Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Tax Law
by
Eagan, Minnesota, assisted in apprehending Procknow, who had absconded while serving supervised release imposed by a Wisconsin state court for forgery. Authorities had received information that Procknow and his girlfriend were staying at an Eagan hotel. The girlfriend was registered at the hotel. Officers spotted Procknow’s car, chased Procknow through the lobby, and arrested him. Through the windows of Procknow’s car, they saw a scanner or copier. Learning of the arrests, the hotel manager stated that the their stay was being terminated and asked the officers to collect a dog, believed to be in their room and ensure that there were no other occupants. Officers knocked, and announced. No one answered, so they used a hotel key and found a dog. Entering to ensure that there were no other occupants, officers saw, in plain view, an electric typewriter, a credit card issued in the name of “Smith,” and financial forms bearing various names and social security numbers. Officer photographed the room, sealed it, and obtained search warrants for the room and car. They seized blank W‐2 forms, partially completed tax forms, lists of business employer identification numbers, and prepaid debit cards (tax refunds) in the names of different people. Further investigation revealed that Procknow had obtained the personal identifying information of at least 40 individuals, which he used to file fraudulent tax returns and claim refunds. Procknow pleaded guilty to theft of government money and aggravated identify theft. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained by the warrantless entry into the hotel room and evidence obtained by grand jury subpoena following the withdrawal of IRS administrative summonses requesting the same information. View "United States v. Procknow" on Justia Law

by
Curtis, a lawyer, filed 1996-1997 returns reporting tax obligations of $218,983 and $248,236, but made no payments. His partner had taken $600,000 from the practice and declared bankruptcy; Curtis underwent an expensive divorce. Curtis failed to file a return for 1998. Curtis entered into an installment agreement. He filed a return for 2000 but failed to pay $90,000. He entered into a second agreement, but filed returns for 2003 and 2004 reflecting unpaid tax liabilities of $176,802 and $61,000. Curtis did not make estimated payments and stopped making installment payments. He filed returns for 2007, 2008 and 2009, but paid nothing. Curtis was charged with misdemeanor willfully failing to pay taxes owed for 2007, 2008 and 2009, 26 U.S.C. 7203. The court allowed evidence under Rule 404(b), of Curtis’s history of failing to pay his taxes and his withdrawals of money from his law practice for personal expenses. Curtis did not object, but objected to the government’s proposed evidence that he failed to pay payroll taxes for his employees in 2013, arguing that any violations after the charged years did not bear on his state of mind during the time of the charged offenses. Although the court gave Curtis’s proposed instruction on good faith, it declined to modify the pattern instruction to include a requirement for bad motive, with respect to willfulness. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his convictions. View "United States v. Curtis" on Justia Law

by
The Internal Revenue Service determined that Gyorgy (who did not file tax returns 2001-2007) owed approximately $100,000 in unpaid income taxes, penalties, and interest for tax years 2002 and 2003. The IRS mailed notices of his deficiencies in 2006 and 2007, including demands for payment, to the address on his most recently filed tax return. But Gyorgy no longer lived there and did not receive the notices. More than two years later, his debts were still outstanding, so the IRS filed notice of a federal tax lien on his property. Gyorgy challenged the action in a collection due process (CDP) hearing before the IRS Office of Appeals, which sustained the IRS’s filing of the lien notice, findings that the IRS properly mailed Gyorgy’s deficiency notices under I.R.C. 6212(b)(1) before filing the lien and correctly determined his underlying tax liabilities. The tax court and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Gyorgy presented no arguments and no evidence before the tax court to challenge the IRS’s calculation of the taxes and penalties he owes. View "Gyorgy v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Posted in: Tax Law
by
When the dude ranch owned by a closely held Wisconsin corporation was sold, the shareholders planned to liquidate, but the asset sale had produced a sizable capital ($1.8 million) gain and the corporation faced significant federal and state tax liability. Midcoast proposed an intricate tax-avoidance transaction that involved Midcoast purchasing shares for offset against bad debts and losses purchased from credit card companies, purportedly financing the purchases with a loan. The shareholders implemented the plan. The taxes were never paid. The IRS sought to hold the former shareholders responsible for the tax debt as transferees of the defunct corporation under 28 U.S.C. 6901 and Wisconsin law of fraudulent transfer and corporate dissolution. The tax court ruled in favor of the IRS. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the tax court that the substance of the transaction was a liquidation. Midcoast did not actually pay the shareholders for their stock; instead, each shareholder received a pro rata distribution of cash on hand— the proceeds of the asset sale—making them “transferees” as that term is broadly defined in section 6901(h). View "Dugan v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

by
In opening and closing arguments during his trial on three counts of tax evasion for failing to pay almost $239,400 in income tax between 2005 and 2007, 26 U.S.C. 7201, Stuart’s attorney argued that he believed he owed no taxes. Stuart thought that the United States had no authority to tax income. Stuart had adopted these views after reading a book called “Cracking the Code,” which urges people to resist paying income taxes, but his counsel told the jury that Stuart learned his ideas from his fellow church patrons. Counsel described Stuart as a curious, determined, and “kooky, not criminal” person. Only after he received no response to his inquiries from the IRS, the Secretary of the Treasury, or his accountants about his tax ideas, counsel stated, did Stuart begin to refrain from paying income tax. His attorney did not call any witnesses; Stuart did not testify and the jury found him guilty. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "United States v. Stuart" on Justia Law

