Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Burzlaff bought a “Stallion” motorized tricycle from Thoroughbred Motorsports in 2009 for $35,000. When Burzlaff reported the first problems to Thoroughbred, the company instructed him to take his vehicle to a Ford dealer for warranty repairs. Burzlaff did so repeatedly. After the vehicle had been out of service for repairs for 71 days during the first year, Burzlaff demanded, under the Wisconsin Lemon Law, that Thoroughbred replace the vehicle or refund his purchase price. Thoroughbred refused. Further efforts to repair the vehicle at the Thoroughbred factory in Texas failed to correct the defects. Burzlaff sued Thoroughbred under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. 2301, and the Wisconsin Lemon Law, Wis. Stat. 218.0171. The district court awarded double damages plus costs and attorney fees for a total judgment of $95,000 under the more generous provisions of the state law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the jury instructions on the Lemon Law claim, the sufficiency of the evidence on that claim, and the submission of the Magnuson-Moss claim to the jury. View "Burzlaff v. Thoroughbred Motorsports Inc." on Justia Law

Yurt suffers from a psychotic disorder which causes him to experience auditory hallucinations and bouts of uncontrollable rage. He also has obsessive compulsive disorder, moderately severe chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and chronic bifrontal tension headaches. He has worked as a cook and a janitor, last working in May 2010, when he suffered a mental break and was terminated for threatening a coworker with a knife. He applied for Disability Insurance Benefits from the Social Security Administration, but an ALJ denied his application. The Appeals Council declined review. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, agreeing that the ALJ erred by failing to include many of his medical limitations in the hypothetical that she posed to the vocational expert. View "Yurt v. Colvin" on Justia Law

E.Y., a child, was diagnosed with diplegic cerebral palsy. His mother alleges that E.Y.’s illness resulted from medical malpractice by the federally-funded Friend Family Health Center, where she received her prenatal care, and the private University of Chicago Hospital, where she gave birth. Federal law makes a suit against the Center a suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) that had to be filed within the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b). The district court granted summary judgment for the government, finding that the suit was filed about two weeks too late. The mother argued that although she was aware she might have a claim against the University Hospital more than two years before filing this suit, she remained unaware that the Friend Center might be involved until she received a partial set of medical records on December 14, 2006, making her suit timely. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A reasonable trier of fact could find that Ms. Wallace the mother was unaware and had no reason to be aware of the Friend Center’s potential involvement in her son’s injuries until less than two years before she filed suit. View "E. Y., v. United States" on Justia Law

Beardsley was 49 years old when she fell and injured her knee. She had worked as a machine operator, assembler, inspector, and cashier. After the injury, she applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Her doctors determined that she had meniscal tears and a ruptured ligament, compounded by obesity and worsening osteoarthritis. She declined surgery but received injections for the arthritis. Dr. Banyash examined her on behalf of the Social Security Administration and opined that pain and weakness restricted her ability to walk, stand, climb stairs, crouch, and kneel, but she was capable of sedentary work. Given Beardsley’s age and skills, a finding that she was capable of only sedentary work would have qualified her as disabled at the time under the grid SSA uses for making that determination. Another agency physician subsequently judged her able to stand or walk for about six hours of an eight-hour workday. The ALJ denied benefits, finding that she could still perform a range of light work. Beardsley argued that the ALJ gave too little weight to the opinion of the examining doctor and too much weight to an erroneous view of her daily activities, particularly care she provided for her elderly mother and that the ALJ improperly held against her the decision not to seek surgery. The district court affirmed the denial of benefits. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that errors undermined the “logical bridge” between evidence and conclusion. View "Beardsley v. Colvin" on Justia Law

In 1994 Hartman’s father gave him a muzzle-loading rifle that was designed to use black powder as a propellant. The gun ignited newer, pelletized propellants erratically. In 2008, Hartman installed a kit on his gun. The kit was sold by KR Warranty, the maker of the rifle; it modified the muzzleloader and enabled it to ignite new propellants more reliably. The next day, Hartman was sighting in his “upgraded” muzzleloader when the gun unexpectedly discharged as he was trying to load it. The ramrod and a patched round ball passed through Hartman’s hands and arm, inflicting serious injury. Hartman sued KR for negligence and strict liability. The district court dismissed. Indiana has a 10-year statute of repose for products-liability actions and the gun was 14 years old. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There are exceptions to the statute, for “any reconstruction or reconditioning … which has the effect of lengthening the useful life of a product beyond what was contemplated when the product was first sold” and for situations where a manufacturer “merely … incorporat[es] a defective component into an old product.” Hartman cannot satisfy either exception. View "Hartman v. Ebsco Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

