Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Madden had almost reached the railroad crossing when her car stalled. She re‐started it and drove onto the crossing; the car stalled again. The crossing gates began to descend, the warning lights began flashing, and the crossing bells sounded. Madden tried to restart her car, according to witnesses, and another driver got out of his car and started walking toward the crossing. He saw Madden open her car door when the train was only 45 to 50 yards from the crossing, and start to run. The train struck the car, pushing it against her, causing fatal injuries. Her estate sued the railroad, claiming that the crossing gates had descended, the warning lights had begun flashing, and the locomotive horn had been blown, all fewer than 20 seconds before the train reached the crossing, in violation of federal safety regulations, 49 C.F.R. 222.21(b)(2), 234.225. The district court entered judgment in favor of the railroad. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that neither “the children’s testimony, reflecting their incompetent efforts to reconstruct the accident, nor the experts’ worthless evidence, nor both bodies of evidence combined (0 + 0 = 0), would enable a reasonable jury to infer negligence on the part of the railroad. View "Nunez v. BNSF Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Almy lives in Indiana. He began working for Kickert School Bus Line in 2000, at a terminal located in Illinois. He picked up children at private schools in Illinois and took them to homes in Indiana, drove charter trips for Illinois schools, and would occasionally pick up children at Illinois schools and drive them to Indiana. Almy believed that Kickert was under-paying him because, under the collective bargaining agreement, he did not receive a higher hourly rate of pay for overtime, even though he worked more than 40 hours per week; he was not paid for the 20 minutes it took him to prepare his bus each morning or for time required for fueling, cleaning, and paperwork; and was not paid during charter trips for time it took to drive the empty bus to the school and then back to the bus terminal. Kickert began providing overtime pay in 2008. Almy sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act for back pay. The district court entered summary judgment for his former employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, based on an exemption from overtime provisions for interstate drivers whose maximum hours are regulated by the Department of Transportation, 29 U.S.C. 213(b)(1). View "Almy v. Kickert Sch. Bus Line, Inc" on Justia Law

The Federal Highway Administration and the Indiana Department of Transportation decided to complete an Indiana segment of I-69, which will eventually run from Canada to Mexico. Environmentalists opposed the route and sued under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1344, which authorizes the Army Corps of Engineers to issue permits for discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters of the United States. A permit will be denied if there is “a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge which would have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem,” 40 C.F.R. 230.10(a), or if the discharge “would be contrary to the public interest.” 33 C.F.R. 320.4(a)(1). The permit at issue allows six streams to be filled where the highway crosses them and permits destruction of wetlands. The environmentalists proposed, in the alternative, simply upgrading to federal interstate highway standards, and existing route. In an environmental impact statement, the Corps concluded that no less environmentally damaging alternative was practicable, that the project was not contrary to the public interest, that damage to wetlands would be modest and would be offset by creation of new wetlands. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the environmental analysis. View "Hoosier Envtl. Council, v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

A 1952 collective bargaining agreement still governs aspects of the employment of some members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen, including the attendance and leave policy. In 2003 the Union Pacific Railroad adopted a new attendance policy. The union demanded arbitration under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 153, arguing that the new attendance policy conflicted with the 1952 agreement. An arbitrator found that the 2003 attendance policy did not conflict with the 1952 agreement. The union sought to vacate the arbitration award. The district court granted summary judgment against the union. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed his jurisdiction in interpreting the 1952 agreement. View "Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Binns was driving a truck on an interstate highway, transporting parts on behalf of U.S. Xpress. Binns was in the center lane negotiating a curve when he saw, in his mirror, a motorcycle sliding down the right lane. After pulling over, Binns ran back to find Betty Jordan lying on the pavement. She ultimately lost both legs below the knee. According to Binns, Betty repeatedly said, “it’s not his fault. It’s my fault.” Betty has no recollection of these statements or of seeing Binns. Binns relayed Betty’s statements to U.S. Xpress claims manager Bukovitz, State Trooper Litt, and insurance adjuster Niles; each of them testified to that effect at trial. Ted, who had been notified of his wife’s accident, had arrived on the scene and introduced himself to Binns. Binns testified that Ted said that Betty stated it was not Binns’s fault. Litt testified that Ted told him that Betty had said that the accident was her fault. Niles also testified that Ted told him that Betty said the accident was her fault. Ted denied the testimony. A jury returned a defense verdict. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the court erred in admitting certain evidence, the error was harmless in light of expert testimony that Binns could not have caused the accident. View "Jordan v. Binns" on Justia Law