by
FFRF, a Wisconsin-based organization of atheists and agnostics, gives its co-presidents housing allowances. They paid income tax on that portion of their salaries. Neither sought to exclude this income on their tax returns and neither has claimed a refund. FFRF and the co-presidents challenged the parsonage exemption, 26 U.S.C. 107, which allows a minister to receive tax-free housing from his church, whether by giving the minister access to a church-owned residence or by giving the minister an allowance to obtain housing. Plaintiffs conceded that they lacked standing to challenge section 107(1), covering in-kind housing, but argued that they had standing to challenge section 107(2), which applies to rental allowances. The district court agreed and held that the subsection is an unconstitutional establishment of religion under the First Amendment. The Seventh Circuit vacated with instructions to dismiss. A person suffers no judicially cognizable injury merely because others receive a tax benefit that is conditioned on allegedly unconstitutional criteria, even if that person is otherwise “similarly situated” to those who receive the benefit. Only a person that has been denied such a benefit can be deemed to have suffered a cognizable injury. The plaintiffs were not denied the parsonage exemption. View "Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Lew" on Justia Law

by
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act requires almost everyone to have health insurance and is enforced by a tax that most businesses must pay if they fail to provide insurance as a benefit, or that anyone not covered by an employer’s plan must pay in lieu of purchasing insurance, 26 U.S.C.4980H, 5000A. The Internal Revenue Service has stated that it will collect the tax in 2014 from uninsured persons, but not from certain businesses. Plaintiffs, a physician and an association of physicians, claimed violation of the separation of powers and the Tenth Amendment. Because they did not complain about their own taxes, the district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rejecting an argument that the challenged policies change demand for plaintiffs’ services, the court noted that plaintiffs “appear to believe” that insurance is free to workers--that wages do not adjust to reflect pensions, insurance, and other benefits. By the same logic, they could litigate any tax policy. In a market economy everything is connected to everything else through the price system. To allow a long, intermediated chain of effects to establish standing is to abolish the standing requirement. The Constitution’s structural features are not open to litigation by persons who do not suffer particularized injuries. Plaintiffs, who do not accept insured patients, want to reduce, not increase the number of persons who carry health insurance. Someone else would be more appropriate to argue that the IRS has not done what it should to accomplish the statute’s goal of universal coverage.View "Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Koskinen" on Justia Law

by
Illinois legalized riverboat casino gambling in 1990. Since then, the state’s once‐thriving horseracing industry has declined. In 2006 and 2008, former Governor Blagojevich signed into law two bills that imposed a tax on in‐state casinos of 3% of their revenue and placed the funds into a trust for the benefit of the horseracing industry. Casinos filed suit under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1964, alleging that defendants, members of the horseracing industry, bribed the governor. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the racetracks, finding sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that there was a pattern of racketeering activity; that a jury could find the existence of an enterprise‐in‐fact, consisting of Blagojevich, his associates, and others; sufficient evidence that the defendants bribed Blagojevich to secure his signature on the 2008 Act; but that the casinos could not show that the alleged bribes proximately caused their injury. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, there was enough to survive summary judgment on the claim that the governor agreed to sign the Act in exchange for a bribe. View "Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Johnston" on Justia Law

by
The government sued to enforce tax assessments against the Zabkas and tax liens against their property and against property of partnerships to which they had transferred assets. The district court ruled that the assessments (several million dollars) were valid and that, when the IRS made the assessments, the liens had attached to all the Zabkas’ personal property and to all their rights to property, including their ownership interests in the partnerships. The government sought appointment of a receiver. The court denied motions to reconsider calculation of the unpaid assessments, and directed the clerk to enter judgment. The order is captioned “Judgment in a civil case” and states: “Judgment is entered in favor of the Plaintiff.” The docket entry adds: “CASE TERMINATED.” The Zabkas appealed. The Zabkas filed another appeal from a subsequent order, which directed the government to propose a receiver. The judge ordered appointment of the receiver proposed by the government. The defendants appealed that order. They later appealed approval of property sales by the receiver and an order awarding interim compensation to the receiver. The Seventh Circuit concluded that it had jurisdiction only over the appeal from the appointment of the receiver and affirmed that order, which was the last order in the first proceeding and so completed that proceeding. View "United States v. Zabka" on Justia Law

by
ABA Retirement, a not‐for‐profit corporation created by the American Bar Association to provide its members and their employees with a retirement plan qualified to take advantage of income tax benefits, created master retirement plans for adoption by lawyers and law firms. In 1999 ABA Retirement hired State Street Bank to act as sole Plan trustee. ABA Retirement directors ceased to be trustees. ABA Retirement still maintained the IRS‐approved master tax‐qualified retirement plans and acted as Plan fiduciary, with authority to engage, monitor, and fire its trustee. It was responsible for Plan documents (ensuring that they were tax‐qualified), oversight of vendors, contract negotiations, and approval of State Street’s marketing plan. State Street had authority to engage and fire investment advisors, but was required to consult with ABA Retirement. The Plan paid ABA Retirement a fee for its services in connection with the Program based on a percentage of l invested assets. ABA Retirement received the interest on the funds. In 2000, 2001, and 2002, ABA Retirement reported gross income of $1,601,217 to $1,861,258. Its taxable income for those years was $384,972 to $672,098; it held assets worth $3.5 million. On tax returns ABA Retirement described itself as an employee benefit fund, and its product as retirement plans. In 2004 ABA retirement sought tax‐exempt status. In 2005, the IRS determined that ABA Retirement did not qualify for the exemption. ABA Retirement filed claims for refunds on taxes it paid from 2000-2002; those were denied. ABA Retirement filed suit, arguing that it was a tax‐exempt “business league” under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6), from 2000 to 2002, and entitled to a refund. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "ABA Ret. Funds v. United States" on Justia Law