After exhausting the EEOC process, Carlson brought sex discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, against her employer, CSX, a railway company, and brought a related contract claim based on a settlement she had reached with CSX of an earlier discrimination lawsuit. CSX argued that the claims were implausible and that some were precluded by the Railway Labor Act (RLA) because they were based on company decisions justified by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The district court dismissed most of Carlson’s claims for failure to state a claim, and held that the RLA precluded the remaining claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding the allegations in her complaint ‘easily sufficient” to state claims for sex discrimination and retaliation. The RLA, which requires that claims arising under collective bargaining agreements in the railway and airline industries be decided in arbitration, does not preclude Carlson’s claims, which arise under Title VII and a private contract between Carlson and CSX. View "Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Moeser was a commercial loan officer at a Milwaukee bank and, in 2004, prepared a presentation on behalf of co-conspirator Woyan for a $790,000 construction loan. Woyan operated PARC, which planned to build townhouses. Other conspirators included the project’s manager, architect, and real estate agent. Moeser told his superiors that the project’s land would serve as collateral and that PARC would provide the land up front. The bank approved the loan. Before closing, Moeser learned that Woyan did not own the land and did not have the funds to purchase it. Rather than informing his superiors, Moeser loaned Woyan $30,500 to purchase the land; Woyan paid Moeser back, plus $15,000 in interest, using funds from the loan’s initial disbursement of $111,299. Although Moeser learned that the project was not progressing and that disbursements were being used for other purposes, he continued to deceive his superiors. The project was never completed and PARC defaulted on its loan. Three contractors and a lumber supplier were never fully paid. The bank foreclosed. Moeser was charged with bank fraud, corrupt acceptance of money, fraud of a financial institution by an employee, and making false statements during an investigation. Moeser and his co-defendants pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344. The district court gave Moeser a below-guidelines sentence of two years’ probation, which Moeser did not appeal, but found him jointly and severally liable for full restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that he should be liable for a lesser share. View "United States v. Moeser" on Justia Law

Sanchez, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1989. Sanchez is now 47, married to a lawful permanent resident, and has four children, all U.S. citizens. Sanchez sought asylum and withholding of removal and applied for special rule cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment & Central American Relief Act (NACARA), 111 Stat. 2160, 2644 and under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b), based on exceptional hardship to his children. While removal proceedings were pending, the government submitted evidence that Sanchez was not eligible for NACARA relief because he had assisted in the persecution of others while serving in the El Salvador military. Sanchez asked for a continuance. At Sanchez’s next hearing, in August 2009, Sanchez stated that he had been arrested in 2008 for leaving the scene of an accident where serious bodily injury occurred. The government argued that Sanchez’s conduct constituted a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i). Sanchez submitted a docket sheet showing that he was charged with a Class D felony, although the court entered the conviction as a misdemeanor and imposed a sentence of 365 days in jail with 363 days suspended. Sanchez claimed that, because of weather conditions, he thought that he had merely hit “a post or a small object” and only learned that he had hit a person when police arrived at his residence the next day. The IJ ordered removal; the BIA dismissed an appeal. The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that the Board did not properly conduct the three-step inquiry prescribed in Matter of Silva-Trevino. View "Sanchez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Following the 2010 census, and pursuant to state law, Chicago sought to reapportion its 50 aldermanic wards, 65 ILCS 20/21-36. The City Council conducted hearings to solicit the views of citizens and, in 2012, approved the redistricting plan by a vote of 41 to eight. Chicago’s population was 2,695,598, which, if divided equally, would result in 53,912 people in each ward. The wards created by the new map deviate from the average population per ward by a maximum of 8.7 percent. Objectors alleged that the new map was implemented prematurely and deprived constituents of their right to equal protection; that the maximum deviation of 8.7 percent violated the Equal Protection Clause; that the map was arbitrary; that it politically discriminated against “independent” aldermen; and that it departed from traditional redistricting criteria. The district court dismissed, finding that the objectors had not alleged permanent disenfranchisement nor a change to election law and had failed to establish prima facie unconstitutionality because a maximum population deviation below 10 percent is considered minor. The complaint did not allege that the map targeted an objectively defined group. The map preserved the voting rights of minorities; disfavoring certain aldermen over others is an inherent part of the political process and an inevitable result of redistricting. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "League of Women Voters of Chicago v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Shuffle makes consumer grade automatic card-shuffling equipment. Wolff distributes casino grade gaming equipment. In 2010 the two signed a letter of intent that Shuffle, with financial assistance from Wolff, would develop casino-grade shuffling equipment, and Wolff would become its exclusive distributor. Before development of the new equipment was completed, Shuffle ended the relationship and sought a declaratory judgment that the agreement was not an enforceable contract. Wolff counterclaimed, claiming breach of contract, fraud, and unjust enrichment. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of Shuffle with respect both to its claim for declaratory relief and to Wolff’s counterclaims, essentially rescinding the agreement. In its complaint, Shuffle acknowledged that it would have to return $124,940 earnest money to Wolff, but the order failed to mention the earnest money. Shuffle ignored Wolff’s request for a refund. Wolff moved, under FRCP 60, that the court order Shuffle to refund the money. The judge entered a post-judgment order requiring the refund, without mentioning Rule 60 or any other ground for amendment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that “if the flaw lies in the translation of the original meaning to the judgment, then Rule 60(a) allows a correction.” The correction just made explicit what the parties must have assumed; that with the draft agreement rescinded the earnest money had to be returned. View "Shuffle Tech Int'l, LLC v. Wolff Gaming, Inc." on Justia Law