The railroad fired a locomotive engineer, Narron. The union filed a grievance, which eventually came before the National Railroad Adjustment Board, which ordered the railroad to reinstate Narron with back pay but authorized the railroad to offset the back pay by any earnings that he had obtained between his firing and his reinstatement. The union filed a petition in the district court challenging that part of the award. The district judge remanded for determination of whether Narron had had any such earnings and ordered the earnings-offset provision vacated. The Seventh Circuit vacated the order, holding that the district court exceeded its authority. A district court may set aside a Board order only “for failure of the division to comply with the requirements of [the Railway Labor Act]” or “to conform, or confine itself, to matters within the scope of the division’s jurisdiction,” or “for fraud or corruption by a member of the division,” 45 U.S.C. 153. View "Bhd of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainment v. Union Pac. R.R. Co." on Justia Law

Illini Concrete formally ceased doing business in October 2009 and sold certain of its assets, including delivery trucks, to Kienstra. The Teamsters Local Union, which represents concrete mixer drivers and others employed by Illini and then by Kienstra, alleged that Kienstra laid off 14employees, declined to make good on Illini’s unfunded liability to its employees’ union pension fund, subcontracted work to competitors to avoid hiring back union employees,and refused to hear grievances regarding the asset sale and its effect on the employees. The Union claimed that the asset sale was a ruse to allow Illini to evade obligations under its collective bargaining agreement and sought a declaration that Kienstra is Illini’s alter ego, bound by the CBA. The district court denied motions to compel arbitration. Kienstra and Illini Concrete filed an interlocutory appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction, citing the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, which states that “nothing [in the FAA] shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” View "Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 50 v. Kienstra Precast, LLC" on Justia Law

Lynch was injured while working at a jobsite as a mechanic for Metropolitan Rail (Metra), when the top rail of a chain-link fence he was installing fell and struck him on the back of his neck and shoulders. In his suit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Metra. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that Lynch adequately raised material issues of fact concerning whether Metra was negligent. View "Lynch v. NE Reg'l Commuter R.R.Corp." on Justia Law

The company, S.C. Johnson & Son, was injured by a bribery and kickback scheme involving a dishonest employee and transportation companies with which it had contracts and filed a tort lawsuit in Wisconsin state court. The company filed a second suit, against different transportation defendants, in federal court, based on diversity jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the suit, which raised state law claims of fraudulent misrepresentation by omission; criminal conspiracy to violate Wisconsin’s bribery statute, Wis. Stat. 134.05; conspiracy to commit fraud; violations of the Wisconsin Organized Crime Control Act, Wis. Stat. 946.80, through racketeering activity and mail and wire fraud; and aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty by providing bribes and kickbacks. The court indicated that federal law preempted state tort claims because they could have “the force and effect of a law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1). The Seventh Circuit reversed. A claim for fraudulent misrepresentation was properly dismissed, but theories based on bribery and kickbacks fall outside the scope of the preemption provision. View "SC Johnson & Son Inc. v. Transp. Corp. of Am., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005, a Union Pacific train derailed in Oklahoma causing extensive damage to both the railroad and the train’s cargo. Kawasaki, K-Line, and Union Pacific sought damages, alleging that Plano’s steel injection molds were improperly packed, broke through their crate, and fell onto the track. The district court granted Plano summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Negligence claims were properly rejected, Plano had no indication that the parties with which it dealt would be unable to properly package and transport its steel molds from China to the United States, nor did Plano have any special knowledge of any unique danger the molds would pose during transit. Plano owed no special duty of care to the carriers. There were, however, unresolved questions of fact material to the determination of one contract claim, based on a bill of lading. It was unclear whether Plano or another arranged the molds’ shipment. View "Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. v. Plano Molding Co." on Justia Law