legal practice, CLG. Freed claims to have provided CLG’s operating capital through loans of $12 million. Under the partnership agreement between the two, Freed was entitled to repayment before CLG could make distributions to other members. According to Freed, shortly after he received partial repayment from CLG in 2011, Weiss began taking steps to terminate Freed’s control of CLG and to create a new limited liability company without him, by moving CLG funds held by Chase into other accounts, to which Freed lacked access. Freed demanded that Chase freeze CLG accounts. Freed contends that Chase employees informed Weiss, who then removed all funds from Chase. Freed sued Weiss in state court, alleging improprieties primarily regarding access to records and funds, breach of fiduciary duties and of the partnership agreement, and seeking a declaration of voluntary termination of CLG. Weiss counterclaimed, seeking to expel Freed from CLG. Freed sued Chase claiming that Chase facilitated Weiss’s unauthorized transfer, tortious interference with contractual rights, and aiding Weiss’s breaches of fiduciary duties. The suit was removed to federal court and Chase brought third-party claims for indemnity or contribution. Freed filed suit in federal court against Weiss, his father, and CLG, asking the court to force CLG to purchase Freed’s distributional interest. The district court found that abstention in the federal court cases was proper and stayed both pending the outcome of the state court proceedings. The Seventh Circuit agreed.View "Freed v. Weiss" on Justia Law

After his transactions with a large-scale supplier of crack were witnessed and recorded by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, which was investigating the supplier, Goree admitted purchasing cocaine. He was convicted of conspiring to knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute less than 28 grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. The government presented “ample evidence” for a jury to conclude that Goree had conspired to purchase a considerable amount of crack cocaine with intent to distribute. View "United States v. Goree" on Justia Law

Officers Mitchell and Bowersock responded to a 911 call by Bumgarner late on a Saturday night in 2008. They learned that Bumgarner and Hawkins had been drinking and got into a heated argument. Hawkins was alleged to have a history of abusiveness, but that night’s argument was “verbal only.” Hawkins had locked Bumgarner out and her keys were in the residence. Bumgarner confirmed with Mitchell that she was not injured. Hawkins did not want to talk to the police. Mitchell prevented him from closing the door, entered his home, and refused to leave after Hawkins called his attorney. Hawkins did not comply with a demand to get off the phone and Bowersock told him he was under arrest, grabbed Hawkins’s left wrist while Mitchell grabbed Hawkins’s right wrist, resulting in a struggle on the floor. The state filed, but later dropped charges against Hawkins. Hawkins sued the officers, claiming that he needed surgery to remove a cyst from above his eye where he was injured and psychiatric counseling for the traumatic encounter. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the officers are liable to Hawkins as a matter of law for seizing him in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that on other counts, the court must determine whether his call to the attorney was a motivating factor in arresting Hawkins and whether probable cause existed to arrest Hawkins for disorderly conduct. View "Hawkins v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Farmer learned that a man (Allen), a casino employee, had used a company credit card without authorization. Using an alias, Farmer contacted Allen by cell phone and threatened to inform management unless Allen paid him. Farmer had a female acquaintance travel to Indiana to collect the extortion money. Allen contacted law enforcement. The female associate was apprehended. Farmer pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 1952(a)(3) and 875(d), by attempted extortion, using interstate communications. A presentence investigation report indicated that Farmer had a 2003 conviction for using interstate communications to transmit extortionate threats, three convictions for obtaining property by false pretenses (involving customers of his sports-schedule business), and a conviction for larceny. Neither the PSR nor any document disclosed proposed conditions of supervised release. Farmer was sentenced to incarceration for 22 months, plus three years of supervised release, with conditions that Farmer submit to the search of his person, vehicle, business, and residence, and property, including computer devices, and to the seizure of any contraband, and warn other occupants that the premises may be subject to searches. The prosecution suggested that Farmer be barred from self-employment during supervised release. Farmer’s counsel, objected that “I don’t think this Court should restrict his ability to earn a living. If he wants to be an entrepreneur and be in business for himself.” The district court overruled that objection and did not solicit objections to the other conditions. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that the search and self-employment conditions did not bear a reasonably direct relationship to the underlying crimes. View "United States v. Farmer" on Justia Law

Indiana pawnbrokers must obtain license from the state’s Department of Financial Institutions (DFI). Saalwaechter, owns Fares Pawn in Evansville, Indiana. He applied for a license in 2009, but DFI denied his application, citing concerns about previous operations on the property and about his store manager’s criminal history. The property has been used as a pawnshop for about 20 years, but different businesses with overlapping ownership. Saalwaechter received a license after he signed an agreement to comply with certain conditions, in particular not employing the manager. Saalwaechter sued DFI, alleging violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Saalwaechter did not contend that DFI treated him unfavorably on account of some identifiable characteristic, such as age, sex, or race, but that the state had singled him out for disparate treatment without a rational basis. The district court granted DFI summary judgment on the “class of one” claim, finding that no reasonable jury could conclude that DFI treated Saalwaechter differently from similarly situated applicants without a rational reason. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Fares Pawn, LLC v. IN Dep't of Fin. Insts." on Justia Law

In 2011, the Michigan City Area Schools hired Nichols as a temporary, substitute janitor. Nichols worked at Joy Elementary School without incident. He then went to Springfield Elementary School as a replacement until a permanent janitor could be found for a recently retired janitor. He claims that employees there spoke to him in a mocking tone, tried to entrap him into taking a purse because he is African-American, and acted in a “bullying” manner. Other employees claimed that they felt threatened by Nichols’s strange behavior, which included taking pictures of one of them. Nichols was told that the custodial position had been filled with a permanent employee and that they would call him if they needed his services, but they never did. Nichols filed a pro se complaint asserting racial harassment and discrimination. The district court granted Michigan City summary judgment, finding that the complained-of conduct did not give rise to Title VII liability. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Nichols v. MI City Plant Planning Dep't" on Justia Law

Groves was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of ammunition by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and the district court sentenced him to the statutory maximum of 240 months in prison, 120 months on each count, to run consecutively. The Seventh Circuit court affirmed in 2009. In 2011, Groves filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence (28 U.S.C. 2255). The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the Presentence Investigation Report’s characterization of his 1995 burglary conviction as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a), 4B1.2(a)(2) and “in failing to fulfill movant’s intention to plead guilty.” The court noted extensive evidence that Groves wanted to go to trial and looked at counsel’s performance “as a whole.” View "Groves v. United States" on Justia Law

Montanez sued the City of Chicago and Officers Fico and Simon, alleging that Fico used excessive force while arresting him for drinking on a public way and Simon failed to intervene. He sustained minor injuries and sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state-law. The state-law claims were dismissed as time-barred. The city conceded its obligation to indemnify, so the section 1983 claims proceeded to trial. Fico was found liable, Simon was cleared, and the jury awarded $1,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000 in punitive damages. Montanez’s lawyers submitted a bill for more than $426,000 in attorneys’ fees and about $6,500 in costs and expenses. The judge scrutinized the bill line-by-line, discounted entries where more than one partner oversaw the same activities, or where the lawyers researched or drafted motions that were never filed, excluded hours spent on a full-day mock trial and entries related to matters that were essentially administrative matters, and reduced the hourly billing rates. After these and other reductions, the final award of costs was $3,051.94 and the court awarded $108,350.87 in fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, referring to the city’s “scorched-earth” defense strategy and the need for trial judges to exercise their broad discretion to adjust bloated bills for attorney’s fees after the fact and case-management authority during the litigation. View "Montanez v. Simon" on Justia Law