Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Taxpayer, having challenged a penalty in a pre-assessment hearing, may not again contest its liability in a CDP hearing. The employer had an employee‐benefit plan with one employee-participant and took tax deductions for its payments into the plan. The employee claimed no income. The IRS proposed a section 6707A penalty for the company’s failure to report its participation in the plan; deficiency penalties; a section 6662(a) penalty, for making a substantial understatement and acting with negligence or disregard of the rules or regulations; and a section 6662A penalty, for making an understatement related to a reportable transaction that was disclosed inadequately. An appeals officer sustained a $200,000 penalty. After the IRS assessed the penalty and issued a final notice of intent to levy, the company requested a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing. An appeals officer reviewed transcripts from the earlier pre-assessment hearing and determined that the Appeals Office had already considered a liability challenge to the same penalty, so that section 6330(c)(2)(B) precluded another liability challenge. The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the government. Under section 6330(c)(4)(A)’s plain language, because the company raised the issue of its liability in a prior hearing before the Appeals Office, and participated meaningfully in that hearing, the company could not contest its liability again in its CDP hearing. View "Our Country Home Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Musa owns and operates a restaurant in Milwaukee. The IRS determined that Musa made misrepresentations on his tax returns, including underreporting his federal income taxes by more than $500,000 for the years 2006-2010. The Tax Court upheld that determination, plus a civil fraud penalty of more than $380,000. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting, as “heavy on chutzpah but light on reasoning or any sense of basic fairness,” Musa’s argument that after his fraud was discovered, the Commissioner should have allowed him additional deductions on his individual tax returns based on amended employment tax returns in which Musa had corrected earlier false underreporting of wages. The court noted that he made those corrections after the statute of limitations had run on the Commissioner’s ability to collect the correct amounts of employment taxes that Musa’s amended returns admitted were due. The court also rejected Musa’s argument that the Tax Court erred by permitting the Commissioner to amend his answer to add the affirmative defense of the duty of consistency under tax law, and then erred by granting partial summary judgment to the Commissioner on that defense. View "Musa v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Medical College of Wisconsin, a nonprofit corporation, received a refund of Social Security (FICA) taxes after the IRS ruled that medical residents were exempt from them until April 2005. The IRS added to the refund approximately $13 million in interest but later demanded $6.7 million back, claiming to have used too high a rate. Medical College returned the money and filed suit under 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1), asking to have the disputed sum restored. The district court and Seventh Circuit denied the request, rejecting Medical College’s argument that, under 26 U.S.C. 6621, a nonprofit is not the sort of corporation to which a lower rate in paragraph (a)(1)(B) refers. View "Medical College of Wisconsin v. United States" on Justia Law

After the IRS assessed tax deficiencies and penalties, the taxpayers filed a pro se petition for review. Acting on advice from Niehus, a lawyer who was not authorized to practice in Illinois, the couple stipulated that only half of the tax relief they sought was appropriate. Upon discovering that Niehus was not a member of the Illinois bar, they asked the court to set aside the stipulation. The Tax Court refused and entered judgment against the couple. On remand, with the couple represented by a CPA, Drobny, who was authorized to practice before the Tax Court, the court held that the couple had not been prejudiced by Niehus’s ineligibility to practice and that the advice he had given them had been valid. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Niehus provided “competent, valuable, diligent, and effective” assistance, and noting that there is no right to counsel in a Tax Court proceeding. View "Shamrock v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Bey, a self-described “Aboriginal Indigenous Moorish-American,” sought to enjoin state and county officials from taxing his Marion County real estate, a refund of taxes he has paid, and $11.5 billion in compensation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, rejecting Bey’s claim to be a “sovereign citizen” who cannot lawfully be taxed by Indiana or its subdivisions in the absence of a contract between them and him. The court explored the history of the “sovereign citizen” movement and its connection to some members the Moorish Science Temple of America (MSTA). Proponents argue, “without any basis in fact,” that as a result of eighteenth-century treaties the United States has no jurisdiction over its Moorish inhabitants, who are therefore under no obligation to pay taxes. Bey “is a U.S. citizen and therefore unlike foreign diplomats has no immunity from U.S. law … his suit is frivolous and … he was lucky to be spared sanctions.” View "Bey v. Indiana" on Justia Law

Tilden received an IRS notice of deficiency covering his tax years 2005, 2010, 2011, and 2012. The last day to seek review (26 U.S.C. 6213(a)) was April 21, 2015. The Tax Court received Tilden’s petition on April 29, 2015, and dismissed it as untimely. Although section 6213(a) requires petitions to be filed within 90 days, 26 U.S.C. 7502(a) makes the date of the postmark dispositive. Tilden’s lawyer’s staff did not put a stamp on the envelope, and the Postal Service did not apply a postmark. Staff purchased postage from Stamps.com, which supplies print‑at-home postage. The purchase was dated April 21, 2015, and a staff member states that she delivered the envelope to the Postal Service on that date. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the IRS properly conceded error. The parties cannot stipulate to jurisdiction, but can stipulate to facts underlying jurisdiction. The court expressed "astonishment" at the law firm's risk-taking. View "Tilden v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Micrins Surgical went out of business in 2009, without paying all of its taxes. Eriem Surgical was incorporated the same day, purchased Micrins’ inventory, took over its office space, hired its employees, used its website and phone number, and pursued the same line of business, selling surgical instruments. Teitz, the president and 40% owner of Micrins, continued to play a leading role in Eriem, though its sole stockholder is Teitz’s wife. Eriem uses “Micrins” as a trademark. The IRS treated Eriem as a continuation of Micrins and collected almost $400,000 of Micrins’ taxes from Eriem’s bank accounts and receivables. Eriem filed wrongful levy suit, 26 U.S.C. 7426(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of the IRS, concluding that Eriem is a continuation of Micrins. The Supreme Court has never decided whether state or federal law governs corporate successorship when the dispute concerns debts to the national government; the Internal Revenue Code says nothing about corporate successorship. Illinois law uses a multi‐factor balancing standard to determine successorship. Rejecting an argument that the change in ownership should be dispositive, the court upheld the district court’s conclusion that Mrs. Teitz serves is proxy for her husband, so that there has not been a complete change of ownership. View "Eriem Surgical, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2014, the IRS attempted to collect $244,464 in unpaid taxes and penalties from Adolphson for tax years 2002 and 2006-2010. Adolphson claims he was unaware of the IRS’s collection efforts until the agency levied on his funds held by third parties (26 U.S.C. 6330). Rather than challenge the levies with the IRS, Adolphson filed a pro se petition, asking the tax court to enjoin the collection efforts and refund amounts already collected. Adolphson argued that the IRS had not mailed him the required Final Notice of Intent to Levy, so that he was deprived of a “collection due process hearing” (CDP) before the IRS Office of Appeals. Adolphson cited tax court decisions in which the tax court asserted that it lacked jurisdiction without an IRS notice of determination, yet nevertheless invalidated levies after finding that the taxpayer was prevented from requesting a CDP by failure to mail a Final Notice to the proper address. The IRS was unable to say “with certainty” whether the Final Notices were sent to proper addresses. Exhibits corroborated the dates on which the Final Notices were issued but did not show where the notices were mailed. The tax court dismissed, reasoning that it lacked authority to grant relief without a notice of determination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While Adolphson’s case is indistinguishable from the tax court precedent he cited, those decisions were unsound and reflect an improper extension of the tax court’s jurisdiction. View "Adolphson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

In 2012, the City of Country Club Hills City Council adopted an ordinance that provided to homeowners a 25 percent rebate of 2010 city property taxes paid in 2011, subject to the completion of an application by the homeowner and approval by the City Clerk. This was the city’s twelfth consecutive year of offering a rebate program. The application stated that the “FILING OF THIS APPLICATION DOES NOT GUARANTEE APPROVAL BY THE CITY OF COUNTRY CLUB HILLS.” The city prepared the rebate checks but never distributed them. In 2012, the Cook County treasurer overpaid the city by more than $6 million. The county successfully sued to collect the overpayment. Bell filed a purported class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that refusal to issue the rebates amounted to an unconstitutional taking and asserting state law claims for conversion and unjust enrichment. The City Council then repealed the 2012 ordinance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, agreeing that Bell had no constitutionally protected property interest in the expectation of a rebate, and that she had adequate state court remedies for her claims under state law. View "Bell v. City of Country Club Hills" on Justia Law

Michael and Christine Wu each have an individual retirement account (IRA); each contributed $200,000 after selling their home in 2007. For that tax year their maximum allowable deduction for IRA contributions was $4,000, and “excess contributions” incur a tax of up to 6% annually until withdrawn. 26 U.S.C. 219(b)(1), (b)(5)(A), 4973(a), (b). The Wus realized their mistake in 2010, informed the IRS, and corrected the problem by withdrawing the excesses from their accounts. The Wus paid the taxes for 2007-2009, and although they conceded liability for the first two years, they each sought a refund for tax year 2009, arguing that they had avoided incurring taxes for that year by adjusting the IRA account balances before the April 2010 filing deadline for their 2009 tax return. The IRS rejected this contention. The Wus filed suit under 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(1). The district court and Seventh Circuit agreed with the government. Under section 4973(b), the consequence of taking a qualifying distribution under section 408(d)(4) is that the amount of the withdrawal “shall be treated as an amount not contributed,” but the Wus were not asking that their 2007 contributions be treated as if they were never contributed; they asked that those contributions be eliminated from the calculation for 2009 alone. View "Wu v. United States" on Justia Law